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INTRODUCTION
In recent years, U.S. corporations have become concerned about
the misappropriation of trade secrets.1  Civil trade secret litigation has
grown enormously over the last two decades, and trade secret law has
become more popular among legal practitioners.2  In light of these
concerns, Congress passed the comprehensive Economic Espionage
Act of 1996 (“EEA”)3 which makes certain misappropriations of trade
secrets federal felonies.4  Increased access to information through
computers and the Internet has heightened concerns regarding the
international pilfering of U.S. corporate trade secrets.5
Congress has primarily focused on cases of industrial espionage
                                                 
1. See Thomas P. Heed, Comment, Misappropriation of Trade Secrets:  The Last Civil RICO
Cause of Action That Works, 30 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 207, 210-11 (1996) (stating that between 1985
and 1994, reported incidents of misappropriated trade secrets rose 260% and tripled from
1993-1995).
2. See Suellen Lowry, Note, Inevitable Disclosure Trade Secret Disputes:  Dissolutions of
Concurrent Property Interests, 40 STAN. L. REV. 519, 519 (1988) (noting that “trade secret litigation
is burgeoning”).
3. See Economic Espionage Act of 1996 § 101(a), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831-1839 (Supp. 1997).
4. See id. §§ 1831-1832 (providing for individual fines of up to $500,000 and
imprisonment for up to 15 years, as well as organizational fines of up to $10,000,000 for
violations of the Act).
5. See Marc S. Friedman & Kristin Bissinger, “Infojacking”:  Crimes on the Information
Superhighway, J. PROPRIETARY RTS., May 1997, at 2, 5-6 (describing the EEA as one response to
the increasing concern over computer-related theft of trade secrets).
involving foreign agents and corrupt employees.6  A more subtle,
long-term trend, however, is the growth in civil litigation over the
unintentional, or even inevitable, transfer or disclosure of employers’
trade secrets by former employees to their new employers.
Employers have argued that under certain conditions, employees
who leave an employer to work for a competitor will inevitably,
inappropriately, and thus illegally disclose or use their former
employers’ trade secrets in the course of their new employment.7
Former employers of key employees have raised this argument,
known as “inevitable misappropriation,” in support of motions to
enjoin employees from working for competitors.8  These employer-
plaintiffs have brought suit under common law as well as state law
versions of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (“UTSA”).9
Over the last thirty years, a growing number of federal and state
courts have wrestled with employers’ concerns regarding the
disclosure of trade secrets in an attempt to develop a coherent
approach to the doctrine of inevitable misappropriation.10
                                                 
6. See Spencer Simon, The Economic Espionage Act, 13 BERKELEY  TECH. L.J. 305, 309 (1998)
(contending that federal legislation is necessary to combat the growing scourge of economic
espionage by both domestic and foreign agents); Robert L. Tucker, Industrial Espionage as Unfair
Competition, 29 U. TOL. L. REV. 245, 246 (1998) (commenting on the increasing number of
American companies subject to industrial espionage sponsored by foreign governments);
Darren S. Tucker, Note, The Federal Government’s War on Economic Espionage, 18 U. PA. J. INT’L
ECON. L. 1109, 1142 (1997) (suggesting that one of the main purposes of the EEA is to combat
foreign trade secret theft); see also, e.g., FBI Charges Taiwanese Tried to Steal Taxol Trade Secrets from
BMS, 1998 Andrews Intell. Prop. Litig. Rep. (Andrews Publications) 3  (June 18, 1997)
(reporting the first indictments of international trade secret theft under the EEA involving
Taiwanese nationals attempting to buy anti-cancer drug production secrets from an executive
posing as a “corrupt [company] scientist”); Louis Lavelle, Spies and Spy Catchers; Espionage Thrives
in Business World, RECORD (Bergen County, N.J.), Sept. 6, 1998, at A1 (reporting that five
prosecutions of international agents have taken place under the EEA as of September 1998).
7. See, e.g., PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262, 1272 (7th Cir. 1995) (upholding an
injunction against the employment of a beverage company employee by a competitor on the
grounds that the employee would inevitably disclose the former company’s trade secrets
through the course of similar employment with the latter company); Norand Corp. v. Parkin,
785 F. Supp. 1353, 1356 (N.D. Iowa 1990) (providing a temporary restraining order on the basis
of threatened or inevitable misappropriation).
8. See PepsiCo, 54 F.3d at 1268.
9. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 2(a) (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 433-67 (Supp. 1998).
The Uniform Trade Secrets Act has been passed by 40 states and the District of Columbia.  See
James H.A. Pooley et al., Understanding the Economic Espionage Act of 1996, 5  TEX. INTELL. PROP.
L.J. 177, 187 n.64 (1997) (observing that although 40 states and the District of Columbia have
adopted the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, some states have modified it); see also Roy E. Thoman,
Book Review, 22 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 695, 695 (1997) (reviewing MICHAEL CRAIG
BUDDEN, PROTECTING TRADE SECRETS UNDER THE UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT:  PRACTICAL
ADVICE FOR EXECUTIVES (1996)).  The extent of the courts’ application of the inevitable
misappropriation doctrine is detailed in Part I.B.
10. Compare IDS Life Ins. Co. v. Sunamerica, Inc., 958 F. Supp. 1258, 1282 (N.D. Ill. 1997)
(granting an injunction to prevent a defendant corporation from hiring a former employee of
plaintiff in order to prevent the misappropriation of plaintiff’s trade secrets), aff’d in part,
Unfortunately, the result has been an inconsistent, unpredictable and
undesirable patchwork of legal standards that appears both
inequitable and inefficient.  Currently, the courts use four different
approaches to determine inevitability, each of which suffers from its
own specific limitations,11 as well as from an excessively narrow focus
on the employers’ property interests which undervalues employees’
interests.12  In addition, the courts’ general all-or-nothing approach to
remedies often results in inconsistent, crude, and unduly harsh
outcomes for both employees and employers, and creates an overall
pro-employer bias.13  The combination of these conflicting
methodologies and crude remedies threatens the coherence of trade
secrets law, general economic efficiency, and specific fundamental
employee interests.14
Unfortunately, existing proposals to change the current system
suffer from their own limitations.  First, academic proposals that
totally abandon or wholly embrace the inevitable misappropriation
doctrine are too extreme—each threatens to underprotect some set
of important employer or employee interests.15  Second, although
recognizing employers’ and employees’ joint or concurrent property
interests in trade secrets would account for both the employers’
interests in property and the employees’ interests in employment,
this divided property interest approach would result in valuation and
efficiency problems as well as disrupt the current ownership system
for trade secrets.16
This Article argues that the correct approach to the doctrine of the
inevitable misappropriation of trade secrets requires a fundamental
shift in perspective.  Rather than following the path of the last thirty
years or adopting the suggestions of the last few years, the correct
approach to the modern doctrine of inevitable misappropriation
should be derived from the ancient property law of accession.
Accession law, developed before Blackstone’s time,17 allocates
interests in personal property that are created by a combination of
different parties’ properties or the transformation of one person’s
property into something else by another.18  Instead of treating
employers’ and employees’ property interests separately and
balancing them against each other or weighing concurrent property
                                                 
vacated in part, 136 F.3d 537 (7th Cir. 1998), with Engineering Assocs., Inc. v. Pankow, 150
S.E.2d 56, 59 (N.C. 1966) (denying an injunction and affirming former employees’ rights to all
knowledge and skill acquired during their tenure with former employers).  For a more
comprehensive list of cases and courts, see infra notes 46-51.
11. See discussion infra Part II.A.1.
12. See discussion infra Part II.A.2.
13. See discussion infra Part II.A.3.
14. See discussion infra Part II.A.4.
15. See discussion infra Part II.B.1.
16. See discussion infra Part II.B.2.
17. See 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *404-07.
18. See id. (commenting that Roman law recognized that if an object received an accession,
naturally or artificially, then the original owner of the object was entitled to the improvement
unless the object itself was changed, such as making wine out of grapes).
interests in trade secrets, this Article argues that the doctrine of
inevitable misappropriation should actually be understood as
allocating the interests in a combined or transformed “property”
consisting of employees themselves and their future employment.19
Under this reasoning, the misappropriation doctrine can be seen as
determining the control of employees themselves as a combined or
transformed “property” made up of both:  (1) the employers’ trade
secrets, and (2) the employees’ human capital and fundamental
rights to work and choose their employment.  Thus, unlike current
approaches, an accession law approach does not focus only on the
employers’ property interest in the trade secrets to determine if they
are threatened.  Courts, therefore, should approach the doctrine of
inevitable misappropriation with reference to the principles of
accession law, which have long dealt with the ownership and control
of combined or transformed property in other contexts.20  This
Article demonstrates that applying the principles of accession law to
the doctrine of inevitable misappropriation will enable courts to
make more measured and flexible decisions that take into account
the relative values of the interests at stake, thereby generating more
desirable outcomes in individual situations and creating a more
efficient overall system for the regulation of trade secrets in the
employment context.
Part I of this Article outlines and describes the scope of the
doctrine of inevitable misappropriation.  Part II reviews existing court
approaches as well as proposed academic approaches to the
misappropriation doctrine.  Then, Part II argues that all of these
approaches are inconsistent and undesirable.  Part III introduces the
law of accession, argues that it can be reasonably applied to the
doctrine of inevitable misappropriation, and explains how such an
approach to the doctrine would be applied.  Finally, Part III further
argues that applying principles of accession law to the doctrine of
inevitable misappropriation would generate better individual and
systemic results.
                                                 
19. Of course, there are both significant normative and positive reasons for limiting the
application of accession law in the trade secrets and employment context.  See discussion infra
Part III.B.  This Article does not suggest, for example, that people are or should be treated
literally as property.  See infra notes 394-95 and accompanying text.
20. Accession law has generally dealt with personal property, but has been applied across
centuries to a wide range of contexts, from shingles and oil to automobiles and air conditioning
units.  See discussion infra Part III.A.
I.  THE DOCTRINE OF INEVITABLE MISAPPROPRIATION
Courts have developed the doctrine of inevitable misappropriation
of trade secrets over the past thirty years.21  The following section
briefly explains the doctrine, describes its scope of application, and
reviews the two sets of important interests at stake:  employer
property interests in trade secrets and employee liberty interests in
freedom to work.
A. The Basic Doctrine
Although courts have adopted a number of interpretations of the
doctrine of inevitable misappropriation of trade secrets, the core
aspects of the argument remain common.  The doctrine basically
reasons that an employee who has been exposed to her employer’s
trade secrets will inevitably disclose or use those secrets in the course
of her new employment, and therefore should be enjoined from
working for her former employer’s competitors.22  After determining
whether the misappropriation doctrine is applicable under either a
state law version of the UTSA23 or common law,24 the courts will apply
the doctrine in two steps.25  First, the courts will determine whether
misappropriation is inevitable, and second, if misappropriation is
inevitable, they will craft an injunction to prevent it.26  An excellent
example of this process is the widely discussed inevitable
misappropriation case, PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond.27
In PepsiCo, the Seventh Circuit upheld the district court’s
injunction against an employee that went to work for a former
employer’s competitor on inevitable misappropriation grounds.28
Redmond, formerly a general manager in PepsiCo’s California
division, had access to the company’s secret strategic marketing plans
for the West Coast.29  Quaker Oats, a direct competitor to PepsiCo in
the fiercely competitive sport drink and new-age drink categories,
                                                 
21. One of the earliest cases standing for the proposition of inevitable misappropriation is
Plant Industry v. Coleman, 287 F. Supp. 636 (C.D. Cal. 1968).  In Plant Industry, the court found
an implied agreement to maintain the confidentiality of the former employer’s trade secrets.
See id. at 644.
22. See John Bostjanich & Patricia S. Smart, Survey of Illinois Law:  Intellectual Property Law
Developments, 19 S. ILL. U. L.J. 855, 861-62 (1995) (stating that the action of misappropriation
does not have to include a physical taking of information).
23. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 2(a) (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 433-67 (Supp. 1998).
For example, in PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond, the court applied the doctrine of inevitable
misappropriation under the Illinois Trade Secrets Act (“ITSA”), 765 ILL. COMP. STAT.
1065/3(a) (West 1995).  See PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262, 1267 (7th Cir. 1995).
24. See, e.g., National Starch & Chem. Corp. v. Parker Chem. Corp., 530 A.2d 31 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987) (granting injunctive relief without reference to a trade secret
statute).
25. See PepsiCo, 54 F.3d at 1267 (stating that Illinois law provides that after the court finds
that misappropriation is inevitable, it then may grant an injunction).
26. See id.
27. 54 F.3d 1262.
28. See id. at 1263.
29. See id. at 1264-65 (reporting that Redmond’s former employer, PepsiCo, produced “All
Sport,” a drink that directly competes with his new employer’s, Quaker Oats’ sport drinks,
“Snapple” and “Gatorade”).
recruited Redmond.30  PepsiCo asserted that Redmond could not
help but rely on knowledge of PepsiCo’s secret plans while managing
the strategy of the new Quaker Oats division.31  The Seventh Circuit
panel agreed with PepsiCo,32 noting that the nature of the job, and
not Redmond’s conscious intent, would make such misappropriation
inevitable.33  The court remarked that the argument by both Quaker
Oats and Redmond that they had no past or future intent to use any
of PepsiCo’s trade secrets “f[e]ll somewhat short of the mark.”34  The
three-judge panel then adopted the district court’s finding that
disclosure of these trade secrets would cause incalculable harm to
PepsiCo and would provide a substantial advantage to Quaker Oats.35
Since the Illinois Trade Secrets Act (“ITSA”),36 provided for
injunctive relief against the inevitable misappropriation of trade
secrets, the appellate court upheld the district court’s injunction
against Redmond, preventing him from assuming his new position
for six months.37
The PepsiCo case illustrates a few common aspects of the inevitable
misappropriation doctrine.  First, the doctrine effectively prevents an
employee from working for a competitor in the same way as a
noncompete covenant, but it operates in the absence of such a
covenant.38  Even without signing an agreement or covenant not to
compete, Redmond was prevented from taking a new and lucrative
job with Quaker Oats because of his exposure to PepsiCo’s trade
secrets, and because the court believed his new job would require
him to use or disclose those secrets.39  Second, the former employer,
or plaintiff, does not necessarily need to prove intent to
misappropriate as a requirement for applying the doctrine.40
Therefore, the doctrine can prevent even an apparently well-meaning
or neutral employee from working for a competitor, even if she
                                                 
30. See id. at 1264-66.
31. See id. at 1269-70.
32. See id. at 1270.
33. See id.
34. See id.
35. See id. at 1271-72.
36. See 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. 1065/3(a) (West 1995) (“Actual or threatened
misappropriation may be enjoined.”).
37. See PepsiCo, 54 F.3d at 1272.
38. Other critics of the doctrine have noted as much.  See Nina Schuyler, Trading Secrets,
CAL. LAW., Feb. 1996, at 27, 28 (quoting James DiBoise, a partner at Wilson, Sonsini, Goodrich
& Rosati in Palo Alto, California stating, “‘In essence, the doctrine is a powerful noncompete
clause.’”).
39. See PepsiCo, 54 F.3d at 1270.
40. See id.
consciously intends to protect her former employer’s trade secrets.41
Third, the doctrine primarily focuses on protecting trade secrets, not
balancing employee and employer interests or evaluating relative
value.42  Courts apply the doctrine under statutes or common law
precedents aimed at protecting trade secrets.43  The courts’ focus lies
in the nature of the trade secrets and the potential threat to them,
but not on a formal balancing of interests or protection of employee
rights.44
B. Scope
A significant and growing number of federal and state courts have
begun applying the doctrine of inevitable misappropriation.  The
doctrine has been widely applied even in the absence of covenants
not to compete.45  Prior to the PepsiCo decision in 1995, both federal46
and state47 courts used findings of inevitable use or disclosure of trade
secrets to bar employees from working in parts of their new
employers’ operations.  Still other federal48 and state49 courts
                                                 
41. Whether intent is relevant depends on the approach to inevitability taken by the
courts.  See discussion infra Part II.A.1.
42. See Lowry, supra note 2, at 524-26 (asserting that courts favor protecting trade secrets
because trade secret protection encourages technological innovation).
43. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 2(a) (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 433-67 (Supp. 1997);
PepsiCo, 54 F.3d at 1262 (applying the ITSA).
44. See infra notes 162-68 and accompanying text (describing the focus on employer
property interests in trade secrets and the resulting negative consequences of this focus).
45. See Johanna L. Edelstein, Note, Intellectual Slavery?:  The Doctrine of Inevitable Disclosure of
Trade Secrets, 26 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 717, 732 (1996) (criticizing the PepsiCo decision as
altering the terms of employment, and applying covenants not to compete without analyzing
their impact on the former employee’s mobility).
46. See, e.g., Union Carbide Corp. v. UGI Corp., 731 F.2d 1186, 1191-92 (5th Cir. 1984)
(reasoning that inevitability of use of trade secrets in employment required injunctive relief);
FMC Corp. v. Varco Int’l, Inc., 677 F.2d 500, 505 (5th Cir. 1982) (enjoining an employee from
disclosing or working in the area of swivel joint process); IBM Corp. v. Seagate Tech., Inc., 941
F. Supp. 98 (D. Minn. 1992) (enjoining an employee from working for a competitor in the disk
drive industry on the basis of inevitable misappropriation), vacated and remanded, 962 F.2d 12
(8th Cir. 1992); Norand Corp. v. Parkin, 785 F. Supp. 1353 (N.D. Iowa 1990) (granting a
temporary restraining order on the basis of threatened or inevitable misappropriation);
Schlumberger Well Servs. v. Blaker, 623 F. Supp. 1310, 1317-19 (S.D. Ind. 1985) (enjoining an
engineer from working in specific areas of the wireline logging business of a competitor for two
years because he would inevitably disclose trade secrets), aff’d, 859 F.2d 512 (7th Cir. 1998); SI
Handling Sys., Inc. v. Heisley, 581 F. Supp. 1553 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (enjoining employees in the
drive tube industry), vacated, 753 F.2d 1244 (3d Cir. 1985); Emery Indus., Inc. v. Cottier, 202
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 829 (S.D. Ohio 1978) (enjoining an employee in the ozone field on the basis of
the inevitable use of trade secrets); Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. Continental Aviation & Eng’g
Corp., 255 F. Supp. 645, 654 (E.D. Mich. 1966) (providing a preliminary injunction against the
developer of an in-line fuel pump from working on distributor pumps for a competitor of his
previous employer because the developer would inevitably disclose trade secrets regarding the
pump).
47. See, e.g., Barr-Mullin, Inc. v. Browning, Ltd., 424 S.E.2d 226, 228, 230-31 (N.C. Ct. App.
1993) (enjoining employees in the software industry in part because of the likelihood of
misappropriation); National Starch & Chem. Corp. v. Parker Chem. Corp., 530 A.2d 31, 33
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987) (upholding the trial court’s 15-month preliminary injunction
against an employee working in the area of envelope adhesives because circumstances
suggested that such work would inevitably force the employee to use or disclose his former
employer’s trade secrets); Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Johnson, 442 A.2d 1114, 1116, 1120 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1982) (enjoining an employee from working in new employer’s operations for one
year based on inevitable misappropriation theory).
48. See, e.g., Baxter Int’l, Inc. v. Morris, 976 F.2d 1189, 1194, 1197 (8th Cir. 1992) (finding
discussed the doctrine when denying injunctions against former
employees.  Following PepsiCo, an even greater number of courts have
discussed, adopted, and applied the inevitable misappropriation
doctrine.50  Recent decisions in a variety of industries have continued
this trend.51
                                                 
that an employee would not inevitably disclose or use a former employer’s trade secrets in
evaluating a motion for injunction, but discussing application of the doctrine as a serious
possibility); IBM Corp. v. Seagate Tech., Inc., 962 F.2d 12, 12 (8th Cir. 1992) (reversing an
injunction for insufficient facts); AMP, Inc. v. Fleischhacker, 823 F.2d 1199, 1203, 1207 (7th Cir.
1987) (denying an injunction because of a failure to show likelihood of misappropriation, but
not rejecting the doctrine of inevitable misappropriation outright); SI Handling Sys., Inc. v.
Heisley, 753 F.2d 1244, 1255, 1266 (3d Cir. 1985) (remanding an injunction for inevitable
misappropriation not because the doctrine was rejected, but because more specific facts were
needed); FMC Corp. v. Cyprus Foote Mineral Co., 899 F. Supp. 1477, 1482 (W.D.N.C. 1995)
(denying a preliminary injunction against an employee and explaining that the application of
inevitable misappropriation doctrine is limited to cases of bad faith, underhanded dealing, and
employment by a technologically backward competitor); Teradyne, Inc. v. Clear
Communications Corp., 707 F. Supp. 353, 357 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (denying an injunction because
the facts presented were insufficient); Union Carbide Corp. v. Sunox, Inc., 590 F. Supp. 224,
228 (W.D.N.C. 1984) (denying an injunction because of a lack of strong showing of a likelihood
of misappropriation); Standard Brands, Inc. v. Zumpe, 264 F. Supp. 254, 269 (E.D. La. 1967)
(denying a preliminary injunction against a person’s employment with a competitor in the
coffee and tea business, stating that the facts did not support a claim of inevitable
misappropriation).
49. See, e.g., Engineering Assocs. v. Pankow, 150 S.E.2d 56, 58-59 (N.C. 1966) (rejecting an
injunction without a covenant not to compete); Travenol Lab., Inc. v. Turner, 228 S.E.2d 478,
486 (N.C. Ct. App. 1976) (denying a preliminary injunction against an employee, but reviewing
cases of inevitable misappropriation injunctions involving technical employees or some showing
of intent); Obey Indus., Inc. v. Finney, 555 A.2d 1324, 1326-27 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989) (denying
an injunction based on non-technical employment).
50. See IDS Life Ins. v. Sunamerica, Inc., 958 F. Supp. 1258, 1280 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (restating
that an employer misappropriates trade secrets when he knowingly reaps the advantages of an
employee’s conversion of trade secrets from a former employer), aff’d in part, vacated in part,
136 F.3d 537 (7th Cir. 1998); Southwestern Energy Co. v. Eickenhorst, 955 F. Supp. 1078, 1085
(W.D. Ark. 1997) (citing PepsiCo and discussing the inevitable misappropriation theory with
approval); Merck & Co. v. Lyon, 941 F. Supp. 1443, 1460 (M.D.N.C. 1996) (indicating that for
the purposes of an employer’s action against a former employee for trade secret
misappropriation, the employer’s failure to obtain a noncompete agreement from the
employee was not unreasonable); La Calhène, Inc. v. Spolyar, 938 F. Supp. 523, 531 (W.D. Wis.
1996) (reiterating that plaintiff does not need to show that defendant actually misappropriated
any of its trade secrets—a threat of misappropriation is sufficient); Uncle B’s Bakery, Inc. v.
O’Rourke, 920 F. Supp. 1405 (N.D. Iowa), modified, 938 F. Supp 1450, 1475 (N.D. Iowa 1996)
(suggesting that actual or threatened misappropriation allows an owner of a trade secret to
recover damages).
51. For example, in November 1997, a New York County Court enjoined a former
employee from starting a new Internet advertising business for six months in part because it
found that the employee would inevitably use or disclose his former employer’s trade secrets.
See Doubleclick, Inc. v. Henderson, Inc., No. 116914/97, 1997 WL 731413, at *5 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
Nov. 7, 1997).  Also in 1997, a federal district court in the Southern District of New York denied
an injunction against an employee working for a competitor in the paper industry, but
recognized that inevitable misappropriation had served as the basis for issuing other injunctions
in more highly technical industries.  See International Paper Co. v. Suwyn, 966 F. Supp. 246, 258-
59 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (distinguishing the instant case from Continental Group, Inc. v. Kinsley, 422 F.
Supp. 838 (D. Conn. 1976), and Business Intelligence Services, Inc. v. Hudson, 580 F. Supp. 1068
(S.D.N.Y. 1984), by arguing that the latter cases involved high-tech industries and employees
and therefore could support findings of inevitable misappropriation).
In addition, courts have begun to apply the reasoning of the
inevitable misappropriation doctrine to uphold and enforce
noncompete covenants52 through injunctions.53  Although the cases
involving noncompete covenants focus on the reasonability of the
restrictions and apply a more stringent standard of irreparable harm
than the cases applying the doctrine under statutory authority alone,54
they also provide additional and sometimes more flexible examples
of applying the doctrine than cases applying the doctrine in the
absence of such a covenant.
C. Interests at Issue
The doctrine of inevitable misappropriation has sparked heated
debate among practitioners and academics because it implicates two
important values:  employee liberty and employer property rights.55
Preventing the inevitable misappropriation of trade secrets protects
important employer interests.56  First, applying the doctrine both
upholds and enforces principles of commercial morality.  Courts
work to protect trade secrets based on the principle of “the law of
unfair competition . . . in which the courts seek to enforce
increasingly high standards of fairness or commercial morality and to
protect the owner of information obtained through the ingenuity
and effort of its employees, and its expenditures of time and
                                                 
52. For an excellent empirical study of covenants not to compete, see Peter J. Whitmore, A
Statistical Analysis of Noncompetition Clauses in Employment Contracts, 15 J. CORP. L. 483 (1990).
53. See, e.g., Modern Controls, Inc. v. Andreadakis, 578 F.2d 1264, 1270 (8th Cir. 1978)
(reversing a denial of two-year preliminary injunction on the grounds that a restrictive covenant
is reasonable because the employee had access to confidential information, but not reaching
the question of inevitable misappropriation); Branson Ultrasonics Corp. v. Stratman, 921 F.
Supp. 909, 913-14 (D. Conn. 1996) (enforcing a covenant not to compete by enjoining an
employee from working for a competitor for one year on the grounds that the employee would
inevitably disclose trade secrets); Lumex, Inc. v. Highsmith, 919 F. Supp. 624, 631, 636
(E.D.N.Y. 1996) (finding a six-month covenant not to compete reasonable because an employee
working for a competitor with similar products would inevitably force him to disclose trade
secrets); Business Intelligence Servs., Inc. v. Hudson, 580 F. Supp. 1068, 1072 (S.D.N.Y. 1984)
(upholding a 12-month restrictive covenant as reasonable under the inevitable
misappropriation doctrine); Continental Group v. Kinsley, 422 F. Supp. 838, 845-46 (D. Conn.
1976) (upholding an 18-month restrictive covenant in the plastic container industry as
reasonable because disclosure of trade secrets would otherwise be inevitable); Cannondale
Corp. v. GT Bicycles, No. CV-970156601S, 1997 WL 53561, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 4, 1997)
(upholding a covenant not to compete as reasonable and justified because of the inevitability of
disclosure of trade secrets); Medtronic, Inc. v. Sun, Nos. C7-97-1185, C9-97-1186, 1997 WL
729168, at *4 (Minn. Ct. App. Nov. 25, 1997) (upholding a two-year covenant not to compete
because it is reasonable and holding that a showing of inevitable misappropriation is not
necessary when evaluating the reasonability of a restrictive covenant under Minnesota law).
54. See, e.g., AMP, Inc. v. Fleischhacker, 823 F.2d 1199, 1207 (7th Cir. 1987) (explaining
the higher standard of proof in cases without a noncompete covenant); Lumex, Inc. v.
Highsmith, 919 F. Supp. 624, 636 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (holding that to be enforceable, a covenant
not to compete need only be reasonable).
55. See Wexler v. Greenberg, 160 A.2d 430, 434-35 (Pa. 1960) (noting the competing values
at stake in determining the rights of businesses to be free from unfair competition resulting
from disclosure of trade secrets).
56. See Lowry, supra note 2, at 524-25 (noting that protecting trade secrets encourages
companies to invest in technological advancement); see also infra notes 57-61 and accompanying
text (discussing other employer interests).
money.”57  Courts have similarly explained that “[t]rade secrets and
confidential information are protected on the basis that their
wrongful disclosure is a breach of trust.”58  Second, courts have
argued that protecting trade secrets has significant practical effects
for specific types of employers.59  For example, one court explained
that misappropriation of trade secrets is barred because
[m]isappropriation of a trade secret is an injury of “such
continuous and frequent recurrence that no reasonable redress
can be had in a court of law.”  The very nature of a trade secret
mandates that misappropriation will have significant and
continuous long-term effects.  The party wronged may forever lose
its competitive business advantage or, at the least, a significant
portion of its market share.60
As a result of these types of considerations, courts in several
jurisdictions have held that irreparable harm can be presumed when
a trade secret is misappropriated.61
Applying the inevitable misappropriation doctrine also affects
important interests of individual employees.62  Courts consistently
recognize that enjoining an employee from working for an employer
of her choice infringes on her fundamental liberty interests.63
                                                 
57. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. Continental Aviation & Eng’g Corp., 255 F. Supp. 645, 653
(E.D. Mich. 1966) (citing Franke v. Wiltschek, 209 F.2d 493, 495 (2d Cir. 1953)); see also
Schulenberg v. Signatrol, Inc., 200 N.E.2d 615, 620 (Ill. App. Ct. 1964) (granting an injunction
limited by time and scope to protect both employee mobility in the workplace and the
employer’s interest in trade secrets).
58. Standard Brands v. Zumpe, Inc., 264 F. Supp. 254, 262 (E.D. La. 1967) (citing Franke,
209 F.2d at 498) (asserting that protection of trade secrets should be viewed as an issue of
breach of good faith rather than as an issue of protection of a property right); see also Travenol
Lab., Inc. v. Turner, 228 S.E.2d 478, 483 (N.C. Ct. App. 1976) (affirming that although a duty
not to disclose trade secrets was grounded originally in the property rights of the employer, it is
now grounded in the trust and confidence imposed on the employee) (citing the RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 396 (1958) and the RESTATEMENT OF TORTS (THIRD) § 757 (1939)).
59. See Lowry, supra note 2, at 526 (noting that patent protections, like trade secret
protections, encourage companies to seek innovation).
60. Merck & Co. v. Lyon, 941 F. Supp. 1443, 1455 (M.D.N.C. 1996) (quoting Barr-Mullin,
Inc. v. Browning, Ltd. 424 S.E.2d 226, 230 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993)).
61. See id. at 1456 (noting that the court is satisfied that if plaintiffs lose important trade
secrets, they will suffer immediate and irreparable harm) (citing Lumex v. Highsmith, 919 F.
Supp. 624, 628 (E.D.N.Y. 1996)); see also FMC Corp. v. Taiwan Tainan Giant Indus. Co., 730
F.2d 61, 63 (2d Cir. 1984) (stating that once a trade secret is lost, it is lost forever and therefore
results in irreparable harm); Lumex, 919 F. Supp. at 628 (noting the clarity in the law and
indicating that irreparable harm is presumed when a trade secret has been misappropriated).
62. See Lowry, supra note 2, at 524-25 (noting society’s general discomfort with not allowing
employees to market themselves fully); see also infra notes 63-68 and accompanying text
(discussing employee interests implicated by the misappropriation doctrine).
63. See FMC Corp. v. Cyprus Foote Mineral Co., 899 F. Supp. 1477, 1484 (W.D.N.C. 1995)
(“The freedom of employees to sell their expertise to the highest and most congenial bidder is
an important facet of individual liberty long recognized by the law of North Carolina.”);
Travenol Lab., Inc. v. Turner, 228 S.E.2d 478, 483 (N.C. Ct. App. 1976) (“[T]he employee must
Specifically, courts acknowledge “the principle that an individual has
the right to change his employment for whatever reason he wishes
and the right to utilize his general skill, knowledge and experience
for the benefit of his employer.”64  Courts repeatedly state that they
“will not deprive the employee of the right to use the skill he
developed through the years.”65  In addition, many courts recognize
the direct practical consequences of an injunction on the individual
employee.66  For example, in denying a broad injunction against  an
individual employee, a federal district court stated that “[e]njoining
Blaker [the employee] from employment in an area where most, if
not all, of his background and training would be relevant, would in
the opinion of this Court, be potentially devastating to both Blaker
and his family.”67  As one court noted, even a temporary absence can
have significant practical impacts on an individual employee’s life
and relationships, including the alienation of his or her new
employers.68
More generally, the doctrine of inevitable misappropriation also
implicates fundamental public policy concerns.69  For instance,
enforcing a regime of trade secret protection can create greater
incentives for employers to invest in proprietary technologies.70
Courts have grounded their concern for protecting trade secrets in
the needs of the free market:  “[T]o promote experimentation with
new ideas, the employer must feel free to entrust confidential ideas
and information to employees without fear that competitors will
unfairly gain access to such information.”71  Protecting important
intellectual property may be essential to the existence of certain
companies, particularly in the high-technology industries.72  In
                                                 
have the freedom to sell skills fairly and honestly acquired to the highest bidder.  This reflects a
commitment to market efficiency, but more importantly to personal freedom in choosing one’s
employment.”).
64. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. Continental Aviation & Eng’g Corp., 255 F. Supp. 645, 652-
53 (E.D. Mich. 1966).
65. See, e.g., Sarkes Tarzian, Inc. v. Audio Devices, Inc., 166 F. Supp. 250, 262 (S.D. Cal.
1958), aff’d, 283 F.2d 695 (9th Cir. 1960); see also, e.g., Standard Brands, Inc. v. Zumpe, 264 F.
Supp. 254, 259, 268 (E.D. La. 1967) (quoting Sarkes Tarzian, 169 F. Supp. at 262, 278-79)
(stating that the public is interested in highly skilled people moving from job to job to improve
society’s industrial structure); Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 255 F. Supp. at 654-55 (holding that
defendant may work for a new employer using the skills he has acquired over the years, and
must only refrain from working in the design and development of products that might allow the
transfer of trade secrets).
66. See Schlumberger Well Servs. v. Blaker, 623 F. Supp. 1310, 1318 (S.D. Ind. 1985)
(stating that forced relocation of an employee and his family due to termination is potentially
devastating); see also infra notes 67-68 and accompanying text (describing courts’ consideration
of the impact of injunctions on employees).
67. Schlumberger Well Servs., 623 F. Supp. at 1318.
68. See Baxter Int’l, Inc. v. Morris, 976 F.2d 1189, 1194-95 (8th Cir. 1992) (accepting the
district court’s assertion that an injunction must be crafted to protect the employee adequately
to avoid alienation of the new employer).
69. See Lowry, supra note 2, at 524 (noting that inevitable misappropriation must contend
with the competing public policy concerns of protecting business secrets and workers’ rights).
70. See id. at 525 (noting that trade secret protection encourages research, development,
and technological advances).
71. Travenol Lab., Inc. v. Turner, 228 S.E.2d 478, 483 (N.C. Ct. App. 1976).
72. See Edelstein, supra note 45, at 733 n.131 (citing DiBoise & Berger, Inevitable Disclosure of
addition, courts have reasoned that without such exclusive
protection, employers may not be able to afford to subsidize research
and development, or to make improvements in their manufacturing
methods or products.73
Other commentators, however, have argued that applying the
doctrine of inevitable misappropriation to prevent employees from
leaving one company to work for competitor companies will generally
be counterproductive and stifling to company innovation, investment
in human capital, and general economic growth.74  One commentator
has argued that potentially highly-skilled employees will have an
incentive to avoid being exposed to trade secret information because
that exposure ultimately can be used to prevent them from leaving
their current employment.75  While it might be argued that employers
could circumvent this problem by offering higher wages to employees
who enter into potential noncompete contracts, concerns about
“bounded rationality,”76 opportunism, and unpredictability suggest
that it is more likely that these employees will be inadequately
compensated.77  Thus, employees in this situation may either be
treated unfairly, or remain unmotivated to expose themselves to
trade secrets and acquire skills that might increase their productivity
and, by extension, benefit society.78
Another critic has argued that the general effect of applying the
doctrine will lower overall innovation and growth.  For example,
James DiBoise, a partner at Wilson, Sonsini, Goodrich & Rosati, a
high-technology law firm in Palo Alto, California, has argued that
                                                 
Trade Secrets, 20 NEW MATTER 28 (1995)).
73. See id. at 734 n.134 (arguing that absent protections to ensure that the confidential
developments of companies remain undisclosed, new developments will be hampered) (citing
Wexler v. Greenberg, 160 A.2d 430 (Pa. 1960)); see also FMC Corp. v. Cyprus Foote Mineral Co.,
899 F. Supp. 1477, 1484 (W.D.N.C. 1995) (“The protection extended to trade secrets fosters
research and development and the improved products it elicits.”).
74. See, e.g., Edelstein, supra note 45, at 733; Lowry, supra note 2, at 533-35; Schuyler, supra
note 38, at 28.
75. See Edelstein, supra note 45, at 733 n.128 (“[E]mployees may not want to increase their
expertise, since the potential acquisition of alleged trade secrets could prevent them from a
later advantage in the industry in which they are most productive.”) (citing Wexler, 160 A.2d at
435); see also Lowry, supra note 2, at 530-31 (discussing the reluctance of prospective employers
to hire employees that have been exposed to trade secrets because employers fear litigation).
76. See Lowry, supra note 2, at 533 (defining “bounded rationality” as a situation in which
employees are incapable of fully understanding or comprehending the complexities involved in
the noncompetition covenants they are compelled to sign).
77. See id. at 534 (noting that both labor unions and employees without union
representation face great difficulty when negotiating noncompete agreements with employers
who have superior knowledge or the potential value of trade secrets).
78. See id. (noting that employers will not always honor the request of their employees to
work in areas where they will not be exposed to trade secrets).
applying the doctrine of inevitable misappropriation will undermine
competition and economic growth in the same way as enforcing
covenants not to compete undermine them.79  DiBoise supported his
argument with an empirical study of Silicon Valley and a high-
technology area in Massachusetts, known as Route 128.80  The study
attributed the tremendous growth of Silicon Valley to employee
mobility, and the decline of Route 128 to the prevalent use of
covenants not to compete in employment contracts.81  DiBoise has
also noted that inevitable misappropriation cases can take years to
decide, side-tracking both valuable employees and the technological
efforts of prospective employers.82  As an example, he cited the case
of IBM Corp. v. Seagate Technology, Inc.,83 where continuing litigation
over inevitable misappropriation prevented an executive of IBM’s
hard drive division from working for Seagate, a hard drive
competitor, for three years.84  This delay virtually ended the
employee’s usefulness to any company in the innovative hard drive
industry.85  Even if no lawsuits were ever brought under the doctrine,
the threat of litigation itself may make prospective employers less
sanguine about hiring the most highly-skilled employees because
these employees also tend to have been exposed to trade secrets.86
Thus, an inappropriate or an overly broad application of the doctrine
of inevitable misappropriation could have severe consequences,
including undermining both individual investments in human capital
and general innovation, as well as hampering the economic growth
that employee mobility generates.
II. CURRENT APPROACHES AND PROPOSALS
Given the growing application of the inevitable misappropriation
doctrine and the fundamental interests it implicates, a coherent and
well-balanced approach to this area of trade secrets is important.
Unfortunately, current court doctrines and existing reform proposals
fail to provide such an approach.  The following section evaluates,
                                                 
79. See Schuyler, supra note 38, at 28 (quoting DiBoise stating, “‘In essence, the doctrine is
a powerful noncompete clause.’”).
80. See ANNALEE SAXENIAN, REGIONAL ADVANTAGE:  CULTURE AND COMPETITION IN SILICON
VALLEY AND ROUTE 128, at 37 (1994) (explaining that employees with more freedom, such as
those in the Silicon Valley, create a more productive environment for the high-tech sector
generally).
81. See id. at 62 (discussing the conservative social traditions of New England which
discourage job-hopping and technology-sharing); see also Schuyler, supra note 38, at 28
(discussing DiBoise’s criticisms of the doctrine and referring to the Saxenian study).
82. See Schuyler, supra note 38, at 28.
83. IBM Corp. v. Seagate Tech., Inc., Civ. No. 3-91-630, 1991 WL 757821 (D. Minn. Dec.
31, 1991), rev’d, 962 F.2d 12 (8th Cir. 1992) (involving three years of litigation before reaching
a settlement).
84. See id. at *6; Schuyler, supra note 38, at 28 (discussing IBM Corp. from a lead attorney’s
perspective).
85. See Schuyler, supra note 38, at 28 (noting that the three-year case also side-tracked
defendant Seagate’s disk drive development program).
86. See Lowry, supra note 2, at 531 nn.73-74 (noting that high-level employees may be privy
to trade secrets that inevitably will be brought with them to new employment).
critiques and rejects three sets of current and proposed approaches
to the doctrine of inevitable misappropriation:  existing court
approaches; proposals for unqualified rejection of the doctrine or for
its unlimited application; and a concurrent property interests
approach.
A. Current Court Approaches
Current court approaches suffer from three major limitations.87
First, each of the four approaches that courts have developed to
determine when misappropriation is inevitable suffers from specific
problems of over-inclusiveness and under-inclusiveness, as well as
internal inconsistency.  Second, the courts’ current focus on
protecting the employer’s property interest leads to inflexible,
inaccurate, and inconsistent determinations of inevitability.  Third,
courts generally take an all-or-nothing approach to remedies when
finding inevitable misappropriation, thus resulting in inconsistent
and inadequate relief.
1. Specific limitations in determining inevitability
a. The Standard Brands approach:  general fact-intensive analysis
The first method the courts have applied to determine the
inevitability of misappropriation involves a simple, fact-intensive, case-
by-case analysis of the trade secrets themselves and the nature of the
employee’s old and new jobs.88  Courts taking this approach do not
present a clear methodology for determining inevitability of
misappropriation.  Instead of presenting standards for evaluating or
                                                 
87. Many commentators have focused on inconsistencies in the definition of trade secrets
as the source of the courts’ problem in approaching the inevitable misappropriation doctrine.
For example, Suellen Lowry, in an excellent note on the inevitable disclosure of trade secrets,
argued that inconsistencies in courts’ and legislatures’ definitions of trade secrets are the major
source of the problem in the application of the doctrine of inevitable disclosure.  See id. at 528-
32.  Lowry argued that inconsistencies in the definition of protected trade secrets versus an
employee’s general and individual (unprotected) skills, have masked the real issue of
recognizing property interests for both the employee and the employer in trade secrets.  See id.
at 535-44.  She has therefore advocated for recognition of the concurrent property interests of
an employer and an employee in trade secrets to resolve the perceived misallocation problem.
See id.  In contrast, this Article focuses on inconsistencies in the methodology that courts use to
determine inevitability of misappropriation, see discussion infra Parts II.A.1-2, and the remedies
that courts apply to prevent it, see discussion infra Part II.A.3.  In addition, this Article rejects the
concurrent property rights regime that Lowry suggests, see discussion infra Part II.B.2, and
instead suggests that the law of accession provides a better property model, see discussion infra
Part III.
88. See Standard Brands, Inc. v. Zumpe, 264 F. Supp. 254, 259 (E.D. La. 1967) (announcing
that a determination must be made as to the extent of an individual’s knowledge of trade
secrets before injunction decisions are reached).
limiting their application of the doctrine to specific types of cases,
courts simply conclude whether the type of work that the employee
will be doing in her new job will inevitably lead her to use or disclose
trade secrets.89  Applying this approach in Standard Brands v. Zumpe,90
a federal district court in Louisiana engaged in a long discussion of
the facts of the case, exploring in detail the specific technologies
involved and the nature of the trade secrets that the former employer
wished to protect.91  Additionally, the court evaluated whether those
specific secrets would have to be used in the course of the employee’s
new job.92  The court concluded that the nature of the business was
such that use or disclosure of trade secrets was not inevitable.93
Importantly, the court did not adopt a set of standards or recite a list
of factors that led to its conclusion, nor did it suggest a methodology
that courts could replicate in the future.94  Other courts have engaged
in a similar general fact-based analysis, neither adopting nor
expressing a set of specific principles or tests for determining
inevitability.95  Some courts have simply recited different aspects of
the facts, and evaluated the testimony of the parties or other pieces of
evidence without applying a specific set of legal standards or
principles.96
The case-by-case approach has the advantage of flexibility and case-
specific analysis.  It enables different courts to examine closely the
circumstances of an employee’s move from one company to another,
and encourages courts to develop a better understanding of the
situation.  In addition, this approach allows courts the flexibility to
                                                 
89. See id.; see also infra note 95 (listing other courts that use a similar approach).
90. 264 F. Supp. 254.
91. See id. at 260 (acknowledging that a list of technologies that plaintiff provided the court
contained sensitive and valuable information).
92. See id. at 260-61 (stating that many aspects of the employee’s new employment would
not specifically be related to the employee’s skills and knowledge acquired during his former
employment).
93. See id. at 261 (stating that an employee’s disclosure of a former employer’s confidential
information is not likely to occur when the new employer is not engaged in a similar business
activity).
94. See id.
95. See, e.g., Baxter Int’l, Inc. v. Morris, 976 F.2d 1189, 1194-95 (8th Cir. 1992) (upholding
the district court’s finding that prospective employment would not cause inevitable disclosure
of trade secrets based on an analysis of the facts); Schlumberger Well Servs. v. Blaker, 623 F.
Supp. 1310, 1317-19 (S.D. Ind. 1985) (engaging in a lengthy exploration of the facts of previous
and prospective employment, and simply concluding that some secrets inevitably might be
disclosed, but that a complete injunction was not warranted), aff’d, 859 F.2d 512 (7th Cir.
1988); Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. Continental Aviation & Eng’g Corp., 255 F. Supp. 645, 654-55
(E.D. Mich. 1966) (providing a lengthy description of trade secrets involving the design of a
fuel pump system and prospective employment and concluding that absent a limited
injunction, disclosure of some secrets might be inevitable); Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v.
Johnson, 442 A.2d 1114, 1124-25 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982) (holding that the nature of employment
itself under these circumstances implies that an employee would inevitably use the
information).
96. In Campbell Soup Co. v. Giles, 47 F.3d 467, 470 (1st Cir. 1995), the court held that a
formal evidentiary hearing was not necessary before evaluating a motion to enjoin the
inevitable disclosure of trade secrets, but noted that the parties should have “a reasonable
opportunity to put forth, and to oppose, the disputed evidence.”  Id. (quoting Stanley v.
University of S. Cal., 13 F.3d 1313, 1326 (9th Cir. 1994)).
deal with a broad range of cases without limiting the doctrine to only
specific types of trade secrets (such as technology-based secrets) or to
inflexible categories of behavior (such as actual bad faith as opposed
to substantial suspicious circumstances).
Unfortunately, this fact-intensive, case-by-case methodology also
creates significant room for inconsistency.97  Predicting whether a
court will find inevitability of misappropriation based on the “nature”
of an industry or the kind of employment is extremely difficult.98
Cases with similar fact patterns appear to have generated very
different conclusions about the inevitability of misappropriation.99
One commentator has suggested that this legal uncertainty has not
only generated both increased costs and risks of litigation,100 but has
also historically resulted in a general pro-employer bias.101
b. The Cyprus Foote approach:  focusing on bad faith or competitor
intent
The second approach courts have taken to determine inevitability
involves a similar fact-based analysis, but focuses on evidence of bad
faith or intent on the part of either the employee or the prospective
employer.  In FMC Corp. v. Cyprus Foote Mineral Co.,102 for example, a
federal district court held, based on North Carolina’s Trade Secrets
Act,103 that inevitable misappropriation could only be found where
there was evidence of either:  (1) bad faith; (2) under-handed
dealing; or (3) employment by an entity so plainly lacking
comparable technology that misappropriation could be inferred.104
In Travenol Laboratories, Inc. v. Turner,105 the North Carolina Supreme
Court similarly ruled that a preliminary injunction against an
employee was not warranted in part because there was no showing of
                                                 
97. See Lowry, supra note 2, at 524 (noting that courts reach widely divergent results in
inevitable disclosure cases).
98. See id. at 527 (noting that courts will often rely on circumstantial evidence when
determining whether disclosure of a trade secret is likely to occur).
99. See id. at 528-31.
100. See id.
101. See id. at 528 (stating that current doctrines have not allowed for an equitable
resolution of these cases, but instead have created a pro-employer tilt by defining trade secrets
broadly and upholding the use of nondisclosure agreements).
102. 899 F. Supp. 1477 (W.D.N.C. 1995).
103. See id. at 1481 (authorizing preliminary or permanent injunctions for actual or
threatened misappropriation) (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 66-154 (1992)).
104. See id. at 1483 (noting that North Carolina courts will refuse to enjoin an employee
unless certain facts are demonstrated and that the plaintiff in this case has failed to prove
them).
105. 228 S.E.2d 478 (N.C. Ct. App. 1976).
bad faith or intent to misappropriate.106  The Indiana Supreme Court,
in Ackerman v. Kimball International, Inc.,107 upheld a finding of
inevitable misappropriation based on a showing of bad faith and
intent,108 and a New York County Court indicated that evidence of
bad faith was independently relevant in finding inevitable
misappropriation.109  Other courts similarly have stated that the
inevitability of misappropriation can be inferred from evidence of
bad faith or intent on the part of either a former employee or a
prospective employer.110  Essentially, courts applying the Cyprus Foote
methodology limit findings of inevitability to situations involving
indications of intent to misappropriate trade secrets.
The requirement of bad faith or intent has several important
advantages.  First, it provides some measure of certainty and
protection both for the employee and the future employer.  As long
as the employee and new employer adhere to a standard of good
faith and do not intend to misappropriate the former employer’s
trade secrets, they should be free from potential liability and
injunctive actions.  If the standard for behavior is well-established,
such as the good faith and fair dealings standard that governs
contracts,111 the resulting certainty will prevent unnecessary litigation
and promote efficiency by providing a kind of “safe harbor”—a zone
of conduct that is deemed exempt from risk of liability.112
                                                 
106. See id. at 486 (holding that the court would not allow injunctions against employees
simply to allay the fears of trade secret dissemination held by their former employers, but
required a showing of bad faith or intent by the employee).
107. 652 N.E.2d 507 (Ind. 1995).
108. See id. at 510-11 (holding that an employee’s gathering of secret company information
immediately prior to the termination of his employment showed an intent to share that
information, and in part, justified an injunction against his future employment with a
competitor).
109. See Doubleclick, Inc. v. Henderson, No. 116914/97, 1997 WL 731413, at *5-6 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. Nov. 7, 1997) (noting evidence of bad faith and cavalier treatment of duties of loyalty in
finding inevitable misappropriation).
110. See, e.g., Zahodnick v. IBM Corp., 135 F.3d 911, 915 (4th Cir. 1997) (affirming an
injunction prohibiting a former employee from disclosing confidential information to third
parties when the former employee had signed two nondisclosure agreements, yet retained
confidential information after his termination and forwarded it to his attorney without the
former employer’s consent); Inflight Newspapers, Inc. v. Magazines In-Flight, LLC, 990 F. Supp.
119, 137 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (applying a New York law enjoining employee’s use of former
employer’s trade secrets or other confidential information when doing so would violate a
fiduciary duty to the former employer); E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co. v. American Potash &
Chem. Corp., 200 A.2d 428, 431-32 (Del. Ch. 1964) (affirming a preliminary injunction against
the employee of the developer of a chemical process by a competitor who had requested and
been refused a license to use that process from his former employer).
111. See E. Allan Farnsworth, Good Faith Performance and Commercial Reasonableness Under the
Uniform Commercial Code, 30 U. CHI. L. REV. 666, 667-72 (1963) (explaining the good faith and
fair dealings standard, its application in all contracts, and the benefits of such a standard of
conduct).  But see Mark Snyderman, Note, What’s So Good About Good Faith?  The Good Faith
Performance Obligation in Commercial Lending, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1335, 1351-60 (1988) (arguing
against application of the good faith and fair dealings standard, specifically with respect to
commercial lending).
112. Safe harbor provisions exist in numerous areas of law, such as federal securities law, see
Rule 144 Under the Securities Act of 1933, 17 C.F.R. § 230.144 (1998) (defining persons
deemed not to be engaged in distribution and therefore not subject to regulation, and carving
out categories of individuals or activities from coverage or liability).  Establishing a well-defined
good faith exception to the doctrine here could create a similar “safe harbor” zone of behavior
But applying the inevitable misappropriation doctrine only to cases
involving bad faith generates several problems.  Proving bad faith and
intent can be very difficult.113  Thus, limiting the use of the doctrine
to cases where there is clear evidence of bad faith might significantly
decrease the court’s ability to protect trade secrets and leave
employers vulnerable to unscrupulous and deceptive competitors.  In
the alternative, if the standard for proof of bad faith and intent
proves to be nebulous, it may increase rather than decrease
litigation.114  Courts indirectly have tried to avoid confusion with the
good faith standard by requiring objective evidence such as proof
that the employee and her new employer have established
mechanisms to prevent the disclosure of the former employer’s trade
secrets.115  Such an objective requirement, however, also lends itself to
issues of proof and possible strategic behavior:  For example, what
constitutes a sufficient anti-disclosure mechanism could be the
subject of additional litigation and, as of yet, no standard has
emerged from the courts discussing the issue.116  Furthermore,
competitors seeking to appropriate trade secrets could establish
objective mechanisms to prevent disclosure and then simply, and
strategically, not enforce them.117
                                                 
or class of individuals free from application of the doctrine.
113. See Robert W. Emerson, Insurance Claims Fraud Problems and Remdies, 46 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 907, 945 (1992) (discussing the difficulty in proving bad faith claims in the context of
insurance litigation).
114. See Gary N. Schuman & Scott B. Herlihy, The Impending Wave of Legal Malpractice
Litigation-–Predictions, Analysis, and Proposal for Change, 30 ST. MARY’S L.J. 143, 181-84 (1998)
(suggesting that after years of confusion and an increase in litigation, the Texas Supreme Court
attempted to clarify the bad faith standard).
115. See Merck & Co. v. Lyon, 941 F. Supp. 1443, 1460 (M.D.N.C. 1996) (explaining that
steps taken by an employee and new employer to protect the old employer’s trade secrets are a
factor in determining the inevitability of trade secret misappropriation); see also Union Carbide
Corp. v. Sunox, Inc., 590 F. Supp. 224, 228 (W.D.N.C. 1984) (considering the former
employee’s lack of a written employment contract as a factor in the court’s denial of a
preliminary injunction; the court refused to “compel the enforcement of an agreement not to
compete which does not . . . exist”).
116. Compare Merck, 941 F. Supp. at 1460 (discussing generally factors which could trigger
use of anti-disclosure mechanism), and Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. v. Lockhart, 5 F. Supp. 2d
667, 682 (S.D. Ind. 1998) (discussing specific factors that, if present, preclude the use of
permanent anti-disclosure mechanisms), with Air Prods. & Chems. Inc. v. Johnson, 442 A.2d
1114, 1124-25 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982) (holding that the nature of employment itself implies
inevitable use of information and thus an anti-disclosure mechanism was appropriate).
117. Ample precedent for the existence and failure of “Chinese Wall” structures designed to
prevent insider trading in the securities industry exists.  See Ross P. Buckley, The Regulation of the
Emerging Markets Loan Market, 30 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 47, 65 (1998) (discussing a study in
which investment banks claimed extensive abuse of the Chinese Walls while most commercial
banks disagreed); see also Improper Activities in the Securities Industry:  Hearings Before the
Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 100th Cong. 89 (1987) (statement of
Sen. William Proxmire (D-Wis.)); H.R. REP. NO. 100-910, at 15 (1988), reprinted in 1988
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6043, 6052 (finding that recent cases have cast serious doubt on the effectiveness
Finally, society may be concerned about the misuse and
inappropriate disclosure of trade secrets that occur irrespective of
whether bad faith or intent to misappropriate exists.  Regardless of
whether an individual will intentionally use information, trade secrets
may subtly or directly have an impact on that individual’s decision
making in her new role with a competitor.  For example, courts have
issued injunctions against employees who simply have been exposed
to their former employers’ marketing strategies,118 reasoning that
even if an employee did not intend to misappropriate this
information, she would have to use such information in order to
serve her new employer in good faith.119  In Allis-Chalmers
Manufacturing Co. v. Continental Aviation & Engineering Corp.,120 the
court barred an employee from working on distributor-type pumps
that would have required him to take advantage of design innovations
that he had used and helped develop while working for his former
employer.121  The unintentional use of these trade secrets still may
have devastating and socially undesirable effects on an employer.122
c. The International Paper approach:  requiring technical
employment
A third approach to the inevitable misappropriation of trade
secrets limits its application to cases where the employee in question
either has highly technical skills or will be required to use technical
information in her new employment.  Courts reason that technical
employment requires the use of all of an employee’s specialized
knowledge and skills including those acquired from a former
employer; a conscientious employee will, thus, inevitably use or
disclose technical trade secrets acquired from a former employer in
the process of technical employment.123  For example, in International
                                                 
of measures such as Chinese Walls).  Nothing suggests that anti-trade-secret use or disclosure
mechanisms would be more effective or less haphazardly used.  Certainly firms have already
demonstrated ample desire to appropriate other companies’ trade secrets.  See supra notes 1-7
and accompanying text (highlighting the enormous growth of misappropriated trade secrets).
118. See PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262, 1264-67 (7th Cir. 1995) (granting an
injunction when a former high-level employee possessed trade secrets and other confidential
information about product development, pricing, marketing, and packaging).
119. See id. at 1270 (discussing the influence of confidential information on an employee’s
decision-making processes).
120. 255 F. Supp. 645 (E.D. Mich. 1966).
121. See id. at 654 (discussing the “virtual impossibility” of the employee performing his
duties adequately without the benefit of confidential information obtained during the course of
his previous employment).
122. See, e.g., G. Andrew Barger, Comment, Lost in Cyberspace:  Inventors, Computer Piracy and
“Printed Publications” Under Section 102(b) of the Patent Act, 71 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 353, 383
(1994) (concluding that current remedies available to an inventor pale in comparison to the
loss of “creative thinking” by the public due to publication of misappropriated information);
Chris Rauber, Biotech Research Alleges VC Firm Stole His Secrets, S.F. BUS. TIMES, Nov. 26, 1993, at 3
(discussing the effects of trade secret misappropriation on the research and development of
pharmaceutical products).
123. See, e.g., Business Intelligence Servs., Inc. v. Hudson, 580 F. Supp. 1068, 1072 (S.D.N.Y.
1984) (determining that the former employee’s specialized knowledge of computer software
was essential to the employee’s performance with the new employer); Continental Group, Inc.
v. Kinsley, 422 F. Supp. 838, 846 (D. Conn. 1976) (describing the “virtually daily opportunities”
Paper Co. v. Suwyn,124 a federal district court held that a finding of
inevitable misappropriation of trade secrets could only occur in cases
involving highly technical employment, such as plastic container
development or computer programming.125  Similarly, in Schlumberger
Well Services v. Blaker,126 the court held that the employee’s new
employment in a managerial, rather than a technical or engineering
position, made a finding of inevitability more difficult.127  Therefore,
the court specifically limited its finding to specific technical
information that involved the design and manufacture of specialized
devices used in the industry.128  Other courts also have focused on
technical employment as one of the factors in determining the
inevitability of misappropriation.129
Limiting the application of the doctrine to highly technical
employment has the attraction of providing a clear guideline for
courts to follow.  Furthermore, this limitation has some basis in the
pattern of litigation:  non-technical information or employees in non-
technical fields are less likely to inevitably misappropriate or disclose
trade secrets.  Finally, one could argue that protecting technical
knowledge is more easily justified because it stimulates investment in
technology in a way that protecting marketing information, for
example, does not.
Limiting the application of the doctrine to technical employees
and employment, however, ignores the growth of trade secrets law in
other areas, as well as the increasing importance of non-technical, but
strategic information.  For example, both PepsiCo and Merck & Co.
                                                 
for disclosure of technical information regarding the development of a plastic bottle through a
specific and technical process).
124. 966 F. Supp. 246 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
125. See id. at 258-59 (addressing the limited circumstances in which courts granted
injunctive relief, and denying the application for injunctive relief based on the managerial,
rather than technical, nature of the employee’s position); Hudson, 580 F. Supp. at 1072
(granting a preliminary injunction when the company would unfairly benefit by improving its
business with minimal or no effort based solely on the employee’s knowledge of computer
software and client information gained through previous employment); Kinsley, 422 F. Supp. at
846 (granting a preliminary injunction for 18 months to an employer in the plastic industry
whose former employee would have had daily opportunities to convey specialized knowledge of
a blow-molding process obtained from the old employer to the new one).
126. 623 F. Supp. 1310 (S.D. Ind. 1985) (balancing the parties’ interests and concluding
that a limited preliminary injunction should be granted), aff’d, 859 F.2d 512 (7th Cir. 1988).
127. See id. at 1317-18.
128. See id. (limiting the time period of the injunction, and the type of work the employee
with highly technical skills could perform for a new employer).
129. See, e.g., Hudson, 580 F. Supp. at 1072 (discussing the technical nature of computer
software); Kinsley, 422 F. Supp. at 846 (focusing on specialized technical knowledge of the
“blow-molding” process); Travenol Lab., Inc. v. Turner, 228 S.E.2d 478, 486 (N.C. Ct. App.
1976) (rejecting a finding of inevitable misappropriation in part because the nature of the
employment was managerial rather than technical).
presented compelling situations in which non-technical information
specifically pertaining to product launch dates, marketing strategies,
and basic concepts in product design or retailing were at risk of being
disclosed or misappropriated.130  Excluding non-technical informa-
tion from possible protection under the inevitable misappropriation
doctrine merely because it does not involve highly technical data,
ignores the competitive dynamic that exists in significantly non-
technical industries where information is highly valued and is
protectable as a trade secret.131
Other areas of the law do not place such stringent limits on the
kind of information that they protect.  For example, the securities
laws do not limit their punishment for material misrepresentation or
omissions to mere technical information.132  Some information
cannot help but affect decisions and thus be material even if it is not
technical in nature.133  Similarly, courts generally have held that
strategic information constitutes protectable trade secrets.134  More
importantly, recent developments in the law of trade secrets have
tended to broaden the definition of trade secrets and their
protection, without making distinctions based on technical content.135
The EEA, for instance, adopts a much broader definition of trade
secrets,136 and makes available its criminal sanctions and civil
                                                 
130. See PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262, 1265 (7th Cir. 1995) (discussing the
valuable, as well as sensitive, nature of an employer’s “Strategic Plan” and “Annual Operating
Plan”); Merck & Co. v. Lyon, 941 F. Supp. 1443, 1457 (M.D.N.C. 1996) (reviewing product
launch information and pricing data).
131. See, e.g., Pat Shockley, The Availability of “Trade Secret” Protection for University Research, 20
J.C. & U.L. 309 (1994) (discussing the various ways of protecting university research as
intellectual property).
132. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78(b) (1994) (prohibiting the
use of manipulative or deceptive devices in connection with the purchase or sale of all
securities); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848-53 (2d Cir. 1968) (concluding
that information is material if it would affect an ordinary investor’s decision to invest and
holding that failure to disclose (non-technical) knowledge of ore richness was a material
misrepresentation).
133. See, e.g., Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 236 (1988) (holding that the existence of
merger negotiations is material); TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976)
(same); Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d at 848-53 (finding that non-technical information
regarding a company’s determination of the true value of ore deposits was material and subject
to a duty to disclose).
134. See Schlumberger Well Servs. v. Blaker, 623 F. Supp. 1310, 1317 (S.D. Ind. 1985)
(indicating that information about the marketing plans and technology of wireline logging
would affect the behavior of a competitor and holding that it constituted a trade secret), aff’d,
859 F.2d 512 (7th Cir. 1988); see also C.A. Muer Corp. v. Big River Fish Co., Nos. Civ. A. 97-5402,
Civ. A. 97-6073, Civ. A. 97-7154, 1998 WL 488007, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 10, 1998) (holding that
commercial information such as marketing plans will receive protection if a party could show
that it would face competitive injury if the information were released).
135. See Economic Espionage Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C. § 1839 (Supp. 1997) (providing
examples of trade secrets); RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939) (explaining that trade
secrets can include specialized marketing codes and materials or price lists as well as technical
formulas); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION (1995) (same); UNIF. TRADE SECRET
ACT § 1 (as amended), 14 U.L.A. 433-67 (Supp. 1998) (defining trade secrets to incorporate
non-technical matter); see generally Esther C. Roditti, The Choice Between Patents and Trade Secrets to
Protect Software Innovation, in COMPUTER SOFTWARE PROTECTION 705-10(PLI Patent Practice
Course Handbook Series No. 479, 1997) (discussing definitions of trade secrets).
136. The EEA defines trade secret as “all forms and types of financial, business, scientific,
technical, economic, or engineering information, including patterns, plans, compilations,
injunctions to the entire range of these trade secrets, not merely
those that are considered technical in nature.137  The distinction
between technical and non-technical trade secrets and methods of
misappropriation therefore appears outdated and unjustified.
d. The Merck & Co. approach:  objective competition and similarity of
position
The fourth and most complicated approach to determining the
inevitability of misappropriation focuses on the objective
competitiveness of an industry, and the similarities between new and
old positions.  This approach, outlined in PepsiCo and its progeny,
involves a complex analysis of four independent factors.138   In Merck
& Co. v. Lyon,139 the court held that four factors must be considered
when evaluating the inevitability of misappropriation:  (1) the degree
of competition in the industry; (2) the new employer’s efforts to
safeguard the secrets of the old employer; (3) the forthrightness of
the employee; and (4) the degree of similarity of the new and old
employment.140  The court distilled these factors from the PepsiCo
court’s discussion of inevitability141 and evaluated them to find that
misappropriation was inevitable.142  Although the Merck & Co. court
evaluated both the new employer’s efforts to safeguard the old
employer’s secrets, as well as the forthrightness of the employee, it
specifically held that there was no need to prove underhanded
                                                 
program devices, formulas, designs, prototypes, methods, techniques, processes, procedures,
programs, or codes, whether tangible or intangible, and whether or how stored, compiled or
memorialized physically, electronically, graphically, photographically, or in writing if” the
owner has taken reasonable steps to keep the information secret and the information has either
potential or actual independent economic value.  See 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3) (Supp. 1997).
137. See id. §§ 1831-1832.
138. Throughout its analysis the PepsiCo court itself discussed four factors that have been
subsequently identified and adopted by other courts in their analysis of the issue.  See Merck &
Co. v. Lyon, 941 F. Supp. 1443, 1460 (M.D.N.C. 1996) (outlining the four factors and citing
PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262, 1267 (7th Cir. 1995)).
139. 941 F. Supp. 1443.
140. See id. at 1460-62 (discussing the intense competition between the employee’s old and
new employer, the lack of evidence that the new employer recruited the employee because of
his knowledge of the competitor’s secrets, the employee’s misrepresentations in an attempt to
obtain a more favorable severance package, and the similarities between the employee’s old and
new duties).
141. See PepsiCo, 54 F.3d at 1267-71 (describing the inherent tensions between morality,
innovation and market competition as they relate to the inevitability of trade secret
misappropriation).
142. See Merck & Co., 941 F. Supp. at 1461-62.  The Merck & Co. court found that the
industry and the companies in question were highly competitive, the competitor had made no
efforts to safeguard the old employer’s secrets, the employee made misrepresentations, and that
the new and old positions were quite similar.  See id.
dealing or bad faith,143 thus directly rejecting the Cyprus Foote
approach.144  Instead, the court held that evaluating the similarity of
the new and old positions and the value of the allegedly threatened
information was sufficient.145  Prospective employers’ efforts and
employees’ forthrightness were relevant to inevitability, but not
essential.146  Therefore, the Merck & Co. approach focuses on an
objective analysis of competitiveness and similarity of position,
noting, but not requiring, a showing of intent or bad faith.147
Other courts have taken similar approaches to determining
inevitability.  For example, in National Starch & Chemical Corp. v.
Parker Chemical Corp.,148 a New Jersey superior court discussed the
competitiveness of the envelope adhesives industry, noting that five
percent of the employee’s time would be spent working on envelope
adhesives formulas for her new employer.149  After reviewing these
facts, the court upheld a lower court’s finding that inevitability of
misappropriation existed with regard to five percent of the time the
employee spent on formulas.150  In upholding the lower court, the
National Starch court imitated Merck & Co. by noting that the
employee’s good faith and intent were irrelevant to a finding of
inevitability.151  Following the approaches in Merck & Co., other courts
have discussed competitiveness and similarity of position,152 and held
that intent and bad faith are unnecessary to a finding of
inevitability,153 or they note the new employer’s efforts to safeguard
                                                 
143. See id. at 1460 (stating that in situations where the court enjoins potential
misappropriation through the inevitable disclosure theory and the injunctions are limited in
scope, no requirement of bad faith by the former employee or employer exists).
144. See id. at 1460-61 nn.5-6 (discussing Cyprus Foote and emphasizing the distinction that
no evidence of bad faith or underhanded dealing existed); see also Part II.A.1.a (discussing a
fact-intensive approach to determining inevitability of misappropriation).
145. See id. at 1460 (citing PepsiCo, 54 F.3d at 1267) (stating that consideration of the four
factors is consistent with the approach taken by North Carolina state courts).
146. See id. at 1461 (noting that although no evidence existed that the prospective employer
sought out the employee for his knowledge of trade secrets, the employee’s misrepresentations
indicated a possibility of future temptations to disclose confidential information to further his
career, thus warranting an issuance of a limited injunction).
147. See id. (questioning the employee’s ability to keep confidential information from his
new employer).
148. 530 A.2d 31 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987).
149. See id. at 32-33.
150. See id. at 33 (holding that under circumstances where a significant threat of disclosure
exists, inferences are sufficient to warrant the granting of a preliminary injunction).
151. See id. at 32-33 (declaring that a former employee’s knowledge of trade secrets and the
factual circumstances sufficient to satisfy the likelihood of “immediate and irreparable harm” to
warrant issuance of a preliminary injunction).
152. See, e.g., PepsiCo, Inc., v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262, 1269 (7th Cir. 1995) (discussing
inevitable misappropriation in the context of industry competitiveness and the similarity
between employees’ positions); Doubleclick, Inc. v. Henderson, No. 116914/97, 1997 WL
731413, at *5-6 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov. 7, 1997) (discussing the competitiveness of the Internet
advertising industry and the similarity of new and old employment in a finding of inevitable
misappropriation).
153. A significant number of cases dealing with covenants not to compete discuss the
competitiveness of the industries and the similarity of positions, and consider good faith and
intent irrelevant in finding inevitable misappropriation.  See Branson Ultrasonics Corp. v.
Stratman, 921 F. Supp. 909, 913-14 (D. Conn. 1996) (“When . . . a high degree of similarity
between an employee’s former and current employment makes it likely that the former
employer’s trade secrets . . . will be . . . disclosed by the employee in the course of his new work,
the old employer’s trade secrets.154
Furthermore, Merck & Co.’s approach significantly broadens the
reach of the inevitable misappropriation doctrine.  First, eliminating
the requirement of bad faith or intent significantly increases the
number of cases in which a court can find inevitable
misappropriation.  Second, eliminating the technical employment
requirement broadens the application of the approach to additional
cases involving management plans and employees.155
Merck & Co.’s approach presents some important advantages.  It
both evaluates objective criteria, such as industry competitiveness and
employment similarities, and engages in a subjective inquiry into the
behavior and intent of the employee and prospective employer.
Second, Merck & Co. is relatively clear in its guidance,156 generating
more reliable and predictable precedents.  Rather than a case-by-case
analysis of facts, Merck & Co.’s objective criteria enable courts to
develop more consistent standards, tests, and precedents for applying
the doctrine.  For example, having established that the sport drink
industry is highly competitive in PepsiCo157 and that Internet
advertising is equally competitive in Doubleclick, Inc. v. Henderson,158 a
court facing another sport drink or Internet advertising case easily
could apply the Merck & Co. inevitability analysis.  In addition, guided
by the criterion of similarity of position and responsibility, a court
also could evaluate the nature of specific responsibilities without
                                                 
enforcement of a covenant not to compete is necessary to protect against . . . disclosure.”);
Lumex, Inc. v. Highsmith, 919 F. Supp. 624, 631 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (explaining that when similar
and dissimilar and competitive and noncompetitive elements are involved, the court should be
cautious and grant the request for a preliminary injunction); see also Business Intelligence
Servs., Inc. v. Hudson, 580 F. Supp. 1068, 1072 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (granting a preliminary
injunction when client information and non-competition clause limitations were limited in
scope); Continental Group, Inc. v. Kinsley, 422 F. Supp. 838, 846 (D. Conn. 1976) (granting a
preliminary injunction limited in scope with respect to duration where specialized knowledge
obtained as a result of employment was directly relevant to the new position and daily
opportunities existed for disclosure of such information).
154. See, e.g., Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. v. Lockhart, 5 F. Supp. 2d 667, 682 (S.D. Ind.
1998) (finding that misappropriation was not inevitable in part because employee and
employer specifically worked to design an employment position different from the old position
so as to prevent the use or disclosure of the former employer’s trade secrets).
155. See supra notes 123-37 and accompanying text (discussing the misappropriation of non-
technical and strategic information).
156. See Merck & Co. v. Lyon, 941 F. Supp. 1443, 1460 (M.D.N.C. 1996) (stating that the
court will “enjoin threatened misappropriation based upon an inevitable disclosure theory
where the injunction is limited to protecting specifically defined trade secrets [that are] clearly
defined and of significant value,” and noting that the similarity of positions and value of the
information demonstrate the likelihood of disclosure).
157. See PepsiCo, 54 F.3d at 1263-64 (describing the “fierce beverage-industry competition”
between the parties).
158. See  No. 116914/97, 1997 WL 731413, at *2 (N.Y. County Sup. Ct. Nov. 7, 1997) (citing
the case record for evidence of industry-wide competition).
engaging in a difficult analysis of the intentions or good or bad faith
of the individuals involved.159  At the same time, the court could take
into account evidence of bad faith or the efforts to safeguard the old
employer’s secrets without requiring these factors for its analysis.
Thus, the Merck & Co. procedure combines the advantages of clearer
objective minimum requirements with flexibility to account for
evidence of subjective intent.
Unfortunately, the Merck & Co. approach also suffers from
significant limitations.  First, a finding of inevitable misappropriation
under Merck & Co. results in unnecessarily harsh outcomes.  If the
objective criteria alone are met, an individual employee can be
restricted from employment whether or not she intended to
misappropriate trade secrets.  The framework of Merck & Co.
specifically does not require an evaluating court to account for an
employee’s good faith or intent not to appropriate when it analyzes
inevitable misappropriation.160  Second, Merck & Co. does not provide
a system for weighing the objective versus subjective evidence in its
analysis.  Consequently, like the case-by-case approach161 it too can
generate uncertainty and inconsistency in its findings of inevitability.
Thus, the four existing methods of determining inevitability—case-
by-case analysis, bad faith limitations, technical employment
requirements and objective competitiveness/similarity of position—
all suffer from significant specific limitations.  A simple case-by-case
approach creates inconsistency and masks pro-employer information
biases.  Requiring bad faith ignores special and important cases
where using or disclosing trade secrets might be inevitable even
absent evidence of direct intent.  Moreover, requiring bad faith
increases difficulties of proof.  Technical employment limitations
exclude important non-technical confidential information like
pricing, marketing, and strategy data from protection at a time when
the trend in the rest of trade secrets law is to increase recognition
and protection of these and other valuable pieces of intellectual
property.  Applying the objective criteria of competitiveness and
similarity of position, while also taking into account other indications
of intent, would probably best capture the concept of inevitability;
however, this approach still generates some inflexible, categorical
findings of inevitability.
2. Excessive general focus on employer interests
More generally, all four approaches to determining inevitability
suffer from their singular and excessive focus on the employer’s
                                                 
159. See supra notes 102-22 and accompanying text (analyzing the good faith and fair
dealings standards and associated issues).
160. See Merck, 941 F. Supp. at 1461 (suggesting that where an employer fails to establish
that a former employee used his position to obtain trade secrets, the court may consider the
employee’s previous misrepresentations as a basis for questioning his willingness to uphold the
confidentiality agreement he has with his former employer).
161. See discussion supra Part II.A.1.a.
interests.  Although the courts applying these approaches separately
discuss the importance of the employee’s interests and appear to
balance them against the employer’s interests after the determination
of inevitability, the courts’ initial inevitability inquiry focuses solely on
the trade secrets themselves.  In Standard Brands, the court noted the
importance of the employee’s interest in working,162 but made its
determination of inevitability based only on the nature of the
employment involved.163  The court does not mention the relative
value of the employee’s interests or the extent of infringement on the
employer’s trade secrets in the initial inevitability determination.164
Similarly, the bad faith inquiry of Cyprus Foote requires no
determination of the extent to which the employer’s trade secrets will
be compromised or the relative value of the employee’s interests in
its initial inevitability determination.165  The International Paper
approach makes a rather crude valuation of the employer’s trade
secrets by limiting protection to technical employment areas,166 but
courts following this methodology also do not discuss the employee’s
specific employment interest and its value compared to the
threatened trade secrets when they determine inevitability.167  Merck
& Co. initially ignores the value of the employee’s interests in
determining inevitability as well, and it fails to inquire into the extent
of inevitable misappropriation.168  Consequently, none of these
approaches accounts for the potential value differential between the
                                                 
162. 264 F. Supp. 254, 263-67 (E.D. La. 1967)  (explaining Louisiana’s long-standing policy
against placing broad restrictions on employment when the limitations are unrelated to the
actual duties of the position and noting that Louisiana and public policy discourage
noncompete agreements restricting employment).
163. See id. at 268-71 (discussing the previous employer’s attempt to receive injunctive relief
because the type of work involved indicated a probability of disclosure).
164. See id. at 270 (limiting the inquiry to disclosure or imminent threat of disclosure based
on the employee’s position).
165. See FMC Corp. v. Cyprus Foote Mineral Co., 899 F. Supp. 1477, 1483 (W.D.N.C. 1995)
(granting an injunction only upon a “showing of bad faith, underhanded dealing or
employment by an entity so plainly lacking comparable technology that misappropriation can
be inferred”).
166. See International Paper Co. v. Suwyn, 966 F. Supp. 246, 258 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)
(distinguishing between cases involving the relatively low-technology wood and building
products industries and those involving high technology industries where preliminary
injunctions were granted).
167. See Schlumberger Well Servs. v. Blaker, 623 F. Supp. 1310, 1317 (S.D. Ind. 1985)
(focusing analysis on the technical nature of the employment); Business Intelligence Servs. v.
Hudson, 580 F. Supp. 1068, 1073 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (granting a preliminary injunction, in part,
due to the technical nature of computer software); Continental Group, Inc. v. Kinsley, 422 F.
Supp. 838, 846 (D. Conn. 1976) (granting a limited preliminary injunction because of the
technical nature of the industry at issue).
168. See Merck & Co. v. Lyon, 941 F. Supp. 1443, 1460 (M.D.N.C. 1996) (commenting that a
former employee is likely to misappropriate some information with his new employer, but
declining to examine the scope of the inevitable misappropriation).
loss of trade secrets (presumed to be invaluable) and the restrictions
of individual livelihood (generally treated rhetorically or ignored),
nor do they allow for findings of partial inevitability or limited
misappropriation.
Furthermore, each of these approaches treats a finding of
inevitability as the end of the initial analysis.  After determining that
trade secrets inevitably will be misappropriated, courts following each
of the four methodologies move immediately to providing injunctive
protection for the trade secrets; a finding of inevitability always
appears to lead to some kind of protective relief.  Because the current
approaches do not account for relative value or partial inevitability,
any determination of inevitability ends the initial inquiry.  As a result,
cases involving the inevitable misappropriation of only a small part of
the employer’s trade secrets with a relatively small value compared to
employee’s interests are treated the same as cases involving much
larger disclosure or misuse, or much more relatively valuable trade
secrets.  The extent of inevitability and the relative value of the trade
secrets are irrelevant to the all-or-nothing determination of
inevitability.
Thus, the courts’ trade-secrets-centered approaches to determining
initial inevitability are too simplistic.  They take no more than the
crudest account of the relative values or degrees of inevitability,
thereby threatening to under-protect employees’ interests in favor of
employers’ interests.  This is exacerbated by the inconsistent
application of the remedies discussed below.
3. Inadequate and inconsistent all-or-nothing remedies
In addition to applying overly simplistic methods to determine
inevitability, generally courts have taken an all-or-nothing approach
to remedies.  This approach unsystematically provides inconsistent,
inaccurate, and inadequate relief after a finding of inevitability of
disclosure or use.
The courts generally have provided all-or-nothing injunctive relief
upon a finding of inevitable misappropriation.  The scope of this
injunctive relief, however, has been inconsistent.  Some courts, after
finding that the misappropriation of specific trade secrets was
inevitable, have completely enjoined employees from working for
their new prospective employers.  In PepsiCo, for example, although
the trade secrets involved in the case only pertained to specific
marketing plans and markets, the court enjoined Redmond, the
employee, from working for Quaker Oats in any capacity for six
months.169  Other courts also have completely barred employees from
working for new employers, even when the trade secrets that
                                                 
169. See PepsiCo., Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1212, 1272 (7th Cir. 1995) (affirming the
reasoning of the district court that the employee could not be trusted to withhold his
knowledge of the former employer’s trade secrets, and therefore an injunction was needed to
avoid a conflict of interest).
employees would inevitably misappropriate only pertained to specific
areas of an employer’s operations.170
In contrast, some courts faced with cases similar to PepsiCo have
provided much more limited and narrowly tailored injunctions that
restrict employees from working in specific areas of operations.
Ostensibly applying the same standards to similar strategic marketing
and pricing plans as the PepsiCo court, the Merck & Co. court issued a
much more limited injunction, simply barring the employee and new
employer from discussing a specific product launch for one year.171
Other courts have also issued much more limited injunctions.  These
courts have barred an employee from performing five percent of the
duties required in her new position,172 limited the specific types of
products with which the employee can work,173 or restricted the
specific areas of operation in which the employee can work.174  Some
courts simply have enjoined the employee’s use or disclosure of trade
secrets when working in similar situations, but have not restricted the
type or scope of her employment.175  Although courts have suggested
that a limited injunction may have the same effect as a complete ban
on employment because the new employer may have no other use for
                                                 
170. See, e.g., Norand Corp. v. Parkin, 785 F. Supp. 1353, 1356 (N.D. Iowa 1990) (granting a
temporary restraining order against any employment with new employer); SI Handling Sys.,
Inc. v. Heisley, 581 F. Supp. 1553 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (enjoining all employees from any
employment with the new employer), rev’d, 753 F.2d 1244 (3d Cir. 1985) (remanding for more
specific factual findings).  Total injunctions appear to be more prevalent in cases of bad faith.
See Ackerman v. Kimball Int’l, Inc., 652 N.E.2d 507, 510-11 (Ind. 1995) (barring an employee
from working for a competitor entirely after finding threatened misappropriation and specific
acts of bad faith); Doubleclick, Inc. v. Henderson, No. 116914/97, 1997 WL 731413, at *5-6
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov. 7, 1997) (enjoining employees from starting a new Internet advertising
company for six months, even though only some information that would be used in the process
could have constituted trade secrets).
171. See Merck, 941 F. Supp. at 1464-65 (M.D.N.C. 1996) (tailoring the injunction to deal
with specific over-the-counter and prescription drugs).
172. See National Starch & Chem. Corp. v. Parker Chem. Corp., 530 A.2d 31, 33 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1987) (enjoining an employee from working in envelope adhesives for 15 months,
even though such work constituted five percent of her expected position activities).
173. See Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. Continental Aviation & Eng’g Corp., 255 F. Supp. 645,
654-55 (E.D. Mich. 1966) (enjoining an engineer from working on the design and development
of distributor pumps but allowing him to work for a competitor in other areas).
174. See Schlumberger Well Servs. v. Blaker, 623 F. Supp. 1310, 1318-19 (S.D. Ind. 1985)
(enjoining an engineer for two years from “using or disclosing certain confidential
information” in areas related directly to wireline logging technology, but allowing him to accept
a management position with new employer), aff’d, 859 F.2d 512 (7th Cir. 1988); Air Prods. &
Chems., Inc. v. Johnson, 442 A.2d 1114, 1115-16 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982) (granting a limited one-
year injunction preventing the employee from working in a specific area of a new employer’s
operations).
175. See, e.g., B.F. Goodrich v. Wohlgemuth, 192 N.E.2d 99, 105 (Ohio Ct. App. 1963)
(finding threatened misappropriation of high-altitude pressure suit design trade secrets, but
simply enjoining an employee’s disclosure of such secrets and allowing him to work in the
competing department of his new employer).
the employee,176 or because even a limited injunction might alienate
the employer,177 the differences in the scope and range of the
injunctions make them appear inconsistent.178
Of course, differences in the method of finding inevitability
generate additional inconsistencies in the application of remedies to
similar fact patterns.  Although these different types of injunctive
relief might appear to be evidence of a flexible approach to the
doctrine, the courts have failed to articulate either a coherent or
consistent framework for crafting the scope of the relief, and thus
they have opened the door for variability and unpredictability.179
Courts have disagreed regarding the possibility of providing
damages for trade secrets in cases of putative inevitable
misappropriation.  The majority of such courts have held that
damages caused by the inevitable misappropriation of trade secrets
are incalculable and irreparable.180  Therefore, inevitable
misappropriation under this theory must be enjoined completely.181
At least one court, however, suggests that the damages from trade
secret misappropriation are calculable through estimations of market
share and profit-losses or other mechanisms,182 and California even
provides courts with a mechanism for requiring and directing
payment of royalties for use of trade secrets.183  Therefore, these
courts may deny an injunction (an equitable remedy) with the
implication that a determination of legal damages might be
sufficient.184
Finally, only a few courts have crafted combinations of injunctive
relief and legal damages.  In the case of Emery Industries v. Cottier,185 a
federal district court entered an injunction against an employee
                                                 
176. See FMC Corp. v. Cyprus Foote Mineral Co., 899 F. Supp. 1477, 1483-84 (W.D.N.C.
1995) (finding that even a limited injunction would prevent the employee from working in the
bulk of the employer’s manufacturing process).
177. See Baxter Int’l, Inc. v. Morris, 976 F.2d 1189, 1194-95 (8th Cir. 1992) (finding a
protracted absence, even with compensation to the employee, might alienate the employer).
178. Compare id. (ordering a narrow injunction to protect an employer from harm, as well as
limiting restraints on the former employee), with Cypress Foote, 899 F. Supp. at 1484 (denying the
employer an injunction on the grounds of broadness and potential harm to the former
employee).
179. Inconsistent remedies generate significant concerns.  See infra notes 202-16 and
accompanying text (suggesting inconsistency increases the cost of trade secret protection and
harms employees).
180. See, e.g., Merck & Co. v. Lyon, 941 F. Supp. 1443, 1456 (M.D.N.C. 1996); see also supra
note 61 and accompanying text (discussing the irreparable harm stemming from the
misappropriation of trade secrets).
181. See id. (holding that calculating damages by anticipated market share would be an
insurmountable task); Barr-Mullin, Inc. v. Browning, Ltd., 424 S.E.2d 226, 230 (N.C. Ct. App.
1993) (holding that misappropriation of trade secrets results in an injury “of such continuous
and frequent recurrence that no reasonable redress can be had in a court of law”).
182. See, e.g., Cypress Foote, 899 F. Supp. at 1483 (holding that damages would be difficult to
calculate, but not incalculable).
183. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.3(b) (West 1997).
184. See Cypress Foote, 899 F. Supp. at 1483 (holding that North Carolina’s Trade Secrets
Protection Act “provides a wide range of relief”).
185. 202 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 829 (S.D. Ohio 1978); see also Lowry, supra note 2, at 542 (focusing
on Emery Industries as an important and creative solution).
working for a competitor of his former employer, but also ordered
the employer to pay the employee $3,300 for each month that his
employment was restricted.186  Virtually no other courts have even
considered similar remedies,187 although they routinely enforce such
judgments in the context of upholding noncompete covenants or
agreements.188  More commonly, courts recognize the harms suffered
by the employee as a result of restrictions on his employment,189 but
they will not require employers to provide any compensation for
restrictions due to injunctions to prevent inevitable
misappropriation.190  Thus, although almost all courts explicitly
acknowledge the damages to employees from restrictions on their
employment, they only rarely provide them with compensation
during an injunction.
The existing approach to remedies has several important negative
consequences.  First, it generates considerable uncertainty and
inconsistency concerning remedies.  As noted above, many courts
facing similar fact patterns have adopted different remedies to the
situations under question.191  This generates more speculation and
uncertainty, which consequently leads to unnecessary litigation costs,
and a pro-employer bias caused by resource and information
inequalities between employer and employee.192
Additionally, the haphazard, all-or-nothing approach to remedies
causes inconsistency in inevitability of misappropriation
determinations.  Because under the current approaches courts
                                                 
186. See Emery Indus., 202 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 836 (holding that courts should balance the
restrictions in noncompete agreements between the parties in a reasonable manner).
187. See, e.g., Baxter Int’l, Inc. v. Morris, 976 F.2d 1189, 1197 (8th Cir. 1992) (noting that
the harm to the employee from a one-year injunction would be so great that even paying the
employee’s salary for that year would be insufficient compensation).
188. See, e.g., Lumex, Inc. v. Highsmith, 919 F. Supp. 624, 636 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (enjoining an
employee for six months and requiring the employer to pay his salary for that time period per
the explicit covenant); Marcam Corp. v. Orchard, 885 F. Supp. 294, 298 (D. Mass. 1995)
(enjoining an employee from working for a competitor for one year pursuant to a covenant not
to compete, but requiring the former employer to pay the employee 110% of the salary offered
by the competitor).  For a general discussion of the issue of employment restrictions coupled
with compensation in this context, see THOMAS M. JORDE ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN
THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 89 n.16 (1997).
189. See supra notes 62-68 and accompanying text (discussing courts’ recognition of harms
to employees).
190. See Lumex, 919 F. Supp. at 636 (holding that a former employee should be completely
enjoined from working for a competitor for six months); Merck & Co. v. Lyon, 941 F. Supp.
1443, 1455 (M.D.N.C. 1996) (discussing simple injunctions against misappropriation as well-
recognized remedies).
191. See supra notes 169-90 and accompanying text (discussing several court remedies used
to balance the relative harms to each party).
192. See infra notes 202-16 and accompanying text (discussing inherent problems with
misappropriation litigation).
generally are limited to providing or denying broad injunctive relief,
courts’ evaluations of inevitability effectively determine whether
employees or employers entirely will benefit.193  As a result, courts that
foresee the blunt and potentially inequitable consequences of their
inevitability determinations have an incentive to alter their
inevitability analysis to prevent one side from winning or losing.  For
example, in Schlumberger, the court combined its discussion of
whether an employee would inevitably misappropriate trade secrets
in the course of his new employment with its analysis of the dramatic
consequences that the broad injunction asked for would have on the
employee and his family.194  Courts in these situations are asked to
make decisions based on the equities involved because they are
evaluating injunctive relief;195 however, the all-or-nothing approach to
providing remedies pushes courts to alter their original
determinations of inevitability, with consequences for the consistency
of their approach.  Courts subsequently attempting to apply the
doctrine are likely to face the increasingly difficult challenge of
reconciling these increasingly inconsistent precedents.  Thus, the
unsystematic, all-or-nothing relief provided under the existing
approaches may cause courts to alter inevitability decisions, and
create additional inconsistencies.
Finally, the general all-or-nothing approach is likely to compensate
inaccurately the individual employee and employer in any given case.
If an injunction is granted, the employee is generally not
compensated for her lost employment opportunities and the
employer does not have to pay for the benefit of barring a competitor
from acquiring a skilled employee.196  The employee is under-
compensated (i.e., does not recover for her lost employment value)
and the employer overcompensated (i.e., does not pay for barring the
competitor from getting skilled labor).  On the other hand, if an
injunction is denied, an employer will not be compensated for harm
(i.e., may still suffer from the use of trade-secret related information
by its competitors), while the employee does not have to pay for the
value she received from exposure to such trade secrets.  Again the
employer is undercompensated (i.e., does not recover for harms) and
the employee is overcompensated (i.e., receives some value for
exposure to trade secrets from the new employer).  Moreover, there
may be many cases in which the balance of harms leans more on one
                                                 
193. See Lowry, supra note 2, at 539 (arguing that application of the current doctrine to
trade secret cases often results in seemingly unfair judicial holdings).
194. See Schlumberger Well Servs. v. Blaker, 623 F. Supp. 1310, 1318-19 (S.D. Ind. 1985)
(granting a partial injunction that prohibited the former employee from using or disclosing
certain information, but permitted him to work in specific departments of the new employer’s
company), aff’d, 859 F.2d 512 (7th Cir. 1988) .
195. See id. (discussing whether to grant injunctive relief based on the “no compete”
covenant in the employment contract).
196. But see Emery Indus., Inc. v. Cottier, 202 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 829, 836 (S.D. Ohio 1979)
(awarding damages and the injunction).
side than the other, but where both parties are harmed.197  In an all-
or-nothing system, only one party gets relief.198  Although a few courts
appear to be trying to mitigate this problem by tailoring their
injunctions,199 the courts’ sporadic granting of damages200 and their
failure to articulate or apply a consistent approach when granting
remedies201 suggest that inefficient and inequitable relief will remain
an important problem.
4. General critiques and concerns
Two general concerns emerge from this evaluation.  First, the
inconsistencies in the methodology and the damages themselves are
troubling.  As an initial matter, as discussed above, important
interests and fundamental values are implicated by the doctrine of
inevitable misappropriation.202  Inconsistent or contradictory
applications of the doctrine suggest that the balance between
employer and employee interests is being struck haphazardly.  In
particular, the unsystematic, almost exclusively all-or-nothing
approach to damages seems to reward crudely one party or another
entirely at the expense of the other.203  Such inconsistency heightens
concerns that the public policy goals of promoting efficiency,
innovation, and growth also are being frustrated.204
One commentator suggests two ways that the current, inconsistent
application of the doctrine increases the costs of trade secrets
protection generally, and harms the interests of employees,
                                                 
197. See, e.g., id. at 833-34 (recognizing harm to employer and employee and attempting to
balance the interests of both when issuing a temporary injunction against the former
employee).
198. See Lowry, supra note 2, at 539.
199. See supra notes 171-75 and accompanying text.
200. See supra notes 180-90 and accompanying text.
201. See discussion supra Part II.A.3.
202. See supra notes 55-68 and accompanying text (observing the conflicting interests
between employers and employees including the employees’ right to use their skills and
employers’ right to trade secret protection).
203. See Lowry, supra note 2, at 529-31, 536-39 (discussing court decisions that applied the
all-or-nothing approach).  Compare Air Prod. & Chem., Inc. v. Johnson, 442 A.2d 1114 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1982) (enjoining temporarily a management employee from working for a
competitor in a technical area because the employee’s knowledge of non-technical market
information could be characterized as a trade secret), with Scott Paper Co. v. Finnegan, 476
N.Y.S.2d 316, 317-18 (App. Div. 1984) (holding that a high-level manager’s knowledge of
identity of distributor systems, the results of market research studies on customer preferences,
pricing information and plans for promotional activities did not constitute trade secrets);
compare Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1002-03 (1984) (clarifying that a trade
secret is property of the employer), with Eaton Corp. v. Appliance Valves Corp., 526 F. Supp.
1172, 1180-81 (N.D. Ind. 1981) (acknowledging that an employee has a property interest in
prior work experience).
204. See supra notes 69-86 and accompanying text.
specifically.205  First, by creating uncertainty about the success of
different claims, the inconsistent application of the doctrine
increases both the likelihood and cost of litigation.206  Employers and
employees may be more likely to litigate inevitable misappropriation
in the absence of a clear standard, and to expend more money
seeking different venues or courts to hear their cases.207  Increasing
growth in the number of jurisdictions adopting inconsistent
approaches to the doctrine will only exacerbate this problem.
Second, because employers possess greater access to information
and resources, inconsistency in the application of the doctrine will
subtly favor employers’ interests at the expense of less well-positioned
employees.208  As an initial matter, employers generally have greater
knowledge about employment law and litigation because they are
repeat players.209  Furthermore, because employers generally have
greater economic resources available for litigation, they benefit from
the threat and uncertainty of claims of inevitable misappropriation.210
Conversely, the expenses of such litigation are enough to deter
employees from risking an uncertain outcome.211  As a practical
empirical matter, the commentator also argues that inconsistency in
judicial decision-making about inevitable misappropriation has
masked a general pro-employer bias.212  The all-or-nothing remedies
most courts provide are weighted against employee interests.
Because of the structure of these remedies, litigation not only fails to
provide employees with compensation for their restricted
employment when they are enjoined, but also injures them through
the expense of legal fees without compensation even when they
win.213  Finally, the inconsistency in the doctrine and the cost of
litigation may enable unscrupulous employers to engage in
opportunistic or bad faith litigation or, more importantly, simply
                                                 
205. See Lowry, supra note 2, at 528-31.
206. See id. at 530-31 (suggesting that unclear guidelines encourage employers to bring
trade secret lawsuits even without evidence of disclosure, thereby increasing economic costs for
both employers and former employees).
207. See id.
208. See Miles J. Feldman, Toward a Clearer Standard of Protectable Information:  Trade Secrets and
the Employment Relationship, 9 HIGH TECH. L.J. 151, 172 (1994) (noting that employees are hurt
by the uncertain status of the law because the possibility of litigation discourages changing
employers, and employers are deterred from employing former competitors’ employees out of
fear of potential trade secret litigation); infra Part III.D (discussing the need for a deterrent to
employers’ strategic threats to litigate and actual litigation regarding such activities); see also
Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. v. Lockhart, 5 F. Supp. 2d 667, 685 (S.D. Ind. 1998) (holding that
all of the noncompetition provisions in the former employee’s contract were “unreasonably
broad and unenforceable”).
209. See Lowry, supra note 2, at 531-35 (discussing employee inequities in trade secret
litigation).
210. See id. (suggesting that employers’ superior bargaining power and economic position
perpetuates inequitable trade secret decisions).
211. See id. at 531 (stating that unclear laws decrease employee mobility).
212. See id. at 530-31 (noting that the lack of clear guidelines encourages employers to
pursue trade secret lawsuits while decreasing employee mobility).
213. See id. at 530-31, 536-39 (discussing the high costs of litigation and the
undercompensated value of employee property interests).
threaten litigation either to deter employees from leaving or to attack
competitors.214  The combination of these effects has a significant
negative impact on both fundamental employee rights and
interests,215 as well as on more systemic issues of innovation and
economic growth.216
The next major concern emerges from examining existing
approaches on employers’ property interests in the trade secrets.  As
has been noted above,217 current approaches to the doctrine generate
a crude determination of inevitability without formally accounting for
partial inevitability or the value of employee interests.  In
Schlumberger, for example, the court found that wireline logging trade
secrets would be inevitably misappropriated without evaluating the
degree of inevitability or the value of the employee’s human capital
or liberty interest in choosing his own work.218  Because the focus of
the inevitability determination is based only on the threat to the
employer’s trade secrets and does not inquire into partial inevitability
or relative value, partially misappropriated or relatively low-valued
trade secrets may be protected at the expense of more valuable
employee interests in freedom to work or human capital.  Even if the
value of an employee’s interests (such as Blaker’s in Schlumberger)219 to
choose his work or exercise his human capital vastly exceeded that of
the trade secrets in question, the current method of determining
inevitability does not formally or systematically account for these
relative values.  Blaker could be enjoined without the court ever
inquiring into relative value of his interests, resulting in significant
inequities and inefficiencies in the outcome of his case.
In addition, the general all-or-nothing approach to remedies
appears to favor crude protection of employer trade secrets.  Because
courts have almost never provided offsetting compensation to
                                                 
214. See Schuyler, supra note 38, at 27 (discussing the opportunistic use of the inevitable
misappropriation doctrine to evade restrictions on covenants not to compete); cf. Lowry, supra
note 2, at 534 (describing the employers’ advantages and the likelihood of engaging in
opportunistic behavior while negotiating covenants not to compete).
215. See supra notes 62-68 and accompanying text (discussing employee interests in the
marketplace).
216. See supra notes 79-86 and accompanying text (addressing critics’ arguments that the
doctrine of inevitable misappropriation, when applied inappropriately, is counterproductive
and inhibits economic growth).
217. See supra notes 162-68 and accompanying text (detailing how initial determinations of
inevitability focus solely on employers’ and not employees’ interests).
218. See Schlumberger Well Servs. v. Blaker, 623 F. Supp. 1310, 1317 (S.D. Ind. 1985)
(evaluating solely the employer’s interest in trade secrets despite other competing and
potentially more valuable employee interests), aff’d, 859 F.2d 512 (7th Cir. 1988).
219. See id. at 1318.
employees for their lost interests when issuing injunctive relief,220 and
because the determination of inevitability and the crafting of
remedies do not formally account for relative value,221 employee
interests are left further undervalued and underprotected.  When
inevitability of misappropriation is found, courts provide protection
only in the direction of employers’ trade secret property interests,
without formally accounting for employee interests.  In Seagate
Technology, the court appeared oblivious to the burden of injunctive
relief on the employee, and instead focused solely on the protection
of the employer’s trade secret interests.222
The inaccurate and potentially harsh results of these approaches
may result in secondary effects, such as additional inconsistency and
disingenuousness from some courts which resort to subterfuges to
avoid egregious outcomes.  For example, as discussed above, in
Schlumberger, the court mixed its discussion of employment factors
and trade secrets with the effect of its injunctive remedy on the
employee in its inevitability determination; thus the court appeared
to alter its evaluation based on the potentially harsh outcome of all-
or-nothing relief.223  The outcome in Schlumberger suggests that these
alterations by courts create unpredictability at the margins while
maintaining an undesirable, generally pro-employer bias.
Thus, current court approaches to the doctrine suffer from specific
problems of over-inclusiveness, under-inclusiveness, and internal
inconsistency.  Their overly narrow focus on employer property
interests and crude all-or-nothing remedies combine to generate
significant inequitable and inefficient results as well as an
undesirable, generally pro-employer bias that discounts or ignores
fundamental employee interests and resources.
B. Existing Proposals
With the limitations of current court approaches to the doctrine in
mind, commentators have proposed three different approaches to
the doctrine of inevitable misappropriation:  global rejection of the
doctrine, acceptance of the doctrine, or recognition of concurrent
property interests.  Unfortunately, these proposals suffer from
significant limitations as well.
                                                 
220. As noted above, courts have provided damages or compensation to employees in the
context of inevitable misappropriation in only a very few instances.  See supra notes 180-90 and
accompanying text.
221. See supra notes 162-68 and accompanying text (contending that case precedent fails to
acknowledge the relative value of employee interests in the determination of inevitability).
222. See IBM Corp. v. Seagate Tech., No. Civ. 3-91-630, 1991 WL 757821 (D. Minn. Dec. 31,
1991) (overturning the district court’s granting of injunctive relief to IBM after finding
insufficient evidence to support IBM’s claim that the information in question was confidential
and/or a trade secret), rev’d, 962 F.2d 12 (8th Cir. 1992); see also Schuyler, supra note 38, at 28
(suggesting that these types of decisions result in significant overall pro-employer/anti-
employee biases).
223. See Schlumberger, 623 F. Supp. at 1312-18.  Seeking to avoid an overly harsh remedy, the
Schlumberger court set a dangerous precedent of unpredictability which influences current court
approaches to the doctrine of inevitable misappropriation.  See id. at 1318-19.
1. Global rejection or acceptance
The first two options that courts have are either to reject or accept
the inevitable misappropriation doctrine in its entirety.  Several
arguments suggest that both absolute rejection and total acceptance
are too crude to take into account important values that arise in
specific and complex factual situations.
a. Total rejection of inevitable misappropriation
First, several commentators have suggested that as a result of the
inconsistencies and the general harms the doctrine causes to
employees and the general public interest, the inevitable
misappropriation doctrine should be rejected.  For example, one
suggestion is that the doctrine of inevitable misappropriation should
be uniformly rejected because its existence and application create
risks for employees, impede their mobility, limit their options, and
strip their bargaining power.224  Furthermore, the growing adoption
of the doctrine will stifle economic growth and innovation.225
Although significant arguments in favor of outright rejection of the
doctrine exist, this proposal raises several important concerns.  First,
if there is no doctrine of inevitable or threatened misappropriation,
some genuine cases of employees pilfering companies’ trade secrets
may not be prevented.  A delicate balance must be struck between the
interests of total employee mobility on one hand and investments in
innovation and proprietary information on the other.  There are
some instances of inevitable misappropriation, such as the poaching
of employees solely to acquire specific marketing plans or technical
information, that society might well wish to prevent.226  In addition,
                                                 
224. See Edelstein, supra note 45, at 732-36 (suggesting that the doctrine of inevitable
disclosure unfairly restricts an employee’s ability to market his or her skills).
225. See id.; see also Harland M. Blake, Employee Agreements Not to Compete, 73 HARV. L. REV.
625, 682-83 (1960) (discussing the restrictive nature of covenants not to compete on an
employee’s mobility and asserting that courts do not consider the possible “injury to society” as
a separate matter when reviewing these covenants); Schuyler, supra note 38, at 27 (noting that
growth of the inevitability doctrine in California could be a “blow to competition and growth,”
especially in industries that have benefited from the mobility of its employees such as high
technology in the Silicon Valley).
226. See Doubleclick, Inc. v. Henderson, No. 116914/97, 1997 WL 731413, at *8 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. Nov. 7, 1997) (enjoining defendant from immediately starting a directly competitive
Internet advertising firm where there was evidence of extreme bad faith and of possible direct
appropriation of proprietary and valuable systems); see also Monovis, Inc. v. Aquino, 905 F.
Supp. 1205, 1234 (W.D.N.Y. 1994) (holding that a manufacturer was entitled to a permanent
injunction when a licensee’s former employee misappropriated a trade secret).  Apparently, the
former employee’s bad faith in not protecting the manufacturer’s trade secret was a factor in
the Aquino court’s decision to enjoin the defendant from competing in the same industry.  See
id. at 1234-35.
establishing a default condition of no protection might create greater
inefficiencies and cost for the economy as companies and
organizations would seek to contract around the lack of protection.
At the same time, employees would seek to bind themselves credibly
against misappropriating trade secrets, and employers would seek to
protect their trade secrets from employees through atomizing
information or significantly lowering or raising salaries.227  Each of
these effects might generate greater inefficiency than the existing
system, often by outweighing the potential gains of individual rights.
In addition, the removal of all applications of the doctrine might
decrease commercial morality and subject new companies to the
deeper pockets of predatory mature companies.228  This, in addition
to reducing the standards of commercial morality, might similarly
have an effect on overall innovation and economic growth.229
Consequently, it appears that there should be some mechanism for
protecting trade secrets from threatened or inevitable
misappropriation.
b. Total acceptance of the alienability of human capital
On the other end of the spectrum, Professor Stewart Sterk has
argued that there should be no restraints on the alienation of human
capital.230  Grounding his position in employment, family, and
bankruptcy law, Sterk has contended that removing constraints on
the alienability of human capital will correct the existing
inefficiencies and inequities generated in each of these areas.231
Specifically, he argued, that the primary problem with these restraints
is the limitation they place on future contracting.232  Failure to permit
the alienability of human capital can limit an individual’s ability to
contract fully to sell her services or human capital because of
                                                 
227. Several commentators in discussing theories of the firm have noted that the divergence
in a principal’s and an agent’s interests give rise to a need for both parties to find a method of
credibly “binding” themselves against acting against the other’s interest as well as a way of
monitoring each other’s performance.  See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of
the Firm:  Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, in FOUNDATIONS OF
CORPORATE LAW, 7-9 (Roberta Romano ed., 1993) (discussing the need for monitoring costs
and bonding activities in a firm organization because of the divergence between interests of
principals and agents); Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction Cost Economics, in FOUNDATIONS OF
CORPORATE LAW, supra, at 12, 14-17 (discussing the desire of individuals to avoid transaction-
specific assets).  Similar costs of binding and monitoring can be expected in the case of trade
secrets where employer and employee interest diverge.
228. See supra notes 56-61 and accompanying text (discussing the important interest
involved in protecting employers from the inevitable misappropriation of trade secrets).
229. Whether social norms will create substitute mechanisms for policing this activity,
however, remains questionable.  Cf. ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW:  HOW
NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 123-26 (1991) (discussing the role of social norms, not law, in
shaping relations).
230. See Stewart E. Sterk, Restraints on Alienation of Human Capital, 79 VA. L. REV. 383, 383
(1993) (demonstrating how alienation of human capital contrasts with traditional property
law).
231. See id. at 389-95.
232. See id. at 454-59 (addressing the distributional consequences of restraints on the
alienation of human capital).
restrictions on alienability.233  Sterk suggested that this restraint has
created bad distributional results234 and that a move towards
alienability of human capital should be viewed as a natural
evolution.235  Consequently, no restrictions should be placed on the
alienation of human capital.
This support of human capital alienation, however, indirectly
implicates the doctrine of inevitable misappropriation.  Barring
courts from applying the doctrine of inevitable misappropriation to
prevent employees from working for competitors indirectly removes
one mechanism for alienating employees from their human capital.236
Absent an injunctive enforcement mechanism, employees may find it
difficult to persuade employers that contracts to alienate their human
capital are credible or valuable—if a breach gives rise simply to
damages, for example, a contract for such limited alienation may not
be worth much to an employer.  Courts’ applying the doctrine of
inevitable misappropriation to enjoin employees from such breaches,
however, would provide an injunctive enforcement mechanism.
Barring application of the doctrine could thus reduce employees’
abilities to negotiate credibly for better wages ex ante, causing the
adverse distributional consequences described by Sterk.237  The
doctrine of inevitable misappropriation, viewed in this light, is
another important minimum guarantee that allows employees to sell
more of their human capital to companies with trade secrets stored,
in part, in that human capital.
This indirect support for the general existence of the doctrine
raises several counter-arguments.  First, significant differences
between employees’ and employers’ information and market power
suggest that eliminating limitations on alienability of human capital
may result in greater exploitation and undesirable distributional
consequences than leaving such limits in place or enforcing them at
some level.238  For example, one critic of inevitable misappropriation
                                                 
233. See id. at 443-54.
234. See id. at 454-56 (suggesting that those persons who benefit from the inalienability of
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235. See id. at 456-59.
236. Cf. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 227, at 7 (discussing binding activities in the context
of firm organization).
237. Cf. Sterk, supra note 230, at 454-56 (naming loss of freedom to enter into mutually
beneficial exchanges, potential monopolies to the detriment of the public, reduced credit
availability of credit, and limiting employment opportunities as some of the adverse
distributional consequences associated with the restrictions on the alienation of human
capital).
238. Cf. id. at 393-94 (noting that differences in knowledge about the value of information
may complicate efficient exchanges of information); see supra notes 208-14, infra note 470
has argued that employers have a vastly disproportionate amount of
information and market power when negotiating covenants or
agreements not to compete.239  Employers tend to have greater
market and negotiating power than employees because they are
repeat players, they understand their business and information better
than the employee, they can strategically expose or limit exposure of
the employee to trade secrets and information, and they have less at
stake.240  Furthermore, as noted above, there is a strong pro-employer
bias in the muddied application of the inevitable misappropriation
doctrine.241  Sterk also recognized this limitation on employee
knowledge in negotiating covenants not to compete.242  Thus,
although the potential negotiating position of an individual might be
improved in theory if her human capital can be credibly alienated in
light of the inevitable misappropriation doctrine, in practice it
appears unlikely that an employee will benefit from her ability to
alienate her human capital because of her limited information and
market power.
Second, even if allowing individuals to alienate their human capital
voluntarily would generate better distributional outcomes, it is
unclear that courts applying the inevitable misappropriation doctrine
to unchoosing, if not unwilling, individuals would secure the same
benefits.  Although negotiated, well-discussed, and well-understood
agreements to alienate human capital—such as explicit and
bargained-for covenants not to compete—may be an efficient and
equitable method of allowing individuals to monetize their human
capital, there is no guarantee that a court’s ex post application of
inevitable misappropriation to an individual who did not choose to
alienate her human capital would be either efficient or equitable.243
Indeed, several commentators have argued that the application of the
doctrine imposes a covenant not to compete in places where one was
not negotiated and might be used where such agreements are barred
as a matter of public policy.244  The purported benefits are reduced
                                                 
(discussing market power and information disparities between employees and employers).
239. See Lowry, supra note 2, at 532-35 (discussing the inequities in bargaining power
between employees and employers).
240. See id.
241. See id.; see also supra notes 208-16 and accompanying text.
242. See Sterk, supra note 230, at 393-94 (acknowledging the asymmetry of information
between employee and employer).
243. Sterk’s analysis rests on an assumption that employees’ choosing to alienate their human
capital will optimize distributional consequences—in part because they know their own
preferences and can make efficient choices accordingly.  See id. at 390-93.  Nothing suggests
courts could ex post strike as efficient a bargain on unwilling parties.  Cf. Kham & Nate’s Shoes
No.2, Inc. v. First Bank of Whiting, 908 F.2d 1351, 1356 (7th Cir. 1990) (expressing concern
regarding the courts’ ability “years later” to reinterpret the duties of parties to a bargained-for
contract “years later”).
244. See Edelstein, supra note 45, at 734-35 (remarking that the application of inevitable
misappropriation in California would conflict with the spirit and perhaps legal effect of code
sections banning covenants not to compete); Schuyler, supra note 38, at 27 (reporting critics’
complaint that inevitable misappropriation simply creates covenants not to compete); see also
Standard Brands, Inc. v. Zumpe, 264 F. Supp. 254, 263-67 (E.D. La. 1967) (barring application
of the doctrine of inevitable misappropriation in part because it runs afoul of a Louisiana state
even further by the potential for inconsistent and delayed court
rulings on the inevitable misappropriation restrictions placed on an
employee’s use of her human capital.245  These factors combined
suggest that the doctrine may not secure the purported benefits of
greater alienability of human capital.
Third, allowing the widespread application of inevitable
misappropriation could force society into a default position of
binding employees into alienating some portion of their human
capital.  Just as employees might wish to bind themselves against
reneging on their alienation of human capital in favor of greater ex
ante compensation, employers might wish similarly to bind
themselves against alienating an employee’s human capital to
negotiate lower ex ante compensation.246  Enforcing the doctrine of
inevitable misappropriation restricts the latter option; employers
cannot easily bind themselves credibly against the application of the
doctrine if it is generally available.  Without a countervailing
enforcement mechanism to police employer threats to use the
doctrine, employers’ superior market power will make the credibility
of such binding suspect.247  As a result, they may be forced into higher
and more speculative ex ante compensation.
Finally, growth in the application of the doctrine might generate
the same kind of inefficiencies and inequities associated with
standard covenants not to compensate.  As detailed above, several
commentators have alleged that covenants not to compete with their
consequent reductions in labor mobility greatly reduce productivity,
innovation, and economic growth.248  Applications of the doctrine
that result in similar restrictions on employment and labor mobility
can be expected to have a similar effect.  Ultimately, an unrestrained
application of the doctrine of inevitable misappropriation would also
be undesirable.
2. Concurrent property interests
A final and extremely innovative option is to apply a concurrent
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245. See Schuyler, supra note 38, at 28 (reporting a defense lawyer’s argument that delay in
decision-making alone will favor former employers over employees and new employers).
246. Cf. Williamson, supra note 227, at 14-17 (discussing the counterincentive to use non-
firm specific assets).
247. See infra Part III.D (discussing employers’ superior market power and resources and
ability to threaten litigation).
248. See supra notes 74-86 and accompanying text (citing examples presented by
commentators on how the enforcement of the doctrine of inevitable misappropriation has led
to economic inefficiencies).
property interests approach to the doctrine of inevitable
misappropriation.  One argument is that because the definition of
trade secrets is too broad and uncertain to make the application of
the inevitable misappropriation doctrine predictable, the current
treatment of the doctrine has yielded inconsistent results that
(1) almost always entirely benefit the former employer or entirely
benefit the employee; and (2) subtly favor employers.249  One way of
mitigating this problem is to recognize that employers and employees
have concurrent property interests in the use or possession of trade
secrets.250
First, on the employer side, the argument is that property rights of
trade secrets have long been recognized.251  As early as 1868 in Peabody
v. Norfolk,252 the Massachusetts Supreme Court held that trade secrets
create a property right in a dispute between an employer and a
former employee about the use of a manufacturing process.253  The
U.S. Supreme Court similarly recognized that trade secrets create
property rights and interests when agreeing that the forced disclosure
of trade secrets could constitute a taking under the Fifth
Amendment.254  Second, an employee’s property rights in the
workplace should also be recognized.255  Since there are cases where
the employee’s ability to work has been considered property by a
court of law,256 an employee’s property rights in trade secrets should
be similarly recognized.257
Following this analysis, the dispute over inevitable
misappropriation of trade secrets should be recharacterized as an
application of the law of concurrent property interests.258  One
commentator has given two examples of concurrent property interest
systems: tenancies-in-common and community property.259  She
argued that trade secrets should be treated like tenancies-in-common
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252. 98 Mass. 452 (1868).
253. See id. at 459-60.  Former employer Peabody sued former employee Norfolk for
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452-55.
254. See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 998-99 (1984).  In Monsanto, employer
Monsanto argued that compliance with the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act
(“FIFRA”) would require disclosure of trade secrets.  See id.  The U.S. Supreme Court held that
some of Monsanto’s trade secrets could properly be considered property and thus were
protected by the Takings Clause of Fifth Amendment.  See id.
255. See Lowry, supra note 2, at 536-37.
256. See, e.g., New Method Laundry Co. v. MacCann, 161 P. 990, 991-92 (Cal. 1916) (holding
that the right of a citizen to work in a profession is a property right deserving protection).
257. See Lowry, supra note 2, at 536-37 (positing that an employee’s property interest in
marketing her skills should be recognized by the courts and is the first step toward a more
equitable inevitable disclosure doctrine).
258. See id. at 539 (emphasizing that the property interests in trade secrets of an employer
and employee are not mutually exclusive).
259. See id. at 539-41 (analyzing how the dissolution of property interests in tenancies in
common and community property are relevant to inevitable disclosure disputes).
or community property, with a partitioning of interests for remedial
purposes.260  Partitions could be accomplished through judicial “sales”
that recognize the value of the concurrent interests, and would create
valuation problems no worse than in other divisions of property,
including intellectual property.261
The result would be a range of flexible and more accurate
remedies.262  For example, an employee could be enjoined from
working for a new employer, but the old employer might be forced to
pay her salary.  In Emery Industries, Inc. v. Cottier,263 ex-Emery employee
Cottier was offered a job with a competitor in the complex ozone-
processing industry.264  The court ruled that even though there was no
indication that Emery would purposely harm his old employer,
disclosure of trade secrets in this complex and competitive business
was inevitable.265  As a result, the court granted a temporary
injunction for one year, but ordered Emery to pay Cottier $3,300 per
month for the duration of the restriction.266  This approach
recognizes that the employee owns part of the trade secrets and
provides her with some compensation for her ownership.267  In
general, this method enables a court to recognize and redress the
existing bias against employees.
In addition, courts could deny injunctive relief but make the
employee pay for use of the employer’s trade secret information.  For
example, the California version of the UTSA allows courts to order
payments of reasonable royalties in the event of trade secret use.268  If
employees are not enjoined from working for a competitor but there
is a risk of actual use or disclosure of trade secrets in the course of
that work, the employee could be forced to pay for the employer’s
portion of the trade secrets.  This approach mitigates concerns that
employees in specific cases were being overcompensated and
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264. See id. at 833.
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267. See Lowry, supra note 2, at 543 (lauding the Emery Industries court’s recognition of the
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268. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.3(b) (West 1997) (allowing payment of reasonable royalties
when neither damages nor unjust enrichment are provable in a misappropriation case).
provides employers with some measure of relief.  In addition,
granting these kinds of flexible remedies rather than an all-or-
nothing solution, reduces the incentive to alter the determination of
inevitability.  Courts could determine inevitability of misappropria-
tion separately from the appropriate remedy, thereby creating a more
consistent set of precedents for the inevitability determination.
Unfortunately, this approach of recognizing concurrent ownership
interests in trade secrets creates several problems.  For instance,
recognizing employee ownership interests in trade secrets jeopardizes
the existing and important conceptions of unified ownership of trade
secrets.  For example, the UTSA implicitly suggests that companies
have ownership interests in trade secrets in its definition of
misappropriation.269  In addition, the Supreme Court vests the
ownership of trade secrets with specific corporate entities.270  More
importantly, the recently passed EEA bases its trade secrets protection
on a carefully defined understanding of the owner of the trade
secret.271  For example, one EEA requirement focuses on the
misappropriation of a trade secret with the intent to cause economic
harm to the owner of the trade secret.272  Thus, unifying ownership of
a trade secret in a specific entity simplifies the protection and
transactional regimes for trade secrets.273  Allocating a concurrent
property interest to each employee who enters into an employment
relationship with a firm would severely complicate the existing
structures of protection for, or transfer of, trade secrets by
dramatically expanding the definition of “owners” of a trade secret.
Questions about whether each employee could misappropriate a
trade secret that she has some ownership over would significantly
complicate a court’s analysis.  Furthermore, granting or recognizing
such an interest would divide and diffuse the ownership of property
interests which are already difficult to administrate and transfer.  If
all employees of a company had concurrent ownership interests in
the company’s trade secrets, then what rights would they have over
the transfer of those secrets?  What rights or responsibilities would a
purchaser of those secrets have regarding those employees?  How
could a court determine what amount of the property interests of a
trade secret were disclosed or misappropriated and in what
proportion to the employee’s interest?  Significant arguments in favor
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of clear and unified ownership of intangibles like trade secrets make
recognition of concurrent ownership interests in them less
attractive.274
Another problem with recognizing concurrent ownership in trade
secrets is that the system provides no justification for, or guidance to,
the proportion of ownership that should be allocated to each
employee vis-à-vis the employer.  Unlike property held in tenancies-
in-common or community property, trade secrets may not be the
product of any effort by a specific employee;275 an employee does not
have any basis or initial investment in a trade secret that was
produced before she arrived that is comparable to the basis in an
investment by an individual in a piece of property held as a tenancy-
in-common or as community property.  An employee is compensated
for what she contributes to the firm through the course of her
employment.  This makes justifying the recognition of concurrent
ownership of trade secrets more difficult than in traditional tenancy-
in-common or community property situations where each co-owner
has contributed measurable investments or value.  Moreover, the
standard principles for allocating ownership in tenancy-in-common
and community property systems—namely, creation, contribution, or
agreement—are not easily applied to the situation of an employee
joining a firm with trade secrets, which might have been created
before the employee arrived.  It is thus also unclear how ownership
interests would be allocated among employees.  The system is further
complicated by the fact that adding new employees would require
some kind of reallocation of ownership interests.  In addition, ex post
recognition of these concurrent ownership interests creates
significant negative incentives for firms to expose individuals to trade
secrets or to compensate them therefor.  The concurrent property
interests proposal provides no principled basis for recognizing or
allocating ownership interests in trade secrets (beyond simply
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establishing the employee’s right to the workplace).276  Because it
leaves the allocation of interests unclear, it may confuse, rather than
reconcile competing interests and complicate other areas of trade
secret protection based on unitary ownership systems.
Furthermore, trade secrets pose challenges to administration
under concurrent property regimes not presented by other types of
intellectual property.277  Even if a court only recognizes a
proportionate concurrent ownership of a trade secret and liquidates
its value through a partition sale, unless the memory of an individual
is erased, the individual retains possession of the entire secret with
the power to destroy its value through disclosure or use.  Moreover,
multiple individuals can possess the entire trade secret and thus,
retain the power to destroy it.  To recognize a partitioned concurrent
interest in a trade secret when additional possessors or property
owners can be added to the interest, through no control of the
owners, appears to be unjustified.  But by what rule should
concurrent ownership between employer and employee be divided?
Basing ownership on the number of employees or level of
contribution of effort, time, or value ignores the special problem that
any possessor or owner of any fraction of a trade secret can utterly
destroy its value.  Also important is the fact that subsequent to the
“partitioning” and judicial “sale” of the employee’s or employer’s
interests in the trade secret, the employee can still retain possession
and use of it.278  Does this possession and use affect the concurrent
ownership of the trade secrets by other employees or the employer?
A concurrent property interests regime seems ill-suited to allocating
ownership interests in trade secrets when any owner has the power to
destroy their value.
Another concern with concurrent property interest recognition is
that it ignores the value of some of the trade secrets involved.  While
some courts disagree,279 most courts recognize that the value of some
trade secrets is incalculable and justify injunctions against
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279. See FMC Corp. v. Cyprus Foote Mineral Co., 899 F. Supp. 1477, 1483 (W.D.N.C. 1995)
(suggesting that damages for misappropriation of trade secrets could be calculated); cf.
American Sales Corp. v. Adventure Travel Inc., 862 F. Supp. 1476, 1479 (E.D. Va. 1994)
(holding that a plaintiff is entitled to recovery if the actual value is ascertainable).
misappropriations on that basis.280  Under the concurrent property
interest approach, allocating concurrent property interests in those
invaluable trade secrets to employees raises some important
questions.  First, if a trade secret is invaluable, how much would a
proportionate share of that trade secret be worth?  Are there
situations in which providing an injunction and requiring a firm to
compensate an individual for her proportionate share of a trade
secret would be extraordinarily expensive, especially if this kind of
action might occur each time an employee leaves a firm?281  Or,
perhaps more to the point, is it possible that denying an injunction
against an employee, but forcing her to pay royalties for use of the
employer’s proportionate share of trade secrets, could cause
problems when the value of the trade secrets may be incalculable?282
One commentator has suggested valuing the use of trade secrets
through royalty calculations and other methods of calculation.283
However, it is unclear whether those mechanisms are applicable to a
taking of those trade secrets from an employer by an employee
working for its competitor.  This again is complicated by the question
of what proportionate share of such an enormous value can be
justifiably or practically allocated to an employee.  Questions raised
by the special value of trade secrets do not appear to be addressed
adequately by the concurrent property interest approach to trade
secrets.
Although this approach correctly identifies problems with the
inconsistent methods used by courts in determining the inevitability
of misappropriation and the general all-or-nothing method to
providing remedies, simple recognition of concurrent property rights
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in trade secrets is problematic.  A general recognition of concurrent
property interests in trade secrets conflicts with the justifiably unified
approach to trade secret ownership in other areas of trade secret
law.284  Such an approach provides no justification for determining
the allocation of ownership interests among employers and
employees, and fails to account for the unique nature of total trade
secret possession by multiple individuals.285  Finally, such an approach
presents no framework for consistently assigning value to the
proportionate property interests of employers and employees in the
disputed trade secrets.286  Thus, although the proposal is an excellent
first step towards addressing the question of remedies under the
doctrine of inevitable misappropriation, its insistence on recognizing
concurrent property ownership of trade secrets appears
underdeveloped and inadequately justified.
In sum, current proposals and approaches to the doctrine of
inevitable misappropriation seem inadequate.  Properly balancing of
employer and employee interests will require clearer and more
coherent standards for determining inevitability that account for bad
faith and intent, that address the full range of technical and non-
technical employment, and that recognize a range of findings of
inevitability.  Properly accounting for these interests will also require
a coherent and consistent system of remedies that includes injunctive
relief and damages, that recognizes and accounts for potential costs
to both employers and employees, that maintains a unified ownership
structure for trade secrets, and that accounts for both the
intangibility and valuation issues uniquely raised by trade secrets.
III. THE ACCESSION LAW APPROACH
Having discussed the importance of a consistent and coherent
doctrine of inevitable misappropriation and critiqued the current
approaches and proposals, this Article suggests an approach to the
doctrine of inevitable misappropriation that can be derived from the
ancient law of accession, dealing with the ownership of combined or
transformed property.  This Part first outlines the law of accession,
discussing its background and potential application to inevitable
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286. See supra note 278 and accompanying text.
misappropriation.  It then suggests that principles of accession law
can be applied to develop a consistent, coherent, and practical
methodology for determining inevitability and providing flexible
remedies.  Finally, it explains how a parallel application of the law of
accession can help police employers’ opportunistic threats to apply
the doctrine of inevitable misappropriation.
A. The Law of Accession
Recognized since before the time of Blackstone’s Commentaries,287
the law of accession deals with the ownership of property made up of
materials of one person, combined with materials and/or labor of
another.288  Whether the law of accession applies to a piece of
property is determined by a number of principles, including whether
the property of one individual can be separated or removed from the
unified article, or whether the nature or identity of an individual’s
property has been transformed by the skill and labor of another.289  If
the law of accession applies, a series of rules determine the ownership
of the combined or transformed property and allocate its value and
control.290  In short, accession vests title and control of a combined
piece of property in the owner of its principal parts or in its primary
transformer.  Accession then directs the title holder to reimburse the
owner of the secondary parts of a combined piece of property or its
secondary transformer for her lesser contribution.291
Generally, the law of accession is applied in a single step.  The
recognition that accession applies leads directly to a determination of
title and an allocation of value and control.292  To analyze the law of
accession and to analogize it to the doctrine of inevitable
misappropriation, this Article discusses accession in two parts:
(1) when the law of accession applies; and (2) what happens to title
and value when it does.
1. Analyzing applicability
The law of accession has been generally applied to two situations.
First, the right to property may be determined by accession when the
property of several individuals is combined through skill and labor
                                                 






292. See id. at *405.
into a single, unified object.293  For example, Blackstone noted that
the law of accession applied to the combination of a piece of
parchment and the writing upon it, as well as a garment and the
embroidery placed on it.294  Second, the law of accession can apply
when the materials of one person are sufficiently transformed by the
skill and labor of another person.295  For example, the law of
accession has been held to apply to the transformation of timber into
hoops,296 grass into hay,297 and grain into whiskey.298  The law of
accession is used in both these situations to vest in a single person the
ownership of products that are not severable into their component
parts or shares.299
a. Combinations:  identification and severability
Courts have outlined a number of tests for determining whether
either the property of several individuals has been combined through
skill and labor into a single, unified object or the materials of one
person have been sufficiently transformed by the skill and labor of
another person.  First, whether accession applies to combinations of
materials depends principally on the test of identification and
severability:  if the materials of one individual can be identified and
severed from the joint product without damage, then the law of
accession and its rules for allocating ownership and value do not
apply.300  In the seminal 1872 case of Clark v. Wells,301 for example, the
Vermont Supreme Court evaluated the ownership of the wheels and
axles attached to a wagon.302  The plaintiff had conditionally sold the
wheels and axles that he used to repair the wagon to the wagon’s first
owner, who subsequently sold the wagon (with wheels and axles
attached) to the defendant before completing payment on the wheels
                                                 
293. See Ratcliff v. Gallagher & Holman, 5 Ky. Op. 589, 589 (1871) (holding that the right by
accession is acquired when material is changed in such a way that it cannot be restored to the
owner in its original form).  See, e.g., Stevens v. Briggs, 22 Mass. (15 Pick.) 177, 177 (1827)
(concluding that a desk made from cherry boards is the property of the owner and is not able
to be taken by a creditor).
294. See BLACKSTONE, supra note 17, at *404-07, cited in Bancorp Leasing & Fin. Corp. v.
Stadeli Pump & Constr., Inc., 739 P.2d 548, 551 (Or. 1987).
295. See Wetherbee v. Green, 22 Mich. 311, 315-16 (1871) (holding that accession law
applies when an article is transformed into a different species).
296. See id. at 320 (asserting that the involuntary wrong-doer who transformed the timber
would be punished too severely if the original owner could reclaim the property).
297. See Lewis v. Courtright, 41 N.W. 615, 616 (Iowa 1889) (stating that although the grass
that changed to hay belonged to the plaintiff, the good faith labor of the defendant gave the
hay substantially all of its value).
298. See Hyde v. Cookson, 21 Barb. 92, 104-05 (N.Y. App. Div. 1855) (citing a case which
held that the original owner cannot reclaim chattel converted into different species by an
innocent holder).
299. See Bancorp Leasing, 739 P.2d at 552 (holding that the principal of accession does not
apply when attached articles can be separated and removed from the principal object without
damaging the latter).
300. See id. at 552.
301. 45 Vt. 4 (1872); see also Bancorp Leasing, 739 P.2d at 552 (comparing the facts of Bancorp
Leasing and Clark).
302. See Clark, 45 Vt. at 6.
and axles.303  The court rejected the defendant’s argument that the
wheels and axles were accessions to the wagon and that title to them
had passed with that of the wagon by the law of accession.304  Instead,
the court reasoned that the wheels and axles could be “followed,
identified, severed, without detriment to the wagon, and
appropriated to other use without loss.”305  Thus, title remained with
the plaintiff, the original owner of the materials.306  At roughly the
same time, the Connecticut Supreme Court applied a test of
severability and held that the title in seaweed below the high-tide line
did not belong to the owner of the land above the high-tide line
because it was not “united to the principal [property], so as to
become part and parcel of it.”307  Modern courts have followed this
lead, holding generally that the ownership of engines of trucks and
cars,308 refrigerator units installed on trucks,309 removable hoists and
truck bodies installed in trucks,310 tires installed on cars and trucks,311
and gasoline engines bolted to road graders,312 is not determined by
the law of accession when these items are identifiable and removable
from the combined object without damage.313  Thus, the law of
                                                 
303. See id. at 5.
304. See id. at 6.
305. Id.
306. See id.
307. Mather v. Chapman, 40 Conn. 382, 397 (1873) (discussing the many reasons why the
plaintiffs could not own the seaweed).  The court explained:
“Accession” is defined by Bouvier as “a manner of acquiring the property in a thing
which becomes united with that which a person already possesses.”  The plaintiffs
therefore seem to us to have no title by allusion, or by accretion, or by accession,
certainly none ratione soli, and they cannot be regarded as first occupants by
construction merely because of the propinquity of their land to the property in dispute.
Id. at 397-98.
308. See  Bancorp Leasing & Fin. Corp. v. Stadeli Pump & Constr., Inc., 739 P.2d 548, 552-53
(Or. 1987) (holding that a truck engine did not pass by accession because it was removable
without significant damage to the economic value of truck); Atlas Assurance Co. v. Gibbs, 183 A.
690, 691 (Conn. 1936) (holding that an engine put into a stolen car by an innocent third party
was not an accession to the car because it was removable without damage to the body or
chassis).
309. See IDS Leasing Corp. v. Leasing Assocs., Inc., 590 S.W.2d 607, 609 (Tex. Civ. App.
1979) (holding that refrigeration units are not accessions because of the separate serial
numbers and the easy separation of units from truck trailers).
310. See Omaha Standard, Inc. v. Nissen, 187 N.W.2d 721, 724-25 (Iowa 1971) (maintaining
that when automobile parts are purchased under a retention of title agreement, identifiable or
severable parts do not become part of the automobile by accession).
311. See Goodrich Silvertown Stores v. Caesar, 197 S.E. 698, 700 (N.C. 1938) (stating that car
tires are severable and not subject to the doctrine of accession); Bousquet v. Mack Motor Truck
Co., 168 N.E. 800, 801 (Mass. 1929) (holding that ownership of truck tires does not pass with
the truck title).
312. See Lincoln Road Equip. Co. v. Bolton, 254 N.W. 884, 885 (Neb. 1934) (holding that if
graders were removed and replaced, the elevator would operate as efficiently as it did before
the change and is, therefore, not subject to doctrine of accession).
313. See Hunter v. Scruggs Drug Store, Inc., 113 F.2d 971, 974 (4th Cir. 1940) (remanding
accession does not apply when the materials in question are
physically detachable without damage.
The rule of identification and severability is subject to some
restrictions.  The first restriction is that if the materials in question
have been used to replace other materials in a combined object,
courts have generally held them not severable and the united
property subject to the law of accession.  For example, in 1875, the
Michigan Supreme Court held that new printing material added to
replace the old, which had been destroyed by wear and tear, was not
severable from the whole and was thus subject to the law of
accession.314  The Kentucky Supreme Court similarly held that since
the new batteries, tires, and other accessories put on a stolen
automobile to replace worn-out ones were not severable without
damage to the car, the entire automobile was subject to the law of
accession.315
A second restriction is that if the parties express an intent, it will
usually control whether a court will apply the law of accession to
mixed property.  For example, when a buyer and seller expressed the
intent that tires and tubes attached to a car were not to be merged
into it, and they were readily distinguishable and detachable, the law
of accession was held not to apply.316  Other courts have repeated this
general rule of allowing intent to dictate severability.317  Thus, the
parties’ intent affects whether the law of accession will be applied to
find materials that are combined in a mixed property as severable.
b. Transformations:  identity and value-enhancement
Similarly, the tests of identity and value-enhancement principally
determine whether accession applies to the transformation of one
person’s material by the skill and labor of another:  If an item has
been sufficiently transformed so as to change its identity or
significantly increase its value, courts will apply the law of accession to
determine its ownership and provide remedies.  For example, the
transformations of corn into meal, olives into oil, grapes into wine,
and mud into bricks have been held to subject the resulting property
                                                 
for a determination of whether the soda fountain was a permanent installation or could be
removed without damage to decide whether to apply the law of accession); Ralston Purina Co.
v. Toycen Motors, 124 N.W.2d 24, 27 (Wis. 1963) (holding that for the law of accession to apply
it must be established that custom-made poultry racks cannot be severed from the trucks to
which they are attached).
314. See Fowler v. Hoffman, 31 Mich. 215, 224 (1875) (finding that the materials were
intermixed and difficult to distinguish from the older materials).
315. See Bozeman Mortuary Assoc. v. Fairchild, 68 S.W.2d 756, 758 (Ky. 1934); see also Allied
Inv. Co. v. Shaneyfelt, 74 N.W.2d 723, 727 (Neb. 1956) (holding that the replacement motor
was not severable, thus subjecting the truck to the law of accession).
316. See Tire Shop v. Peat, 161 A. 96, 97-98 (Conn. 1932).
317. See, e.g., Omaha Standard, Inc. v. Nissen, 187 N.W.2d 721, 724 (Iowa 1971) (stating that
the intention of parties is a strong factor in determining severability); Ralston Purina Co., 124
N.W.2d at 27 (“The controlling factor [in determining severability] is the intention of the
parties whenever that can be ascertained.”).
to the law of accession.318
Furthermore, transformations by skill or labor that substantially
increase the value of the property have been subjected to the law of
accession.  In Wetherbee v. Green,319 the court held the good faith
transformation of $25 timber into $700 hoops would subject the
hoops to the law of accession.320  Erroneously cutting grass valued at
eight or ten cents per acre in good faith and transforming it into hay
worth two to three dollars per ton, where an acre yielded something
more than a ton of hay, likewise subjected the hay to the law of
accession to determine property rights and remedies.321  A court also
applied the law of accession to plat and city maps worth
approximately $1,500 made from the much less valuable paper of a
discarded plat book because of their significant increase in value.322
Of course, there are some limitations on the application of these
rules.  First, transformation of identity is limited in part by a
somewhat unclear rule of identification.  For example, while making
grass into hay is generally considered a sufficient transformation,323
courts have held that the transformation of cloth into a coat, leather
into shoes, timber into logs or shingles, or silver into cups is not
sufficient to apply the law of accession because the altered item can
be identified by its owner.324  For example, in Ratcliff v. Gallagher &
Holman,325 a mechanic’s raising, dressing, and operating on a piece of
stone did not change the stone’s inherent and characteristic qualities
from when it was taken from the quarry.326  As a result, the law of
accession was not applied.327  In addition, the law of accession has not
been applied to cases involving the finishing stock of a wheelwright,328
                                                 
318. See Baker v. Merisch, 45 N.W. 685, 688 (Neb. 1890) (declaring that where
appropriation of another’s property is accidental and labor has been expended upon it, thus
increasing its value, the title to property passes to the laborer); see also Lampton’s Ex’rs v.
Preston’s Ex’rs, 24 Ky. (1 J.J. Marsh) 454, 455 (1829) (stating that original materials cannot be
reproduced out of the resulting property).
319. 22 Mich. 311 (1871).
320. See id. at 313-16 (discussing the law of accession as it stood at the time).
321. See Lewis v. Courtright, 41 N.W. 615, 616 (Iowa 1889) (reasoning that the plaintiff
should not be permitted to enjoy the fruits of the defendant’s labor).
322. See Polk County v. Parker, 160 N.W. 320, 321 (Iowa 1916) (stating that although the
defendant made maps on paper belonging to the county, the county is not authorized to take
them from the defendant after he expended his time and labor).
323. See, e.g., Lewis, 41 N.W. at 615-16.
324. See Lampton’s Ex’rs, 24 Ky. (1 J.J. Marsh) at 455 (holding that the law of accession is not
applicable to easily identifiable articles).
325. 5 Ky. Op. 589 (1871).
326. See id. at 589 (noting that the right of accession occurs when other material is added in
such a way that the changed material cannot be restored to the owner in its original form).
327. See id.
328. See Harding v. Coburn, 53 Mass. (12 Met.) 333, 342 (1847) (stating that the accession
making salted cucumbers into pickles,329 or replacing the wooden
stock and lock of a rifle.330  Thus, the transformation of identity is
limited by the rule of identification.
c. Bad faith, negligence, and willfulness
Finally, there is a general rule against the application of the law of
accession in cases of bad faith actors or thieves and knowing or
negligent trespassers.  For example, if a bad actor, such as a thief or
intentional trespasser (or in some cases even a negligent trespasser),
combines her materials with another’s property, they will generally
not be held severable from the other’s property if it is reclaimed by
the legitimate owner.331  In cases involving thieves or the knowing
enhancement of stolen property, the courts have been quick to deny
rewarding changes in ownership under the law of accession.  In Union
Naval Stores Co. v. United States,332 the Supreme Court held that the act
of converting sap into turpentine did not pass title under the law of
accession to an intentional trespasser who knowingly took the sap
from government timber, even when the manufactured turpentine
was combined with the trespasser’s legitimately owned turpentine.333
In Farm Bureau Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Moseley,334 when a
thief replaced a motor in a stolen automobile, it was held to be part
of the automobile when reclaimed by the owner.335  The subsequent
good faith buyer of the automobile, however, in the absence of any
showing that he knew the car had been stolen, was entitled to the sun
visor, seat covers, and gasoline tank that he attached to the car during
his possession.336  In addition, when an individual placed tires, tubes,
and wheels on a tractor he knew was not legitimately owned, the
court held that he was not entitled to those objects when the true
owner reclaimed the tractor.337  Thus, courts will generally bar a thief
or bad faith actor from benefiting from a favorable application of the
law of accession.
                                                 
principle does not apply where there is difficulty in pointing out the precise articles involved).
329. See Crosby v. Baker, 88 Mass. (6 Allen) 295, 298 (1863) (positing that cucumbers, after
being placed in bottles, were not changed substantially enough to invoke the law of accession).
330. See Comins v. Newton, 92 Mass. (10 Allen) 518, 519 (1865) (declaring that neither the
nature nor value of the article was changed enough for accession to occur).
331. See Farm Bureau Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Moseley, 90 A.2d 485, 487-88 (Del. Super. Ct.
1952) (noting that when the thief added a motor to a stolen car, the article was lost to the true
owner of the car upon reclaiming the stolen item).
332. 240 U.S. 284 (1916).
333. See id. at 290-91 (noting that converting sap was a continuing act of trespass that would
not divest the owner of his property).
334. 90 A.2d 485 (Del. 1952).
335. See id. at 487-88 (holding that continued possession by a wrongdoer after theft is a
continuing wrong and therefore title to the property, even in its enhanced condition, does not
pass to the thief).
336. See id. (noting that a good-faith buyer is entitled to improvements because the
difference between the willful wrongdoer and the involuntary wrongdoer is well recognized by
authorities).
337. See Burroughs v. Garrett, 352 P.2d 644, 648 (N.M. 1960) (stating that the rightful owner
maintained possession of the tractor in its enhanced state because the party knew the tractor
was wrongfully possessed).
In addition, courts have been reluctant to apply the law of
accession to provide negligent improvers of property with
compensation for their efforts.  For example, a Michigan court held
that the transformers of trees into shingles did not acquire title to the
shingles because they were “put on inquiry as to [the timber seller’s]
rights.”338  In addition, a South Carolina court held that an individual
was not entitled to any compensation for the money he expended in
enhancing the value of a car when he did not know, or failed to
exercise care to find out, whether the vehicle was stolen.339  If
individuals negligently combine their materials and/or labor with
others’ property, courts are reluctant to apply the law of accession in
their favor.
Courts have also generally declined to apply the law of accession to
benefit willful takers and combiners/ transformers of property.  Most
courts limit their application of the law of accession to cases in which
the combiner/transformer has acted in mistaken good faith, under
legitimately but incorrectly assumed authority, and with lack of intent
to convert another’s property.340  Thus, bad faith, negligence, and
willfulness will decrease a court’s likelihood of applying the law of
accession in favor of the combiner/transformer.
In sum, courts apply the law of accession where an individual’s
materials have been combined through skill and labor with those of
another and where an individual’s property has been substantially
transformed or enhanced in value through the skill and labor of
another.  Whether the law of accession will be applied is determined
by tests of severability and identification in the case of combinations,
and of identity transformation and value-enhancement in the case of
                                                 
338. See Nelson v. Graff, 12 F. 389, 391 (C.C.W.D. Mich. 1882) (allowing the owner of
original timber to recover property even after it was converted into shingles, in part because the
manufacturers had a duty to inquire into the propriety of the trespasser’s selling them the
timber).
339. See Motors Ins. Corp. v. Department of Highways & Pub. Transp., 437 S.E.2d 555, 557
(S.C. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that individuals were not bona fide purchasers and therefore
were not entitled to consideration for any enhancements in the vehicle’s value).
340. See, e.g., Isle Royale Mining Co. v. Hertin, 37 Mich. 332, 336 (1877) (requiring that
individual labor to convert or transform other’s property must be by mistake and in good faith
to apply the law of accession); Louis Werner Stave Co. v. Pickering, 119 S.W. 333, 334 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1909) (holding that the right to property by accession depends on the good faith of the
person converting the property and the belief in ownership as well as noting that a willful
trespasser will not acquire a right in the property no matter how much she increases its value).
But see, e.g., Baker v. Mersch, 45 N.W. 685, 688 (Neb. 1890) (holding that the doctrine of
accession applies to a willful trespasser’s taking of another’s property and transforming its
substance and form through the exercise of skill and labor, especially when the trespass and
misappropriation is accidental, as through mistake of fact, and when the original property is of
comparatively little value).
transformations.  The ascertainable intent of the parties can also
guide findings of severability, while the state of mind of the
combiner/transformer can determine the application of accession in
both cases.
2. Allocating control and value
When courts determine that the law of accession is applicable, they
then turn to the allocation of title in the combined property and the
possibility of compensation for the individual in whom title does not
vest.  The general rules for both combinations and transformations
are similar.
a. Vesting title and control:  the tests of principal part, identity
transformation, and value-enhancement
Where an individual’s materials are combined with those of
another through the latter’s exercise of skill and labor, the law of
accession vests title in the owner of the principal part of the materials
in the joint product.341  Thus, in numerous ship-building cases, if an
individual combines his labor, skill, and materials with those of
another, the owner of the materials that make up the principal part
of the finished product, the keel, acquires title to the ship.342
Similarly, Blackstone’s owner of the parchment acquires title by
accession to the combined parchment and writing343 (where the net
value was not enhanced above the original),344 and his cloth owner
gains title to the embroidery placed on it by accession.345  Courts
apply this doctrine in manufacturing cases to vest the title of finished
products in the owner of the principal raw materials in suits,346
shears,347 steel products,348 and even locomotives.349  Title to engines,350
                                                 
341. See Stevens v. Briggs, 22 Mass. (15 Pick.) 177, 177 (1827) (holding that when a
defendant added additional materials to the plaintiff’s desk, the whole became the property of
the plaintiff).
342. See Glover v. Austin, 23 Mass. (6 Pick.) 209, 220 (1828) (holding that ownership of all
the materials added to the ship passed to the owner of keel); Coursin’s Appeal, 79 Pa. 220, 229
(1875) (same).
343. See BLACKSTONE, supra note 17, at *404-07, cited in Bancorp Leasing & Fin. Corp. v.
Stadeli Pump & Constr., Inc., 739 P.2d 548, 551 (Or. 1987).
344. Cf. Polk County v. Parker, 160 N.W. 320, 321 (Iowa 1916) (passing title to plat maps
made from the county’s paper to a mapmaker who added significant value).
345. See BLACKSTONE, supra note 17, at *404-07, cited in Bancorp Leasing, 739 P.2d at 551.
346. See Kemp-Booth Co. v. Calvin, 84 F.2d 377, 381-82 (9th Cir. 1936) (finding that a
plaintiff’s changing of goods from suitings to finished suits did not add enough to the product
to transfer title).
347. See Mack v. Snell, 35 N.E. 493, 494-95 (N.Y. 1893) (stating that the shears belonged to
the defendant who had supplied the principal materials, irrespective of the fact that the
plaintiff contributed labor and skill to make the finished product).
348. See Bancroft Steel Co. v. Kuniholm Mfg. Co., 16 N.E.2d 78, 80 (Mass. 1938) (finding
that title to a finished product belonged to the plaintiff, a contributor of steel, since steel
constituted the greatest part of the finished product).
349. See Ex parte Ames, 1 F. Cas. 746, 749 (D.C. Mass. 1871) (No. 323) (noting that any
additions to a locomotive made during the course of manufacture would pass to the owner of
the locomotive).
350. See Allied Inv. Co. v. Shaneyfelt, 74 N.W.2d 723, 727-28 (Neb. 1956) (acknowledging
that since an engine cannot logically be separated from an automobile without making an
tires,351 and other vehicle parts352 that were held not severable have
been similarly vested in the owner of the principal materials in the
vehicles.
Courts have even used the principles of accession to vest title to a
building in a landowner when the building has built with both the
landowner’s and tenant’s materials and was attached to the
landowner’s land.353  Therefore, in the case of combinations, the law
of accession vests title in the owner of the principal materials that are
united in the joint product.
Where an individual’s materials are transformed in substance and
form or are greatly enhanced in value by another’s skill and labor,
the law of accession generally vests title in the transformer.  For
example, when an individual transformed another’s grain into
whiskey, the court held that the transformer acquired title by
accession.354  Similarly, when an individual increased the value of
another’s grass from eight to ten cents per unit to two to four and
one-half dollars per unit by cutting and drying it into hay, the court
held that title vested in the haymaker by accession.355  The individual
who converted another’s lumber worth $25 into hoops worth $700
likewise acquired title to the finished hoops by accession,356 as did an
individual who in good faith improved and enhanced the value of
another’s stolen and dismantled car so that the improvements
approached or exceeded the value of the original article.357  Thus, the
law of accession vests title in the individual who transforms another’s
property through skill and labor so that it changes its nature and
identity or significantly enhances its value.
The amount of property or labor each person has contributed to
                                                 
automobile useless, title to the engine passes to the owner of the car).
351. See Fish v. Connecticut Fire Ins. Co., 5 N.W.2d 779, 782 (Wis. 1942) (stating that the
title to the tires passes with the truck because the owner did not intend for the tires to be
separated from the vehicle).
352. See Auto Owners Fin. Co. v. Evirs, 49 A.2d 507, 509 (N.H. 1946) (holding that the
owner of a completed bus held title to the parts of the body).
353. See Compton v. Barnes Lumber Co., 99 S.W.2d 634, 636 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936) (noting
that the law of accession applies only to personalty; if the law of accession applied to realty,
however, title to the building built on the land passes to the landowner because the owner of
the land furnished the principle material for the enterprise).
354. See Hyde v. Cookson, 21 Barb. 92, 105-06 (N.Y. App. Div. 1855) (relying on the fact that
the converter was not a willing or intentional wrongdoer).
355. See Lewis v. Courtright, 41 N.W. 615, 616 (Iowa 1889) (emphasizing that the plaintiff
should not enjoy the fruits of the defendant’s labor when the defendant cut hay under a
mistake of fact).
356. See Wetherbee v. Green, 22 Mich. 311, 321 (1871).
357. See Ochoa v. Rogers, 234 S.W. 693, 694-95 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921) (holding that title lay
with the unintentional purchaser who made improvements to the article in good faith and
where such improvements approached or exceeded the value of the original vehicle).
make a final joint item may sometimes be of greater significance than
whatever chemical change or mechanical transformation has
occurred.358  For example, when an individual’s labor and materials
contributed more to the value of the final article than the other
materials she added them to, she is entitled to keep the final article as
her own, making due compensation to the owner of the other
materials.359  Whether she acquires title by accession in this way
depends not on the excess of present value over the value of the
unimproved original, but rather on the degree of excess:  accession
transfers title in cases where the increase in value is far beyond the
value of the other original materials.360  As a result, the combination
of the degree of transformation and the amount of relative value
added will significantly affect whether title passes by accession.
b. Allocating compensation and value:  the costs of raw materials, skill,
and labor
In addition to allocating title, the law of accession provides for a
range of other remedies, including compensation for original
materials, actual recovery of property, and the option of damages in
lieu of the property.
The improver of a present article is required to compensate the
original owner for the value of the original materials used if she
acquires title through accession.  The general rule is that if an
individual acquires title through accession to a joint or transformed
product that incorporates the materials of another individual, the
former individual is liable to the latter for the value of the latter’s
materials before they were transformed or combined with those of
the former.361  Thus, when timber was taken by mistake and
manufactured into something significantly different, title passed by
accession, and the original owner of the timber could only recover
the value of the timber in its state while standing, not after its
processing.362  Similarly, when a sheriff impounded and then sold
                                                 
358. See Wetherbee, 22 Mich. at 320 (declaring that consideration of an original owner’s ability
to identify materials is unsatisfactory and that it is fairer to rule on the amount of property or
labor contributed).
359. See Carpenter v. Lingenfelter, 60 N.W. 1022, 1024 (Neb. 1894) (indicating that title
passes to the enhancer if the owner fails to reclaim the property before too much value is
added); Railway Co. v. Hutchins, 32 Ohio St. 571, 577 (1877) (determining that the
manufacturer, rather than the owner, keeps title when the manufacturer expends money in
good faith and the owners simply provided the original value); Ochoa, 234 S.W. at 693
(maintaining that the enhanced final product passes to the improver if the value of the
improvements exceeds the value of the original materials).
360. See Isle Royale Mining Co. v. Hertin, 37 Mich. 332, 337 (1877) (insisting on an
evaluation of hardship when value changes greatly); Wetherbee, 22 Mich. at 320-21 (basing the
importance of increase in value on the general notions of fairness and hardship); Lampton’s
Ex’rs v. Preston’s Ex’rs, 24 Ky. (1 J.J. Marsh.) 454, 465 (1829) (indicating that the value of labor
and the value of material may govern the decision).
361. See, e.g., Louis Weiner Stave Co. v. Pickering, 119 S.W. 333, 334 (Tex. Civ. App. 1909)
(articulating the general rule that the original owner can only recover the value of property at
the time it was taken, not the value of the property in its changed condition).
362. See id.; see also Kirby Lumber Co. v. Temple Lumber Co., 83 S.W.2d 685, 647-49 (Tex.
manufactured hats from a defaulting manufacturer, the individual
who had contracted with the manufacturer to manufacture the hats,
supply the materials, and receive payment for the hats, could only
recover the value of the hat raw materials and the payment, not the
value of the finished hat.363  A tenant’s good faith transformation of
clay from occupied land into bricks vested title in the tenant by
accession and entitled the landowner only to the value of the bricks’
raw materials.364  In Ochoa v. Rogers,365 an individual acquired title by
accession to a car by significantly rebuilding it from dismantled scraps
and thereby increasing its value.366  When it was determined that the
original dismantled scraps had been stolen, the Ochoa court held that
the original owner of the materials was entitled only to the value of
the scrap before it was enhanced.367  Thus, when the law of accession
vests title of a joint or transformed article in the second transforming
party, the first party may be entitled to compensation for the value of
her materials before they were incorporated in the joint product.368
The law of accession has also recognized the converse value of the
labor and materials embodied in a combined or transformed article
and has provided compensation for them under certain
circumstances where title or the article itself is removed from the
transformer/combiner.  In Clement v. Duffy, for example, an
individual who had a claim of title to grain in a stack threshed and
marketed it.369  When he later found the grain destroyed by another’s
negligence, he was allowed the expense of threshing and marketing
the grain, even though the court determined that he had no title to
the grain itself.370  Thus, even when the law of accession does not pass
title to a combiner/transformer, it provides for compensation for the
value of the combiner’s/transformer’s materials, her exercise of skill,
and her labor.
                                                 
1935) (limiting the recovery by the owner to the stumpage value of the timber).
363. See Swift v. Barnum, 23 Conn. 523, 528 (1855) (stating the general rule for damages as
the value of the property at the time of conversion and allowing recovery for the value of
materials only and not the full value of the hats).
364. See Baker v. Mersch, 45 N.W. 685, 688 (Neb. 1890).
365. 234 S.W. 693 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921).
366. See id. at 694-95 (granting title to the improver because the improvement was
significant and in good faith).
367. See id.
368. See Walch v. Beck, 296 N.W. 780, 782 (Iowa 1941) (restating the compensation rule for
the law of accession).
369. 7 N.W. 86 (Iowa 1880).
370. See id. at 86 (allowing recovery because the defendant was not an intentional
wrongdoer).  The general law of quantum meruit would appear to support this kind of
compensation as well.
The law of accession also provides for the option of damages in lieu
of actual property.  If personal property is altered to such an extent
that its character or nature is changed, it may be considered
converted.371  If the nature of the property has not been changed so
that title passes by accession to the improver, the owner of converted
property under the law of accession has the option of recovering the
property itself or bringing an action for damages.372  When a
property’s identity becomes indistinguishable so that its title has
passed to its improver, damages are the only remedy available to the
original owner.373
c. Bad faith, negligence, and willfulness
Bad faith, negligence, and willfulness are also relevant in
determining the remedies that a court can provide based on the law
of accession.  Again, most courts have held to a general rule that a
willful trespasser can acquire no rights in the property of another by
adding her skill or materials to that property, even if there is great
change in the nature of the property or great increase in its value.374
For example, courts have uniformly recognized that a thief’s
possession of a stolen automobile is a continuing wrong and
consequently no matter how much a thief’s added materials or time
enhances the value or changes the nature of the car, the original
owner retains ownership, and may repossess the car with the
additions.375  Some courts have disagreed with this general principle,
held that there is no distinction between a willful and unintentional
wrongdoer, and concluded that either can take title by accession if
the original article is transformed into a new species of good.376
However, the majority of courts uphold the general rule.377  Thus, the
                                                 
371. See Louis Werner Stave Co. v. Pickering, 119 S.W. 333, 334 (Tex Civ. App. 1909)
(determining that the question of whether title passes depends on whether the person
expending labor to alter the property acted in good faith).
372. See Goodrich Silvertown Stores v. Rugg Motor Sales Co., 27 N.E.2d 936, 937-39 (Ohio
1940) (viewing tires as separate from the automobile, and holding that the true owner of the
tires could either recover the tires or, in fairness to the car owner, recover the damages).
373. See Gaskins v. Davis, 20 S.E. 188, 188-89 (N.C. 1894) (declaring that when timber is
sawed into lumber, the timber owner could recover damages for the value of timber only, and
not the value of the finished boards); Foote v. Merrill, 54 N.H. 490, 491 (1874) (finding that the
plaintiff may recover damages only when the identity of the original material has been
destroyed or its value is insignificant).
374. See, e.g., Union Naval Stores Co. v. United States, 240 U.S. 284, 291 (1916) (holding
that a willful trespasser could not claim title to sap even though he had converted it to
turpentine through his labor); Snyder v. Vaux, 2 Rawle. 423, 427 (Pa. 1830) (holding that a
converter could not maintain title to wood when the trees had been transformed to posts and
rails because the converter was a willful trespasser); Betts v. Lee, 5 Johns. 348, 349-50 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1810) (holding that title does not vest in a trespasser even though, through his labor, he
converted the timber into shingles).
375. See Burroughs v. Garrett, 352 P.2d 644, 648 (N.M. 1960); see also Ochoa v. Rogers, 234
S.W. 693, 694-95 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921) (upholding the rule of bad faith, negligence, and
willfulness, but finding that the transformer was not a thief or a bad faith improver).
376. See Peirce v. Goddard, 39 Mass. (22 Pick.) 559, 562 (1839) (discussing the application
of the law of accession to intentionally taken and transformed).
377. See supra note 374 and accompanying text (listing cases upholding the bad faith
exception to the law of accession).
law of accession accounts for issues of bad faith or intent in its
determination of allocation of title.
In addition, bad faith, negligence, and willfulness are important to
the issue of damages and compensation.  If the transforming or
combining act is done in bad faith, with reckless disregard for the
original owner’s property rights, courts have held that the owner of
the original materials is entitled either to the enhanced goods
themselves or their full enhanced value.  For example, in Benjamin v.
Benjamin,378 a grass owner was able to recover the full value of the hay
made from his grass by a trespasser.379  Also, in Kirby Lumber Co. v.
Temple Lumber Co.,380 the court stated that the owners of stolen timber
that had been willfully and wrongfully converted under circumstances
suggesting malice, were entitled to recover either the manufactured
and transformed goods—lumber, crosstines, or shingles—or the
enhanced value of the goods.381  However, the Kirby Lumber court held
that where the taking and transformation of the lumber was the
result of inadvertence, mistake, or in good faith without reckless
disregard of its owner’s rights, the same manufacturing
transformation would vest title in the transformer who would then
only be liable to the timber’s original owner for its value before the
conversion.382  Thus, if the combiner/transformer acts in bad faith,
courts will generally not apply accession and instead will provide the
original owner with the right to recover the entire enhanced property
or its enhanced value.383  In short, the intent and state of mind of the
combiner/transformer affects the allocation of value as well as title
under the law of accession.
In sum, the law of accession presents a framework for determining
unification and combination based on identification and severability,
relative values of contribution, and considerations of bad faith and
intent.384  It also includes an integrated and coherent system for
providing the remedies of assigning title, requiring compensation,
and presenting the option of damages calibrated to the relative values
                                                 
378. 15 Conn. 347 (1843).
379. See id. at 358.
380. 83 S.W.2d 638 (Tex. 1935).
381. See id. at 646.
382. See id. at 648 (limiting damages to pre-conversion value when the property was
wrongfully, but unintentionally converted); see also Strubbee v. Trustees of Cincinnati Ry., 78 Ky.
481, 485-86 (1880) (applying a similar rule to a trespasser’s taking of timber and converting it
into railroad ties by distinguishing between good and bad faith actions).
383. See Kirby Lumber Co., 83 S.W.2d at 646 (stating that the manufactured value of the
article determines the measure of damages).
384. See generally discussion supra Part III.A.1 (describing how and when the law of accession
is applied).
of contribution and considerations of bad faith and intent.385
B. Applicability to Inevitable Misappropriation
Several factors suggest that courts could use the law of accession to
craft a more consistent and balanced approach to the doctrine of
inevitable misappropriation of trade secrets.  First, both the law of
accession and the doctrine of inevitable misappropriation allocate
the rights and interests in a single, joint product that combines the
materials, skill, and labor of different parties.  The law of accession
allocates the title and value of personal property made up of two
individuals’ materials, labor, and skill.386  The doctrine of inevitable
misappropriation assigns the control and value of an employee who
possesses both an employer’s trade secret information and her own
human capital/right to work.387  Looked at through the lens of the
law of accession, inevitable misappropriation deals with a single joint
“product” (the employee) that is the combination of the employer’s
materials (its trade secrets) and the employee’s materials (her human
capital), created through the employee’s skill and labor.388
Second, both accession and inevitable misappropriation determine
whether the materials combined in the joint product are severable.
The law of accession provides standards for determining whether two
individuals’ material, skill, and labor in a single, joint object are
severable.389  The doctrine of inevitable misappropriation provides
approaches to determining whether an employee can be banned
from using an employer’s trade secrets without being barred entirely
from employment.390  Moreover, the doctrine focuses on whether
trade secrets can be separated from an employee’s actions or
thoughts in new employment, or whether they are inevitably and
inextricably tied together.391
Finally, both the law of accession and the doctrine of inevitable
misappropriation attempt to allocate the control and value of the
                                                 
385. See generally discussion supra Part III.A.2 (reporting how the law of accession allocates
title and compensates remaining parties).
386. See supra notes 293-99 and accompanying text (discussing the use and applicability of
the law of accession).
387. See supra notes 28-37 and accompanying text (discussing the doctrine of inevitable
misappropriation as applied in PepsiCo).
388. Compare supra Part II.B.2 (exploring one proposal for the recharacterization of
inevitable misappropriation as needing to recognize the concurrent property interests in trade
secrets), with infra Part III.C (proposing that unitary ownership of trade secrets by an employer
and the allocation of the control of the combination of trade secrets and employee human
capital according to accession principles).
389. See discussion supra Part III.A.1 (outlining the important factors in the application of
the law of accession).
390. See supra Part II.A.1 (identifying the four approaches courts have used to determine
inevitability).
391. Compare Baxter Int’l, Inc. v. Morris, 976 F.2d 1189, 1194-95 (8th Cir. 1992) (upholding
the district court’s finding that the employee could work for a competitor without divulging
trade secrets), with Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Johnson, 442 A.2d 1114, 1122 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1982) (upholding the trial court’s finding that it would be impossible for an employee to
perform his managerial functions for the competitor employer without drawing on the former
employer’s trade secrets).
combined materials of two individuals.  The law of accession allocates
control over combined property:  it distributes value by vesting title
and providing compensation.392  In a similar way, inevitable
misappropriation allocates control over the individual—the
combined “property” in this case—by granting or denying injunctions
and distributing her value through those injunctive decisions as well
as (very occasionally) through legal damages.393
Of course, the analogy between these two areas of law is by no
means perfect.  First and foremost, people and their employment are
not the same as property, and this Article does not in any way
condone the argument that they should be treated or directly
characterized as such.  Strong arguments ranging from historical
concerns regarding the Thirteenth Amendment394 to principles of
anti-commodification395 suggest that the limitations on this analogy
should be taken very seriously for important normative reasons.
Second, directly applying an ancient doctrine of personal property
law (accession) to a rapidly changing and developing area of
intellectual property and employment law (trade secrets) may over-
tax the analogy and prove ultimately unworkable.  For example,
accession law allocates to one person the complete title both to the
combined/transformed personal property and to its included
component parts.396  By contrast, allocating to one party complete
control over a person’s temporary employment interests (which are
made up of a combination of human capital and trade secrets) does
not allocate complete control over the included human capital and
trade secrets.  An accession type system may ultimately raise the same
problems of ownership fragmentation presented by the concurrent
property rights proposal.397  Thus, there are significant normative and
positive limitations to applying accession law to the trade secret
context.
Although these concerns are important, applying a property
perspective to both trade secrets and employment rights/human
                                                 
392. See generally supra Part III.A.2.a (detailing how the law of accession vests title and
control of transformed property).
393. See generally supra Part II.A (discussing current approaches to the application of
inevitable misappropriation).
394. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1 (prohibiting slavery).
395. See Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1870-87 (1987) (discussing
the harms of commodification, the principle that in theory that all things should be subject to
market transfer).
396. See supra notes 342-52 and accompanying text (listing situations where courts have held
that title to transformed property vests in the owner of the principal materials).
397. See supra notes 284-86 and accompanying text (identifying weaknesses in Lowry’s
concurrent ownership interests proposal).
capital has solid legal and doctrinal precedent.  First, as noted above,
trade secrets have long been recognized as establishing property
rights by both state supreme courts398 and the U.S. Supreme Court.399
In addition, courts have treated an employee’s ability to work as
property400 and have evaluated similar restrictions on employment
and their value in a quasi-property or valuation framework when
evaluating covenants not to compete.401  Similarly, although many
kinds of intellectual property and information have different
attributes of ownership and control than realty or personalty, courts
have successfully applied other property doctrines to the context of
copyright, trademark, and information/intellectual property law.402
For example, the EEA of 1996 takes an ownership-based approach to
trade secrets.403  Consequently, although the courts must be aware of
the normative implications of applying accession law to control over
employees and their employment and the positive limitations on
moving from a personal property context to one involving trade
secrets, these concerns do not appear fatal to this proposal.
Thus, similarities in the problems the two doctrines face, the
analytical methods they adopt, and the remedies they try to craft
suggest that applying the law of accession to the doctrine of inevitable
misappropriation is appropriate.
C. An Accession Law Approach
This Part takes the framework of the law of accession and applies it
to the context of inevitable misappropriation.  It suggests how a
coherent methodology, taken from the accession law approach may
be applied to the inevitable misappropriation doctrine.  It then
illustrates how a modified accession approach to remedies could be
applied to resolve the unsystematic range of remedies currently
provided for under the doctrine of inevitable misappropriation.
1. Determining inevitability:  separability, bad faith improver, and
                                                 
398. See, e.g., Thum Co. v. Tioczynski, 72 N.W. 140, 141 (Mich. 1897) (stating that
manufacturers of fly paper had a property right in their invention); Peabody v. Norfolk, 98
Mass. 452, 458 (1868) (protecting an inventor’s property rights from unauthorized disclosure).
399. See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1003-04 (1984) (holding that trade
secrets can constitute a property interest).
400. See, e.g., New Method Laundry Co. v. MacCann, 161 P. 990, 991-92 (Cal. 1916) (noting
that the right to work is a property right entitled to the same protection afforded other kinds of
property); Gillespie v. People, 58 N.E. 1007, 1009 (Ill. 1900) (including the right to labor
among the property rights protected by law).
401. See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text (recognizing the increasing application of
the inevitable misappropriation doctrine to justify enforcement of “no compete” covenants
through injunctions).
402. For example, joint owners co-owning copyrights in a work are deemed “tenants-in-
common” with equal rights to the profits.  See, e.g., Community for Creative Non-Violence v.
Reid, 846 F.2d 1485, 1498 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (citing W. PATRY, LATMAN’S THE COPYRIGHT LAW 116
(6th ed. 1986)).  See generally 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 201(9) (1994) (defining joint works and co-
ownership).
403. See Economic Espionage Act of 1996 § 101(a), 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1831(a), 1832(a),
1839(1) (Supp. 1997) (defining and criminalizing economic espionage); see also supra notes
272-73 (discussing the merits of the EEA approach to the owners of trade secrets).
comparative valuation
Following the accession framework, courts would determine
initially whether employer’s trade secrets had been combined with
the employee’s human capital or had been transformed into part of
the employee to such a degree that applying the rules of accession
would be appropriate.  A court could determine this by using the
tests of identification and severability, as well as identity and value-
enhancement.
A court applying the identification and severability test would
determine if the employer’s trade secrets were identifiable and within
the combined “product” of the employee, and whether they could be
severed or separated from her without damage.404  Practically
speaking, this would require courts to define the specific trade
secrets, establish the employee’s exposure to the trade secrets, and
determine whether injunction could sever the trade secrets from the
employee’s use in her new job without damage.  Borrowing the tests
for severability from the law of accession, courts could analyze the
factors in the Merck & Co. approach to determine whether the
competitive characteristics of the industry and the similarity of the
required positions would enable the trade secrets to be severed from
the employee by an injunction.405  The court would evaluate
(1) whether the employee could be effectively enjoined from
disclosure or use based on the potential for damage to the employer’s
trade secrets; and (2) whether the employee would be damaged by
such an injunction by looking at factors like career impact and
economic value.  If a simple non-disclosure injunction could be
effective and would not damage either the trade secrets (through
disclosure) or the employee (through career restraint), the court
could issue the injunction and end its analysis.  If not, the court
would proceed through the other tests for analyzing the applicability
of accession law and then determine and enforce remedies as
discussed below.406  The application of accession law concepts adds
rigor to the Merck & Co. analysis, focusing not only on whether
injunctions against disclosure could adequately protect the trade
secrets from misappropriation, but on what effects they would have
on the individual employee.
                                                 
404. See supra notes 300-17 and accompanying text (discussing severability analysis).
405. See Merck & Co., Inc. v. Lyon Glaxo-Wellcome, 941 F. Supp. 1443, 1460 (M.D.N.C.
1996) (discussing the relevant considerations in application of the inevitable disclosure
doctrine); see also supra notes 139-47 and accompanying text (describing the four-part test for
determining inevitability).
406. See discussion infra Part III.C.2.
Additionally, in determining severability, the court could examine
the express intent of the parties as considered in accession law.407  It
could focus on any agreements made between the employer and the
employee, for example, addressing the confidentiality of trade secrets
and injunctive relief, while evaluating more broadly the ability to
sever, absent such agreements, the information from the employee
without damage.  This emphasis on controlling intent would clarify
the inevitability analysis.
The court could then apply the identity/value-enhancement
analysis from the transformation prong of accession law to determine
the applicability of the doctrine of inevitable misappropriation.408
The court could evaluate whether the combined product (the
employee) had been sufficiently transformed from being simply the
employer’s raw materials (the embodiment or simple possessor of the
employer’s trade secrets) into a significantly more valuable or
substantially different in kind product.  Its analysis would center on
whether the employee’s value to the new employer was simply as a
vessel for the former employer’s raw material trade secrets, or as
something qualitatively different and significantly enhanced in
value—a skilled employee made up of much more than just these
trade secrets.  In practical terms, the court could compare the relative
value in the market of the employee and access to trade secrets.409
Following the Merck & Co. approach, the court could evaluate
whether the employee had been transformed from a mere vessel for
trade secrets by examining the similarity of positions within the new
and old companies.410  Emphasis on skills and human capital
unrelated to the former employer’s trade secrets and compensation
well in excess of the value of the trade secrets would be evidence of
transformation.  If the court found sufficient transformation in-kind
or value-enhancement of the employee from trade secrets to a
specialized human capital asset, it could proceed to the allocation of
the control and value of the employee through the mechanism
below.  If not, the court could vest control over the employee’s
knowledge of trade secrets in the employer for a specific amount of
time.
Under the final test, the court could examine the apparent intent
                                                 
407. See supra notes 316-17 and accompanying text (describing the role of intent in the law
of accession).
408. See supra Part III.A.1.b (describing the analysis for transformation).
409. An employee’s value in the market could be a combination of the trade secrets with
her specific human capital.  Cf. Lumex, Inc. v. Highsmith, 919 F. Supp. 624, 636 (E.D.N.Y.
1996) (enjoining an employee for six months and requiring the employer to pay his salary for
that time period per the explicit covenant); Marcam Corp. v. Orchard, 885 F. Supp. 294, 299-
300 (D. Mass. 1995) (enjoining an employee from working for a competitor for one year
pursuant to a covenant not to compete, but requiring his former employer to pay him 110% of
the salary offered by the competitor).
410. See Merck & Co., 941 F. Supp. at 1460-61 (considering the increased likelihood of
misappropriation of trade secrets when old and new job responsibilities overlap); see also supra
notes 139-47 and accompanying text (describing the four-part test for determining
inevitability).
and willfulness of the transforming/combining employee, and deny
bad faith or willful combiners or transformers of trade secrets the
beneficial application of the doctrine.411  Under this approach, bad
faith would not be a required showing, but could be taken into
account in the court’s determination of remedies.412
All of these tests could be used together to shape the court’s
analysis for the application of the inevitability of the
misappropriation doctrine.  It should be noted that the accession
approach presented would not exclude the use of the current
approaches to the inevitable misappropriation doctrine, but rather
adopt, enhance, and guide their application with a more coherent
and systematic framework.  For example, similar to the Merck & Co.
court’s approach to inevitability, the accession-based methodology
would compare job similarity and competitiveness to determine
severability.413  It would examine the new job design and its
remuneration in a manner similar to that used to evaluate the
transformation of identity and value-enhancement.  However, this
accession approach would add important additional guiding
elements:  severability is tested by damage both to the employer and
employee,414 a more nuanced test for inevitability through an evaluation
of identity transformation/value-enhancement based on the market
value enhancement of the employee, as well as job similarity and
specificity.415  An accession approach focuses on the employee and
her composition of human capital skills and information—both
general and trade secret—to determine whether she constitutes an
inseverable or transformed joint product from which trade secrets
cannot be injunctively separated without damage.416
Thus, applying the accession methodology to the determination of
inevitability results in a multiple stage-system for examining
severability.  Courts determine if the trade secrets are separable from
the employee’s use at the new job by examining:  (1) whether
                                                 
411. See supra Part III.A.1.c (describing the role of bad faith, negligence, and willfullness in
accession law).
412. See supra notes 331-40 and accompanying text.
413. See Merck & Co., 941 F. Supp. at 1443 (discussing the likelihood of trade secret
disclosure based on the relevance of the information and the similarity in employment
responsibilities); see also supra notes 139-45 and accompanying text (discussing the Merck & Co.
approach to the doctrine of inevitable misappropriation).
414. But see generally discussion supra Part II.A.2 (describing the current approaches’
emphasis on the employer’s interests).
415. See also supra notes 139-47 and accompanying text (discussing the factors used in the
Merck & Co. approach to determine inevitability).
416. See generally discussion supra Part III.A (discussing the origins and current application
of accession law).
removal will cause damage to the employee; (2) whether the
employee’s materials, labor, and effort have transformed her into
something different in kind than a simple user or discloser of trade
secrets; (3) whether the employee had so enhanced her value over
the initial value of the trade secrets themselves so as to warrant
resting title and control of the employee’s skills and accessible trade
secrets in the employee herself; and (4) whether the employee
attempted to combine her human capital and the trade secrets in bad
faith.  Each of the objective factors of separation damage assessment,
transformation of employee kind, and contribution by the employee
herself provides other clear, coherent, and integrated factors for
employers and employees alike to determine inevitability of
misappropriation.  In addition, the law of accession enables courts to
evaluate bad faith and intent as a relevant, but not required,
consideration in determining inevitability.
The accession approach to determining inevitability meets all of
the criteria raised in the criticism of other methodologies above.
First, the accession approach presents a framework that incorporates
clear and coherent standards for determining inevitability.  It
provides a step-by-step analysis that focuses initially on relative value
contribution to determine the preliminary assignment of control.
The accession approach provides a framework for evaluating
inevitability that is clearer and more coherent than the case-by-case
“nature of employment” approach of Standard Brands,417 by applying
tests similar to Merck & Co. in its focus on the employee as a joint
product.418  It then analyzes severability between trade secrets and
human capital by examining three objective factors:  (1) separation
damage assessment; (2) degree of transformation in kind; and
(3) significance of value enhancement.  Second, the accession
approach accounts for, but does not require, a bad faith
determination to find that the employee is a joint and inseverable
product or one significantly transformed or enhanced in value.  In
this way, it moves beyond the limitations of Cyprus Foote,419 while still
accounting for bad faith in its evaluation of severability and
transformation.  Third, the accession approach is not limited to
technical information like International Paper;420 but rather it evaluates
more generally the combination of trade secrets of all varieties and
the human capital of a broad range of individuals.  Fourth, the
approach accounts for severability, addressing the impact on both the
employer and the employee when the trade secret information is
severed from the employee.421  In this way, the accession approach
                                                 
417. See supra notes 90-96 and accompanying text.
418. See supra notes 139-47 and accompanying text (describing the Merck & Co. approach).
419. See supra notes 102-10 and accompanying text.
420. See supra notes 123-29 and accompanying text.
421. This avoids the current courts’ excessively narrow focus on employer property interests.
See discussion supra Part II.A.2 (observing that current approaches to inevitability
determinations favor employer’s interests).
provides a more coherent and employee-evaluative framework for
using the tests outlined in Merck & Co., permitting a richer
understanding of inevitability.422  Inevitability is not determined
merely by examining the impact of employment on trade secrets, but
by evaluating the impact of an injunction on the value of the
employee as well.  The combination of these factors suggests that the
accession approach to determining inevitability offers a significant
improvement over existing court approaches and academic
proposals.
2. Providing a system of remedies
Applying the law of accession to the remedies granted by courts for
inevitable misappropriation would be similarly advantageous.  This
application would present courts with a coherent and balanced
framework for providing injunctive relief, a measure of
compensation, and the correct combination of the two.  It would
enable courts to escape from the current haphazard approach of
providing inconsistent all-or-nothing remedies, without fragmenting
the ownership structure of trade secrets.
After finding unified combinations that were not severable,
transformations in kind, and significant enhancements in value,
courts applying the accession approach would determine control over
the employee in the same way that accession law allocates title to joint
property:  viewing the employee as a combination of inseverable
trade secrets and human capital, the court would determine whether
“title” would vest in the employer or employee based on the relative
value or contribution of employee’s materials to the joint product.423
In other words, courts would weigh the employer’s trade secrets (that
were not severable by a simple nondisclosure injunction) against the
skill, labor, and human capital to determine which constituted more
of the overall value at the time of employee’s new employment.
Of course, valuing each of these factors would be difficult.  Initially,
courts would estimate the value of the trade secrets that could not be
“severed” from the employee by looking to royalty rates for a similarly
limited use of those trade secrets.  Courts could then compare that
value against the difference in wages between the employee and an
                                                 
422. See Merck & Co., Inc. v. Lyon Glaxo-Wellcome, 941 F. Supp. 1443, 1459-60 (M.D.N.C.
1996) (describing the factors to consider when making an inevitability of disclosure
determination); see also supra notes 139-47 and accompanying text (describing the Merck & Co.
four-part test for determining inevitability).
423. See discussion supra Part III.A.2.a (discussing the vesting of title and control under the
law of accession).
individual merely exposed to trade secrets.424  To generate proxies,
courts could evaluate contract rates for employer trade secrets and
differences in the wage rates of individuals exposed to different levels
of trade secrets.  Such an estimate does not seem impossible; courts
have suggested that the trade secrets of employers can be valued,425
and the employee value of human capital has also been valued in the
divorce context426 and in the context of competitive salaries.427
Where courts cannot calculate the value of the trade secrets or the
individual liberty interests of freedom of employment, they could
look to relative guides in the state law’s public policy.  For example,
courts in states with a blanket prohibition against noncompete
covenants would set the abstract value of fundamental liberty
interests higher than those in states that recognize and enforce such
covenants.428  Similarly, the depth of protection of trade secrets in
statutory law and the relative penalties for their appropriation would
also provide a proxy for the relative value of this information.429
Alternatively, the courts could use some of the existing valuation
mechanisms used in calculating the damages for an infringement,
such as expert testimony or comparative market share impact tests, to
determine the value of the trade secrets.430  Similar expert testimony
or comparable employment-offer information could be used to
determine the value of the human capital embodied in the
individual, as is currently used for benchmarking compensation
schemes involving options.431  As a final default mechanism in
determining the relative value of an employee’s human capital and
an employer’s trade secret, courts could use (1) the new employer’s
salary proposal as the value of the total employee product; (2) other
similarly situated employees’ salaries at the new company as a
                                                 
424. Cf. Lumex, Inc. v. Highsmith, 919 F. Supp. 624, 636 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (finding a
restrictive covenant reasonable because the injunction was limited to six months and the former
employer would compensate the employee); Emery Indus. v. Cottier, 202 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 829,
836-377 (S.D. Ohio 1978) (finding mixed damages and an injunction remedy based in part on
an evaluation of employee value).
425. See supra notes 182-84 and accompanying text.
426. See O’Brien v. O’Brien, 489 N.E.2d 712, 717-18 (N.Y. 1985) (holding that professional
degrees constitute divisible marital property and providing a valuation and allocation scheme).
See generally J. Thomas Oldham, Putting Asunder in the 1990s, 80 CAL. L. REV. 1091, 1121 (1992)
(discussing the valuation of human capital accumulations during marriage at the time of
divorce).
427. See Reasonableness of CEO’s Compensation Based on Survey of Comparable Companies, 84 J.
TAX’N 346 (1996) [hereinafter Comparable Companies] (reporting that the Tax Court determines
the reasonable value of a CEO’s services by referring to an index of comparable company
compensation).
428. See, e.g., Standard Brands, Inc. v. Zumpe, 264 F. Supp. 254, 264-65 (E.D. La. 1967)
(reporting that the public policy against covenants not to compete is relevant in determining
the value of liberty versus property interests).
429. See Merck & Co., Inc. v. Lyon Glaxo-Wellcome, 941 F. Supp. 1443, 1459-61 (M.D.N.C.
1996) (looking to the standard of public policy).
430. See GORDON V. SMITH & RUSSELL L. PARR, VALUATION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY &
INTANGIBLE ASSETS 429-49 (2d ed. 1994) (discussing the structure of a typical intellectual
property valuation).
431. See Comparable Companies, supra note 427, at 346 (describing one method of evaluating
the monetary value of a CEO’s services).
comparable salary value; and (3) the most recent efforts of the old
employer to protect its trade secrets on an individual basis, in
combination with estimated economic losses from disclosure or
recent royalty rates.  Consequently, courts could come to some
relative conclusion about the value of the trade secrets and the
employee’s human capital.
Courts could then engage in a second stage of analysis to
determine what relationship these components have to the market
value of the employee in her new job.  The inquiry would focus not
merely on the relative value of trade secrets vis-à-vis human capital in
a potential use situation, but in the specific situation at hand.  For
example, the value of a trade secret would constitute a component of
an employee’s market value if she were being hired as an industrial
spy.  The correct evaluation of the relative values of trade secrets and
employee human capital would have to be made in the context of the
employment being offered–-the market price.
Given all of these factors, the court could then vest “title”–-i.e.,
determine whether to grant or deny an injunction against
employment, based on the relative values of the employer’s trade
secrets and the employee’s human capital, skill and labor.432  This
injunction could be narrowly tailored and issued in combination with
a non-disclosure injunction to maximize the amount of severability of
the trade secrets from the employee without damage.
In practice, the courts could thus determine the relative value of
employee’s contributions to the new employer based on the old
employer’s trade secrets and the employee’s own human capital and
skills.  If the old employer’s trade secrets were a much more
substantial component of that value, then an injunction would issue
against employment in that area in the same way that accession would
vest title in the owner of the materials that make up the primary part
of the joint product.  If the employee’s skills, labor, and human
capital were the principal component of her value to the new
employer and the market in general, then the injunction would be
denied.
Interestingly enough, this kind of accession-based approach is
suggested in part by some of the courts’ current applications of the
inevitable misappropriation doctrine.  Jurisdictions with strong public
policies against covenants not to compete weigh employee rights
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more heavily than employer trade secrets,433 and where employer
trade secrets do not appear to be the main component of an
employee’s value to a new employer—whether through structuring
around these secrets by the new employer434 or because of simple
differences in responsibilities435—courts tend to deny injunctions,
vesting “title” in the employee.  In highly competitive industries with
competing employers,436 courts appear to conclude that the value of a
new employee may be determined more by the employer’s embodied
trade secrets than by the employee’s human capital, and
consequently grant injunctions.437  This accession approach refines
the analysis to focus on the relative values and the likelihood of
disclosure of the trade secrets, and not on the individual employee’s
human capital—specifically within the context of the offered new
employment.  Both of these innovations should provide a more
nuanced evaluation of the relative value of the interests involved and
a more narrowly tailored vesting of title.
The court could also use its findings of transformation in kind and
value-enhancement to determine whether to issue or deny injunctive
relief.  As in the law of accession, if an individual transforms the
material of another into something different in kind or significantly
enhanced in value, she acquires title in the resulting article by
accession.438  Thus, if the court determines that an employee has
transformed herself from a mere vessel for trade secret information
into an employee of a different field or different level of innovation,
or has significantly increased her value beyond that of the trade
secrets embodied within her (for example, by becoming a much
more valued human capital commodity building and transforming
the bare trade secret knowledge and approach), the court will deny
injunctive relief, vesting “title”—control over her employment—in
the employee.439  This kind of analysis would prevent incredibly
skilled or innovative workers from being imprisoned in the field of
their former employers on the basis of trade secret disclosure alone.440
                                                 
433. See Continental Group, Inc. v. Kinsley, 422 F. Supp. 838, 842 (D. Conn. 1976)
(recognizing New York’s cautious approach to “non-compete” covenants based on the
covenants’ inherent interference with an individual’s right to labor); Standard Brands, Inc., 264
F. Supp. at 265-66 (discussing a Louisiana statute prohibiting “noncompete” covenants
designed to protect employees regardless of the chilling effect on the business environment).
434. See Merck & Co., 941 F. Supp. at 1461.
435. See, e.g., International Paper v. Suwyn, 966 F. Supp. 246, 259 (S.D.N.Y 1997) (denying
injunctive relief because defendant’s job functions were not of a highly technical nature and his
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436. See, e.g., PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262 (7th Cir. 1995) (noting the highly
competitive nature of the sport drink industry and employers); Doubleclick Inc. v. Henderson,
No. 116914/97, 1997 WL 731413, at *2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov. 7, 1997) (establishing the highly
competitive nature of the Internet advertising industry).
437. See, e.g., Doubleclick, No. 116914/97, 1997 WL at *8 (enjoining a former employee for
six months from working for any employer or company that competed with the former
employer).
438. See supra notes 318-30 and accompanying text.
439. See generally supra notes 354-57 and accompanying text (explaining when accession law
vests title in the transformer).
440. See, e.g., Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. v. Lockhart, 5 F. Supp. 2d 667, 688 (S.D. Ind.
At present, nothing directs the courts to distinguish between workers
who have been exposed to trade secrets and have been transformed
beyond the value of those trades secrets, and those who have been
exposed to trade secrets but have not been transformed.441  Applying
the accession approach to the allocation of control or “title” to the
employer or employee draws such a distinction, vesting control in
employees who have dramatically transformed themselves from mere
trade secrets vessels.  Given that the protection of intellectual
property is a societal choice442 designed to increase innovation and
encourage development for the public good,443 accounting for
transformative and value-enhancing characteristics is justified.444
Thus, the accession approach to remedies for inevitable
misappropriation accounts for the relative values of the employer’s
trade secrets and employee’s human capital in her value to her new
employer.445  It involves a more systematic, nuanced, and flexible
approach to vesting control over the employee’s new employment
ability, based on evaluating the relative values at two levels:  the
general inherent value of employees’ rights in a given jurisdiction
and specific value of the employee’s human capital in the new
employment combination.  In addition, the transformation/value-
                                                 
1998) (discussing the possibility that a threat of litigation may encourage new employers to
abandon new employees).
441. This is in direct contrast to the problems raised when a court focuses on employer
property interests to the exclusion of employee interests.  See supra notes 162-68, 217-23 and
accompanying text.
442. Similarly, Justice Holmes, in a famous case on misappropriation, remarked that
“[p]roperty, a creation of law, does not arise from value .  .  .  .” International News Serv. v.
Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 246 (1918) (Holmes, J., dissenting).  But see id. at 250 (Brandeis,
J., dissenting) (“[T]he fact that a product of the mind has cost its producer money and labor,
and has a value for which others are willing to pay, is not sufficient to ensure to it this legal
attribute of property.”).
443.
Intellectual property law assures authors the right to their original expression, but
encourages others to build freely on the ideas that underlie it.  This result is neither
unfair nor unfortunate:  It is the means by which intellectual property law advances
the progress of science and art. We give authors certain exclusive rights, but in
exchange we get a richer public domain.
White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1517 (9th Cir. 1993) (Kozinski, J.,
dissenting).
444. An argument could be made about the horizontal equities involved in this situation,
i.e., why should transformative or value-enhancing workers be more protected than less
transformative and value-enhancing ones?  For example, the anti-commodification interests and
similar liberty-based concerns of both kinds of workers seem equally at issue here.  See supra
notes 394-95 and accompanying text.  This is a valid question and cannot be answered on the
grounds of an efficiency or productive incentive analysis alone.  At the very least, this approach
attempts to account for some employee interests in contrast to current approaches to the
doctrine.  See supra notes 162-68.
445. See supra notes 424-31 and accompanying text (suggesting various methods of
calculating values of trade secrets and human capital).
enhancing standard for vesting title provides for a more incentive-
based approach to allocating control over an employee’s future—one
that evaluates the specific character of the employee and her next
employment in greater detail than the current primary focus on the
trade secrets alone.  The accession approach clarifies and systematizes
the balancing approach only loosely discussed in the application of
inevitable misappropriation.446
Perhaps more importantly, the accession approach also provides a
coherent method of balancing the all-or-nothing nature of most
injunctions with compensation for the materials of the employer or
employee that are bound up within the employee.447  As in the law of
accession, if “title” in the employee is acquired by the employee in
the process of applying the accession approach, the employee will be
responsible to the employer for the value of the trade secrets that are
embodied within her.448  Again, this is subject to several caveats.  The
employer will only be compensated for the value of the trade secrets
that are expected to be converted as they would be used or disclosed
in the specific context.  This compensation excludes trade secrets
that can be protected by nondisclosure injunctions (i.e., that can be
“severed”).  Courts could set the level of compensation by evaluating
the overall value of the trade secrets and estimating the likely impact
of disclosure, using the royalty figures for comparable use as
proxies.449  Alternatively, expert testimony and other techniques could
be used to determine this value.450  Courts concerned about
commercial morality and the incalculable damages from disclosure of
trade secrets could add this to their calculations of value as well,
depending, again, on a calibration of these factors against the public
policy of their state.451  Thus, if the employee were vested with control
over her new employment but would still inevitably disclose or use
some trade secrets, she would compensate the employer for their
value.  This approach is similar to the suggestion to use the royalty
payment provisions for use of trade secrets under the California Civil
Code,452 but provides a more systematic and flexible approach to
determine the correct compensation.
Conversely, if the employer were vested with control over the
employee, then the employer would be responsible for compensating
                                                 
446. See discussion supra Part II.A (reviewing the courts’ approaches of to the
misappropriation doctrine).
447. See discussion supra Part II.A.3.
448. See discussion supra Part III.A.2 (discussing the general rule which provides that if one
acquires title to a product through accession from another, the former is responsible to the
latter for the value of materials before transformation).
449. See supra note 268 and accompanying text (citing a California statute that allows courts
to order royalty payments in disclosure situations).
450. See SMITH & PARR, supra note 430, at 137-44 (describing cost, income, and market
approaches as other techniques for the valuation of assets).
451. See, e.g., Standard Brands, Inc. v. Zumpe, 264 F. Supp. 254, 263 (E.D. La. 1967)
(reviewing Louisiana’s public policy of nullifying no-compete agreements).
452. See supra note 268 and accompanying text (discussing how the California Code allows
courts to order royalty payments in disclosure situations).
the employee for the value of her converted or transformed human
capital, skill, and labor.453  This amount could easily be estimated
from her new employment offer or a modification of her old
employment offer.454  Alternatively, the court could use other
mechanisms, such as expert testimony, comparable compensation
data, or the wages of similarly situated employees of the new
employer, to determine the value of the human capital being
converted.455  Thus, if the accession approach bars an employee from
new employment, she will be entitled to a claim for the human
capital embodied in her.  This amount might not be limited to the
salary offered by the new employer and could include the value of the
liberty interests being infringed456 and other calculations reflecting
the restriction’s costs to her career.  The court’s approach in Emery
Industries, Inc. v. Cottier,457 enjoining an employee from new
employment on grounds of inevitable misappropriation, but
requiring the employer to pay,458 echoes this suggestion.  The
accession approach, however, adopts this view as part of its overall
structure of remedies and suggests more specific factors for the
evaluation of human capital.459
Finally, by applying the accession approach to remedies for
inevitable misappropriation, courts could take account of the
employee’s intent in combining her human capital with trade secrets
and transforming the trade secrets into part of herself.460  If the court
determines that an employee is entering into new employment in bad
faith, with reckless disregard, or willful intent, it could refuse to vest
title in her by accession or restrict the amount of compensation for
human capital converted.
The standard for bad faith, reckless disregard, or willfulness could
be used against the employer as well.  An employer’s attempt to
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prevent an employee from going into new employment can be
characterized as an attempt to appropriate the joint property of the
employee, consisting of both the trade secrets and the employee
human capital.  A court could find an employer acting in bad faith if
it deliberately exposed an employee to trade secrets to establish the
grounds for later injunctive relief, asserted that trade secrets were a
joint-product in the employee solely to prevent her from working for
a competitor, or recklessly disregarded the value of the employee’s
human capital.  Under the law of accession, courts finding bad intent
could deny the benefits of the accession to the employer.461
Furthermore, the court could prevent title from shifting or bar
compensation for the employer for the value of the trade secrets
combined with the employee if the employer is found to have acted
in bad faith.462  This part of an accession-like approach would also
police bad faith filings.463
The accession approach would be similarly applicable to damages.
If the employer acquired control of the employee by accession and
the employee constituted a combination and not a transformation of
its trade secrets, it could have the choice of taking control or
acquiring damages for the value.464  Conversely, an employee who
acquires control by accession under the combination structure could
also choose between exercising control or acquiring damages.465  This
aspect of the accession approach would arm each party with a
significant threat that might deter the frivolous filing of suits;
employers and employees acquiring the right to control could force
the other to take control and compensate them for their lost value.
This feature of the structure increases the range of possible remedies
for inevitable misappropriation claims under the accession approach
in a coherent and systematic fashion, as well as provides a mechanism
for some party control over the allocation of ownership and
compensation after a finding.
Additionally, applying the transformation rule of damages would
provide the employee with some guarantee of protection within her
control, even in the face of substantial employer trade secret value,
and provide a counter-balance to the general information advantages
of the employer.  If control vests in the employee by a finding of
transformation under the law of accession, the employer is entitled
only to the value of the converted trade secrets in all events.  Thus,
the most transformative and value-enhancing employees will not be
held up by employer’s trade secret exposure.  The employee in this
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structure would be merely be liable for damages to the employer.
Applying the accession system of remedies to the conclusions about
the inevitability of misappropriation of trade secrets would generate a
similar range of well-calibrated remedies.  First, the courts would
determine the allocation of the title to the property (the employee)
by reference to the principal part test466 and the transformative/value-
enhancement tests.467  After determining the vesting of control, the
party with the right to control would have the option to force the
other party to accept control (a “put option”).  Second, courts would
provide the party not acquiring title by accession with the appropriate
compensation for the conversion of its trade secrets or human
capital.  Third, the shift in title and the amount of compensation
would be subject to a determination of bad faith, reckless disregard,
or willfulness.  This would provide courts with four possible remedy
options:  Option (1) simple injunctive relief against the employee’s
new employment (based on a finding of no employee human capital
value or a showing of employee bad faith); Option (2) injunctive
relief against the new employment with employee compensation for
restraining human capital (based on a finding that the employer’s
trade secrets comprised the principal part of the employee’s new
employment value or the employee’s decision to force the employer
to exercise control under Option (3); Option (3) denial of injunctive
relief with employer compensation for the loss or potential loss of
trade secret value (based on (i) a finding of the employee’s human
capital comprising the principal part of the employee’s new
employment value; (ii) a finding of transformation in kind or
significant value-enhancement of the employee and employer’s trade
secret value; or (iii) the employer’s decision to force the employee to
exercise control under Option (2); and Option (4) simple denial of
an injunction (based on a finding of no employer trade secret value,
through severability or other analysis, or employer bad faith).  Thus,
applying the system of remedies of the law of accession to the
doctrine of inevitable misappropriation generates a coherent and
clear structure of remedies, from the simple granting and denying of
injunctive relief to tailored injunctive relief, from simple damages to
a combination of damages and compensation with injunctive relief,
and finally the option of waiving injunctive relief for damages.
The accession approach to remedies also meets the criteria
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discussed above in the criticism of other methodologies.  By
providing the full range of equitable and legal relief in a systematic
framework, the accession approach presents a coherent and
consistent system of remedies.  While this approach includes both
injunctive relief and damages, it also recognizes the potential for
costs to both parties.
In addition, the accession approach avoids any recognition of a
formal division of the trade secret property interest.  Instead, it
allocates the “title” and control over the actions of an individual to a
single party (either the employer or the employee); it does not
allocate direct property interests in the trade secret.468  Although
trade secrets form part of that individual, the ultimate ownership of
the trade secrets within that individual is not allocated by the law of
accession—only control over the combined individual (for a specified
time) is.  Only trade secrets that are inseparable from the employee’s
human capital, that are transformed with the individual, or that are
part of an individual who has highly enhanced her own value, are
covered in combination.  Applying the modified accession
mechanism to the law of inevitable misappropriation can thus side-
step the direct allocation or recognition of property rights in trade
secrets to an employee.  Thus, the accession approach promotes a
unified ownership of trade secrets, consistent with other areas of
trade secret law.
Furthermore, the accession approach takes into account both the
intangibility and valuation issues uniquely raised by trade secrets.  It
provides each stage with a structured mechanism for determining the
relative value of trade secrets and employee rights.  For example, if a
court does indeed determine that an employer’s trade secrets are
invaluable and that incalculable harm will result from disclosure, it
can vest control of the employee in the employer for a limited time,
but still account to the employee for the calculable value of that
employee’s human capital.  Conversely, if an employee’s liberty
interest is deemed incalculable, the accession approach can vest
control in her, but still account to the employer for the value of the
employer’s trade secrets.  The general approach of the mechanism
should encourage courts to analyze the relative values involved, and
craft more consistent, flexible, and coherent mechanisms for relief.
Overall the accession approach to the doctrine of inevitable
misappropriation of trade secrets provides a coherent and consistent
methodology for determining inevitability.  In addition, the accession
approach to remedies offers an understandable structure for
providing a wide range of carefully calibrated relief, including
injunctions, damages, and combinations thereof.  The approach is
flexible and accounts for variations both in the value and in the
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nature of trade secrets.  The accession approach, therefore, is a
meaningful and significant first step towards meeting the criteria
outlined in the criticisms of earlier systems and approaches to
inevitable misappropriation.469
D. Deterring Strategic Litigation
One of the major problems raised by any approach to inevitable
misappropriation is that employers with deeper pockets can use the
doctrine to either threaten or actually file suit against employees to
enjoin them from working for competitors as long as some form of
the doctrine and some uncertainty about the outcome of the suit
exists.470  Commentators have noted that even suits that are eventually
settled under the doctrine of inevitable misappropriation continue
for years, hamstringing both the employees involved and the
prospective employers,471 with potentially devastating effects.472  None
of the courts or existing academic proposals addresses this problem.
Of the options discussed, only the proposal to abolish the doctrine
addresses the potential problem of bad faith litigation or threats of
litigation.  Under current approaches to the doctrine, there are few
deterrents to employers threatening or actually filing bad faith suits
for inevitable misappropriation; aside from legal fees, employers
generally do not face the risk of legal damages or injunctive relief
when they file suit under the doctrine.
In addition to applying the law of accession to the doctrine of
inevitable misappropriation, this Article also recommends that courts
adopt a penalty mechanism to deter employers from strategically
threatening or actually filing frivolous lawsuits in an effort to enjoin
employees from working for competitors.  Establishing a penalty
against employers’ unmeritorious attempts to enjoin employees on
the grounds of inevitable misappropriation would provide courts with
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a fifth kind of remedy that could balance the de facto power of
employers.  In addition to the four standard remedies outlined
above—Option (1) injunction; Option (2) injunction, but with
compensation; Option (3) no injunction; and Option (4) no
injunction, but with royalties-–the courts would also have the remedy
of granting Option (5) no injunction, but additional penalties.
Employees could file counterclaims against employers who
intentionally file questionable injunctive motions to harass, harm, or
intimidate employees into remaining with them.  If their
counterclaims are successful, courts could award employees
compensatory legal fees or even punitive damages.
This “fifth remedy” was recently implemented in the November
1997 case of Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. v. Lockhart.473  In this case,
Bridgestone/Firestone sued to enjoin Lockhart, one of its former
employees, from going to work for GAF, one of its competitors,
claiming that his new employment would inevitably cause him to
misappropriate trade secrets.474  The court rejected this argument,475
noting that there was no evidence that Lockhart was likely to take any
information476 and that Lockhart and GAF had even actively designed
his work responsibilities to prevent him from having to use or disclose
Bridgestone/Firestone’s trade secrets.477  After rejecting the
company’s claim for inevitable misappropriation on this basis,478 the
court then turned to Lockhart’s innovative fifth remedy proposal.
Lockhart validated a cause of action against employers who file
failing motions to enjoin employees in Indiana.479  After rebutting the
inevitable misappropriation claims, Lockhart counterclaimed for
compensatory and exemplary damages under an old Indiana
blacklisting statute.480  The statute, drafted and passed in the
nineteenth century to combat efforts by the railroads to blacklist
workers, contains very broad language that suggests that anyone who
attempts to prevent an individual from working in their chosen
profession may be sued for compensatory and exemplary damages.481
The statute reads:
If any railway company or any other company or partnership or
corporation in this state shall authorize, allow or permit any of its
or their agents to black-list any discharged employees, or attempt
by words or writing, or any other means whatever, to prevent such
discharged employee, or any employee who may have voluntarily
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left said company’s service, from obtaining employment with any
other person, or company, said company shall be liable to such
employee in such sum as will fully compensate him, to which may
be added exemplary damages.482
Consequently, Lockhart argued that Bridgestone/Firestone’s
motion to enjoin him from working for GAF constituted such an
“attempt by words or writing, or any other means whatever”483 to
prevent an individual from pursuing employment with “any other
person, or company,”484 and counterclaimed for compensatory and
exemplary damages.485
The district court agreed, holding that the nineteenth-century anti-
blacklisting statute was indeed applicable to a failed motion to enjoin
an employee from working for a competitor.486  However, because the
suit appeared to be filed in good faith and because this statute had
not previously been so interpreted this way,487 the court awarded
Lockhart compensatory damages for his legal fees.  The court did
not, however, award Lockhart exemplary damages.488
Interestingly enough, the court explicitly justified the adopting of
the Lockhart remedy of a penalty for unsuccessful injunctive lawsuits
on the grounds that it would help balance the power of the former
employer against the employee:489
Apart from the effect of the blacklisting statute, a former
employer who sues to stop a departing employee from going
to work for a competitor faces no serious adverse
consequences from the lawsuit, apart from its own attorneys’
fees . . . . On the other side of the power equation, even the
mere threat of a lawsuit can be enough to discourage the
departing employee from going to work for a competitor.
And if the employee is not discouraged, the prospective new
employer may be.490
The court thus read the anti-blacklisting statute as providing
employees with some ex post redress for damages suffered and some
ex ante deterrence against employers for filing such lawsuits against
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employees.  Thus, the combination of the accession law approach
with this fifth penalty mechanism option can create a comprehensive
and coherent framework for applying the doctrine of inevitable
misappropriation of trade secrets.
CONCLUSION
As trade secrets have become an increasingly important part of the
modern economy, a growing number of courts have struggled with
the development of a coherent doctrine of inevitable
misappropriation.  Unfortunately, their attempts have suffered from
both over- and under-inclusiveness, as well as an overly crude
approach of all-or-nothing relief.  These limitations threaten the
balance between fundamental individual liberties to choose one’s
own work and powerful economic interests in protecting property
and investments.  They also have the potential for dramatically
affecting the overall climate for innovation, competition, and
economic growth.
The fundamental and common problem of existing approaches to
inevitable misappropriation is that they focus almost exclusively and
somewhat simplistically on protecting the employer’s property
interests in its trade secrets.491  Courts ask whether the trade secrets
will be inevitably misappropriated and provide all-or-nothing relief
based on their answer.492  Although there is a discussion of the
balance of interests including the employee’s interests in freedom to
work and control her human capital and the employer’s interest in
protecting its trade secrets, the central focus of the doctrine on the
state of the employer’s trade secrets does not allow for evaluations of
relative value or partial inevitability.  The same singular emphasis in
providing remedies leads courts to provide crude all-or-nothing
protection to an employer’s trade secrets, without reference to
relative value or intermediate and accurate relief.
Academic responses to these problems fall short of providing an
acceptable solution.493  Proposals for total acceptance or rejection of
the doctrine are too extreme to balance the interests involved, while
recognition of concurrent property interests conflicts with new
developments in the system of trade secret protection.
The correct approach to the doctrine of inevitable
misappropriation can be found not by looking forward to these
existing and proposed legal doctrines, but by fundamentally shifting
perspective back to an older legal doctrine.  The appropriate insight
into solving the problems of the current doctrine can be derived
from the law of accession.494  Rather than centrally concerning
                                                 
491. See discussion supra Part II.A.2.
492. See discussion supra Part II.A.3 (reporting the inadequacy and inconsistency of all-or-
nothing remedies).
493. See discussion supra Part II.B (providing an overview of current proposals).
494. See discussion supra Part III.C (describing the accession law approach).
themselves with the employer’s trade secrets, courts should instead
focus on the employee as a combination of employer and employee
interests.  Instead of viewing the problem as an inquiry into the status
of a simple, discrete property interest (the trade secrets) and
struggling to balance it against other interests (the employee’s
human capital and right to work), courts should approach the
question as a determination of the ownership and control of a
combined or transformed property interest (the employee and her
employment) made up of employer and employee interests.
Accession law, which has, since Blackstone’s time, developed a subtle
and nuanced approach to allocating the ownership of transformed
and combined property, can offer a coherent and well-developed
approach to the modern question of who controls these
combinations of human capital and trade secrets.  Expanding the
accession approach to include penalties for unmeritorious motions to
enjoin employees can also balance the incentives and power positions
of employers and employees and ensure that doctrine will not be
applied lightly.
Finding an accession law solution to inevitable misappropriation
doctrine problems also suggests two larger observations.  First, similar
approaches might be useful in other areas of intellectual property
law.  For example, the continually developing law of derivative works
and the parody fair-use exception in copyright law might benefit
from an accession law analysis.495  These and other areas involve the
                                                 
495. Just as in accession law, courts reviewing injunctions against the distribution or
exploitation of derivative works which are based on underlying original works (such as movies
based on books) have debated about whether the relative value of the transformed/combined
derivative work should play a role in granting relief.  Compare Rohauer v. Killiam Shows, Inc.,
551 F.2d 484, 493-94 (2d Cir. 1977) (allowing the derivative copyright holder to show and
exploit the film even after the copyright of the underlying work was renewed and the film rights
were reassigned because “[t]he equities lie preponderantly in favor of the proprietor of the
derivative copyright” who will “often have made contributions literary, musical and economic as
great or greater than the original author”), with Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 228, 236 (1990)
(denying derivative copyright holders the ability to show and exploit “Rear Window” the holder
of renewed copyright of the underlying short story “It Had to Be Murder” and suggesting that
arguments regarding policies behind copyright “are better addressed by Congress than the
courts”).
As noted above, accession law inquires into the relative value contributed by both parties.  See
supra notes 341-60 and accompanying text.  In addition, as in accession law, courts analyzing
whether one work should be considered a derivative work of another have asked whether the
allegedly derivative work physically incorporates the original work and thus, cannot be
separated therefrom.  Compare Midway Mfg. Co. v. Artic Int’l, Inc., 704 F.2d 1009, 1011 (7th Cir.
1983) (holding that the circuit board that speeds video game play is an infringing derivative
work), with Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 964 F.2d 965, 972 (9th Cir. 1992)
(holding that a video game device that does not incorporate a copyrighted work in some
concrete or permanent form is not a derivative infringing work).
Courts ruling on whether a work constitutes a derivative work of a copyrighted original
combination and transformation of several persons’ intellectual
property and labor, and present similar questions about efficient
allocation of controlled value for that property.  Taking an accession
approach in these areas might clarify the law or increase its flexibility
and efficiency just as it promises to in the area of trade secrets.
Second, and more generally, applying this ancient law solution to a
modern doctrinal problem reemphasizes the value of revisiting old
law when seeking to craft the new.  Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.,
directed us to look to history to understand the path of the law.496  In
part, this look into the past teaches us the limitations of present
justifications for legal rules.497
                                                 
engage in analysis similar to that of separability in accession law.  See supra notes 300-13 and
accompanying text (discussing the test of identification and severability).  Recent decisions
upholding the fair use of original works in parody have relied in part on accession-law-like
concepts, such as transformation.  See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 582
(1994) (discussing 2 Live Crew’s incorporation of some Roy Orbison lyrics into their parody
and upholding it as a fair use in part because of its transformative qualities).
Again, this focus on transformation echoes the emphasis on transformation shifting
ownership and control in accession law.  See supra notes 318-22 and accompanying text
(describing tests of identity and value enhancement).  These discussions suggest that perhaps a
deeper or more direct application of the accession law principles to derivative and parody
copyright law might prove just as rewarding as the application of these concepts in the
inevitable misappropriation of trade secrets context.
496. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 473-74 (1897)
(discussing the need to study history to understand the rational scope of the law); see also
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (Dover Publications 1991) (1881) (“In
order to know what [the law] is, we must know what it has been, and what it tends to become.”)
[hereinafter HOLMES].
497. According to Holmes, the rationale for legal rules “from more primitive times” changes
as new reasons for the rules, “more fitted to the [current] time,” replace the old.  See HOLMES,
supra note 496, at 37, 36.  “The old form receives a new content, and in time even the form
modifies itself to fit the meaning which it has received.”  Id. at 5.  In one way, perhaps, just one
such evolution is occurring:  The old forms of accession are now reapplied and justified by new
reasons of efficiency and innovation (instead of, perhaps, labor theories of value).  In another,
just the converse is occurring:  New problems in new forms (inevitable misappropriations)
implicated old issues and rationales (dividing or allocating mixed or transformed property).
The new form is thus shaped by old content.
